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Commercial air travel is widely regarded as one of the safest methods of 
transportation in terms of fatalities per distance travelled, and the annual 
number of fatal airliner accidents has been in decline since the end of the 
Second World War.  However, a small but significant number of fatal 
accidents still occur each year, indicating that there is scope for further 
improvement in flight safety.  A review of airliner safety statistics 
concluded that the greatest proportion of fatal accidents over the last ten 
years have occurred in the approach and landing phase of flight.  In spite of 
recent advances in flight deck automation for large transport aircraft, 
certain piloting tasks are still performed manually by the pilot.  The flare 
manoeuvre (an aft longitudinal stick input in the final moments before 
touchdown) is an example of such a task, and is often undertaken based 
solely upon the visual information available through the windscreen.  
Previous studies have shown the flare to be considered the most difficult 
piloting task undertaken during typical fixed-wing missions.  Additionally, 
there is no single consensus amongst the existing body of work as to the 
precise nature of the piloting strategies used to perform the flare 
manoeuvre.  Recent studies at the University of Liverpool (UoL) have 
sought to apply theories of visual perception to such piloting tasks in order 
to gain an understanding of how pilots make use of the available visual 
information.  In particular, the optical parameter “time-to-contact”, or “tau” 
( ) has been shown to provide an appropriate basis for understanding and 
modelling pilot behaviour for “gap closure” type manoeuvres.  Such 
manoeuvres, of which the flare is an example, involve the pilot controlling 
the motion of the aircraft between a specified start and end point.  The 
overall aim of the work reported in this Thesis was to build upon these 
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findings to further develop the current and future roles of tau theory in 
fixed-wing piloting tasks.   
The first objective of this research was to establish the nature of the 
strategy used by pilots to initiate the flare manoeuvre.  A number of 
previous studies have investigated this area, often with conflicting results; 
this study, therefore, sought to identify and address some of the limitations 
of these previous investigations.  A piloted simulation experiment was 
undertaken using a model of a generic large transport aircraft (GLTA) in 
the HELIFLIGHT simulator at UoL.  The results suggested that pilots use 
a constant, critical value of time-to-contact with runway,   , to initiate the 
flare manoeuvre.  In addition it was demonstrated that commanding flare 
initiation at a constant value of     through use of a Head Up Display 
(HUD) resulted in more successful manoeuvres (in terms of vertical 
velocity at touchdown,     ) than any of the other parameters tested.  This 
further demonstrated the appropriateness of the tau-based flare initiation 
strategy. 
The second aspect of the work presented in this Thesis was concerned with 
the development and evaluation of a tau-based pilot aid for the flare 
manoeuvre.  This was based on both the findings of the flare initiation 
investigation and of a previous study at UoL.  The concept was used to 
drive a set of HUD symbology which was implemented onto the GLTA 
simulation model to enable piloted evaluation.  The tau-based HUD was 
evaluated against both a baseline Head Down Display (HDD) and an in-
service example HUD in a piloted simulation experiment.  The results 
showed that the tau-based concept provided a performance advantage over 
the baseline HDD, and performance comparable with the in-service 
example HUD.  Recommendations were made for further refinement of the 
concept in future design iterations. 
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A previous study at UoL identified two types of tau-based piloting strategy 
for the flare manoeuvre.  Specifically, it had been observed that pilots used 
either a strategy in which the aircraft performed a continuous vertical 
deceleration until touchdown (“type 1” ), or a strategy in which the vertical 
deceleration was completed before touchdown (“type 2”).  In the case of 
the type 2 flare, the deceleration phase was typically followed by a phase 
of approximately constant vertical velocity.  A piloted simulation 
experiment was undertaken to test the hypothesis that the type 2 flare 
strategy was adopted to compensate for the paucity of the visual 
information available, i.e. the fact that the pilots could not directly observe 
the landing gear.  Three groups of novice pilots performed a simplified 
flare task using varying levels of visual information; the standard 
windscreen view, a simulated video feed showing the main gear and a 
HUD representation of the main gear.  The results supported the 
hypothesis, and also showed that an improvement in performance could be 
derived from enabling the pilot to directly observe the gap closure formed 
by the landing gear and the runway. 
The final aspect of this study sought to extend the tau-based approach to 
fixed-wing flight control to other phases of flight.  To this end, two 
methods of tau-based pilot modelling for fixed-wing aircraft were 
described and evaluated.  The first of these computed a tau-based reference 
trajectory that was passed through a conventional stability control 
augmentation system (SCAS) in order to minimise the error between it and 
the aircraft’s current trajectory.  The second method used an approximation 
of the inverse dynamics of the aircraft to generate the appropriate open-
loop control input.  The error minimisation model was shown to provide 
appropriate guidance for a typical range of manoeuvres for a light fixed-
wing training aircraft.  The perfect control method was shown to provide 
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appropriate guidance for the single manoeuvre tested, and as such was 
recommended for further investigation. 
Overall, through the investigation of piloting strategy, this study showed 
the current role of tau theory to be as an appropriate, succinct method of 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter defines the context, scope and rationale of the work presented 
in this Thesis. 
1.1. Air Transport Safety 
Air travel is widely regarded as being one of the safest modes of transport; 
for example, Ref. 1 conducted a review of fatalities per distance travelled 
for a variety of common transport methods (worldwide statistics for year 
2000).  The results of this analysis are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Fatality rates for common modes 
of transport for year 2000.  Data from Ref. 1. 
Figure 1 shows that, by the measure of fatalities per distance travelled for a 
given year (2000), air transport was approximately 10 times safer than rail 
transport, and approximately 2000 safer than road transport.  However, a 
number of fatal accidents involving passenger aircraft still occur annually, 
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and it could be argued that air travel is not truly safe, but rather the option 
with the lowest level of associated risk.  For example, Ref. 2 states that in 
2011 there were 401 fatalities from accidents involving passenger aircraft.  
Ref. 3 demonstrated that the annual number of fatal airliner accidents had 
been in continuous decline since the end of the Second World War, largely 
due to advances in civilian aircraft design and improved safety standards.  
The number of fatal civilian airline accidents for the period 1999-2011 is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of fatal airliner accidents 
by phase of flight 1999 – 2011.  Data from 
Ref. 4. 
Note that the definition of an airliner and the sources of these statistics are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Figure 2 shows that the total number of fatal 
accidents conforms to the downwards trend identified by Ref. 3, decreasing 
from 45 in 1999 to 20 in 2011; a reduction of 56%.  Figure 2 also shows 
that, for the years 2007 – 2011, the greatest proportion of fatal airliner 
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accidents occurred in the approach and landing phase of flight.  Indeed, in 
2011 fatal accidents in this phase of flight accounted for over half the total 
number (11 out of 20).  Additionally, the statistics show that the number of 
fatal accidents in the approach and landing phase of flight increased in the 
years 2007 – 2011, representing a reversal of the previously observed 
downward trend.   
The final phase of the approach and landing task is the flare manoeuvre, 
the primary objective of which is to reduce the aircraft’s vertical velocity to 
an appropriate value for touchdown [5].  This is achieved by the 
application of an aft longitudinal stick input, which raises the nose of the 
aircraft and causes a vertical deceleration.  In addition to achieving an  
appropriate touchdown velocity, the pilot must also ensure that the aircraft 
is accurately positioned on the runway both laterally and longitudinally.  
The consequences of misjudging any of these elements can be extremely 
serious, ranging from passenger discomfort to complete loss of the aircraft.  
For example, initiating the flare too early can result in the aircraft 
“ballooning” (overflying the normal touchdown position) and overshooting 
the end of the runway.  Such an incident led to the total loss of the Air 
France Airbus A340 in 2005 shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Air France Airbus A340 total 
destroyed following runway overshoot, 
Toronto Airport 2005.  Image from Ref. 6. 
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Although there were no fatalities as a result of this particular incident, it led 
to the loss of an aircraft with an estimated value of £128 million [6], and 
legal proceedings against the operator.  Similarly, initiating the flare too 
late can result in hard landings, which can also have serious consequences.  
Figure 4 shows structural damage to an All Nippon Airways Boeing 767 
following a hard landing at Tokyo Narita Airport in June 2012 [7]. 
 
Figure 4.  Structural damage to All Nippon 
Airways Boeing 767 following hard landing 
in June 2012.  Image from Ref. 7. 
The aircraft shown in Figure 4 was a modern, well equipped aircraft 
undertaking a routine approach and landing in benign weather conditions 
[7].  The pilot performed a late flare, which left insufficient time for the 
aircraft to decelerate (vertically) before main gear touchdown.  As a result, 
the large touchdown “bump” caused the aircraft to become airborne and 
subsequently land on the nose wheel.  Although the resultant damage is 
less obvious than that shown in Figure 3, the underlying structural damage 
also resulted in this aircraft being removed from service [7].  Further 
discussion on incidents during the flare manoeuvre can be found in Section 
2.3. 
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Ref. 8 surveyed a sample of 134 pilots of varying experience levels, and 
found that the majority considered the flare to be the most difficult 
manoeuvre undertaken during typical missions.  This combination of the 
flare being both difficult to execute correctly and of critical importance to 
the safety of the aircraft offers an explanation for the high proportion of 
fatal accidents in this phase of flight shown in Figure 2.  Although a 
number of modern aircraft types are capable of fully-automatic landings 
(given a suitably equipped airfield), the flare manoeuvre is often carried 
out manually by the pilot [3].  Indeed, many regulatory bodies for pilot 
licensing mandate that pilots must undertake a certain number of manual 
landings in a given period in order to maintain proficiency.  For example, 
Federal Airworthiness Regulation (FAR) 121 specifies that pilots must 
perform at least three manual landings in a 90 day period, and that failure 
to do so will result in their currency rating being invalidated [9].  In such 
cases, the pilot relies primarily on the view through the cockpit windscreen 
for guidance; a practice which varies significantly from typical tasks for 
large transport aircraft.  Indeed, Ref. 3 discussed the concept of the pilot as 
a “systems monitor”, distanced from manual piloting tasks by the 
complexity and high levels of automation of modern flight decks.  Training 
literature and aircraft operating manuals suggest that the flare manoeuvre 
itself is not fully understood from a piloting perspective.  For example, 
Ref. 5 states “learning when to initiate the flare manoeuvre is a matter of 
trial and error”, and the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) for the 
Boeing 767 [10] states that the flare should be initiated at “approximately 
50ft”.  Given the previously stated potential consequences of a piloting 
error during the flare, it can be concluded that a better understanding of the 
underlying piloting strategy would be beneficial to flight safety.  This 
argument forms the basis of the work described in this Thesis, and is 
expanded into the specific objectives described in Section 1.3. 
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1.2. The Perception of Motion 
The concept of using sensory information to execute a flare manoeuvre has 
its origins in the natural world, and can be observed in the flight of a wide 
variety of flying creatures [11].  In particular, it has been shown that birds 
make use of visual information to guide their motion [12].  Recent studies 
at the University of Liverpool (UoL) have sought to apply the ecological 
approach to visual perception to a range of piloting tasks.  This approach is 
based on the concept that all the information necessary to guide the 
observer’s motion can be perceived directly from the “optical flow”; the 
motion of surfaces within their field of vision [13].  As an example of the 
visual information that can be directly perceived from the optical flow, 
Ref. 14 introduced the parameter “time-to-contact”, or “tau” ( ), defined as 
the time to close to an obstacle or surface at the current closure rate.  A 
number of subsequent studies demonstrated the use of tau as a basis for 
modelling visually guided motion of animals [14-19].  This concept was 
applied to pilots of simulated rotary-wing vehicles by Ref. 21, with the 
results showing a close correlation between the trajectory of the aircraft 
and one generated based on the tau-model.  Additionally, Ref. 17 
concluded that the tau-based approach to modelling pilot guidance 
strategies was eminently suitable for extension to other manoeuvres. 
On this basis, Ref. 3 sought to apply tau-based strategies to the (fixed-
wing) flare manoeuvre.  The results suggested that tau does indeed provide 
a framework for modelling pilot behaviour during manual flare 
manoeuvres.  Furthermore, a tau-based pilot aid was developed to provide 
guidance for the flare when the normal visual scene was degraded, for 
example by weather conditions.  However, Ref. 3 by no means provides a 
definitive understanding of the tau-based approach to the flare manoeuvre, 
and included a number of recommendations for further work.  By building 
upon these, the work presented in this Thesis aims to further develop the 
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understanding of the piloting strategies used for the flare manoeuvre, as 
well as expanding the application of tau in fixed-wing flight to new areas. 
1.3. Research Aims & Objectives 
Whilst a number of previous studies have been undertaken in this area of 
research, they have left a number of research questions unanswered.  Those 
of particular relevance to the work described in this Thesis are detailed 
below: 
1. The landing phase of flight has been shown to be both the most 
difficult and potentially dangerous aspects of fixed-wing flight 
(Section 2.1.4).  Although Ref. 3 made some progress in terms of 
developing an understanding of the piloting strategies relevant to 
this manoeuvre, the process is still not completely understood.  For 
example, pilot training literature states “learning when to initiate 
the flare is a matter of trial and error” [5].  Although this may be 
appropriate for pilots of light aircraft, it is not a sufficient basis for 
the development of pilot aids or autonomous systems, both of 
which are becoming increasingly common in civil aviation [22]. 
2. The majority of the previous body of work in this area of research 
has been related to rotary-wing flight.  Although Ref. 3 made a 
significant contribution to the investigation of fixed-wing flight, the 
field of rotary-wing pilot strategy identification and modelling 
remains the more advanced.  For example, Ref. 23 describes the 
development of a tau-based control system for a helicopter; no such 
studies have been undertaken for fixed-wing aircraft. 
3. Ref. 3 described the development and evaluation of a tau-based 
pilot aid for the flare manoeuvre, which was evaluated against 
conventional solutions with some success.  Whilst this established 
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the potential merits of the concept, a number of questions remain 
unanswered regarding the appropriate flare strategy and the 
implementation of the pilot aid.  Additionally, although two distinct 
piloting strategies were observed, the reasons for this were not 
investigated in detail.  These topics are discussed in detail in 
Section 2.3.2. 
In order to address these gaps in the existing field of knowledge, the 
following objectives were defined for this project: 
1. To investigate the strategy used by pilots of fixed-wing aircraft to 
determine when to initiate the landing flare manoeuvre.  This was 
to be approached from such a way as to include features 
representative of the real-life piloting task.  Additionally, an 
investigation was to be made into the relationship between the flare 
initiation point and the achieved performance of the subsequent 
flare manoeuvre, as this has been shown to be of critical 
importance to the safety of the aircraft. 
2. To build on the findings of Ref. 3 to develop a tau-based pilot aid 
for the flare manoeuvre.  This was to vary from the previous study 
by making use of an alternative tau-based strategy and method of 
implementation to address the limitations of Ref. 3.  
3. To undertake an investigation into the variations in flare strategy 
(“type 1” and “type 2”) reported but not further investigated by 
Ref. 3.  It was intended that fulfilment of this objective would also 
address the previously highlighted knowledge gap in this area of 
research. 
4. To develop and evaluate tau-based pilot modelling methods for 
fixed-wing aircraft. 
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It was thus proposed that these objectives would provide an appropriate 
balance between expanding the work undertaken by Ref. 3 and research 
into areas not previously covered. 
1.4. Scope, Structure & Content 
In order to adhere to the remit of the project, certain aspects of the area of 
research defined in Section 1.2 have necessarily been omitted or 
simplified.  The first such simplification relates to the nature of tau theory, 
one of the fundamental concepts behind the work reported in this Thesis.  
A substantial body of work exists which debates, from a psychological 
point of view, the relative merits of tau versus other models of perception.  
Although this Thesis features input from theories of visual perception, it is 
primarily intended as an engineering study into a real-world problem.  It is 
not intended, therefore, that this Thesis should seek to prove the validity of 
tau theory in terms of perception of motion.  Rather, it builds upon the 
(often compelling) evidence of tau theory as a convenient method of 
describing a range of aircraft manoeuvres in terms of a simple, temporal 
variable.  This body of evidence is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
It should also be noted that the experimental work undertaken during the 
course of this study relied primarily upon flight simulation, as opposed to 
testing of real aircraft.  Aside from the obvious benefits of simulation (cost 
/ availability), this method simplified the capture and analysis of flight test 
data by removing the reliance on sensors, which are often identified as 
sources of error [15]. Additionally, the certification issues relating to 
testing of novel display types would have been prohibitively rigorous and 
expensive to be considered appropriate for this project.  The simulation 
facilities used for the purposes of this study have been used for a 
significant number of previous studies [17], and as such were considered a 
sufficiently accurate representation of the real aircraft environment.  This 
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included the provision of motion and audio cues to the pilot in order to 
complement the visual cues that were the primary focus of this study. 
This Thesis is divided into eight Chapters, each with a specific purpose in 
terms of the aims and objectives defined in Section 1.3.  Chapter 2 
describes the relevant existing research in this area, and traces the 
development of tau theory from its conception through to its application to 
aerospace scenarios.  Also included within this Chapter is a review of 
aviation safety statistics, which defines the scale of the problem of fatal 
airliner accidents.  Chapter 3 details the equipment, software and methods 
common to the experiments detailed in the subsequent Chapters.  Chapters 
4 to 7 each describe the method and results of experiments based on the 
common theme of the use of tau-based piloting strategies.  The 
implications of these results on the overall research objectives are 
discussed in the concluding Chapter 8. 
1.5. Originality and Novelty 
In order to satisfy its remit as a PhD thesis, the work described in this study 
must constitute an original contribution to learning.  This can be achieved 
by satisfying one or more of the following criteria [24]: 
1. The discovery of entirely new knowledge 
2. The expansion of knowledge in an existing field 
3. The explanation or connection of previously observed results 
4. Revision of established views 
The aspects of the research detailed in this Thesis which satisfy these 
novelty criteria are highlighted within the body of their respective 
Chapters.  For reasons of clarity, these are also stated explicitly below: 
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1. The investigation into flare initiation strategy presented in Chapter 
4 represents a new approach to a previously investigated subject.  
As such, this constitutes a revision of established views.  
Additionally, the investigation of the relationship between flare 
initiation point and task performance presented in this Chapter has 
not been previously undertaken. 
2. The development of a pilot aid based on a “type 2” (three-phase) 
stage flare strategy described in Chapter 5 is entirely novel, 
satisfying the first of the previously stated novelty criteria.  In 
addition, this represents an expansion of the work undertaken by 
Ref. 3. 
3. The flare strategy investigation reported in Chapter 6 represents a 
novel investigation in order to explain a previously observed result.  
As such, this investigation fulfils both the requirement for the 
discovery of new knowledge and the explanation of previously 
observed results. 
4. It has previously been stated that no study has been undertaken to 
develop a tau-based pilot model for a fixed-wing aircraft.  For this 
reason, the development of such a model, as described in Chapter 
7, constitutes an entirely novel exercise. 
  12 
C h a p t e r  2  
TECHNICAL REVIEW 
In order to establish the context and objectives of the work described in 
this Thesis, a review of relevant existing studies was undertaken.  The 
primary objective of the technical review was, therefore, the identification 
of research questions; areas in which the existing body of work has left 
questions unanswered, or indeed unasked. 
2.1. Aviation Safety Statistics Review 
An underlying rationale for this study was defined in Chapter 1 as the 
improvement of flight safety.  In order to maximise the effectiveness of the 
research effort, it was deemed necessary to focus on the area with the 
greatest scope for improvement.  To enable the identification of this area, a 
review of aviation safety statistics was conducted.  Such a review was also 
conducted by a previous study [3], the findings of which are briefly 
summarised in the following Section. 
2.1.1. Previous Findings 
Ref. 3 investigated fatal accident statistics for commercial aircraft, 
including aircraft operating under Title 14, Parts 121 and 135 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations [9].  The findings were divided into three primary 
areas: 
 Phase of flight – The typical operation of a fixed-wing aircraft was 
broken down into a number of phases including takeoff, approach / 
landing, cruise and ground operations. It was found that for 
commercial aircraft, the majority of fatal accidents occurred during 
the approach / landing phase of flight. 
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 Type of aircraft – Fatal accident statistics were analysed for three 
classes of aircraft; “Piston”, aircraft powered by piston engines; 
“Prop”, advanced propeller-powered aircraft types, e.g. turboprop; 
and “Jet”, turbine powered aircraft.  The overall trend showed that, 
since the mid 1980s, the majority of fatal accidents have occurred 
for the Prop class of aircraft, followed by Jet.  The number of 
accidents attributed to piston powered aircraft has fallen steadily 
since the post-war period, potentially as a result of the reduced 
numbers of piston powered aircraft in service. 
 Causal factors – The primary causal factor for the fatal accident 
statistics was “loss of control in flight”, and this occurred most 
often during the approach / landing and takeoff phases of flight.  
The weather conditions at the time of the accident were also found 
to be significant causal factors, with the statistics showing that the 
number of fatal accidents increased in times of reduced visibility. 
The finding of the statistics review in Ref. 3 provided an overview of fatal 
airliner accidents for the period 1983 – 1999.  One of the objectives of this 
new review was, therefore, to investigate the data for the more recent 
period.  This would enable a decision to be made as to whether the area of 
research selected by Ref. 3 was still valid for further investigation. 
2.1.2. Scope 
In order to address one of the limitations of the previous review, a single 
definition of an “airliner” was used for the purposes of this study.  In order 
to be defined as an airliner, the following criteria had to be satisfied: 
 Multi-engine aircraft with a capacity of 15 or more passengers and 
crew. 
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 Domestic and international (scheduled and non-scheduled) 
passenger flights 
 Ferry and repositioning flights 
 Cargo flights with non-crew personnel on board 
 Private and executive flights 
These criteria were established to give a representative sample of typical 
airliner operations.  Aircraft similar to those included in this definition are 
sometimes involved in operations with a greater inherent risk.  For 
example, a number of fixed-wing transport aircraft have both civilian and 
military variants [25].  Although the aircraft itself may be very similar in 
each case, the nature of military operations can lead to a greatly increased 
risk of an incident occurring.  In addition, information relating to military 
incidents is not as widely available as that relating to civilian airliners.  For 
these reasons, the following have been excluded from the criteria: 
 Military operations 
 Military executive transport 
 Hijackings and other illegal activities / acts of terrorism 
 Test and training flights 
 Ground casualties 
As with the survey in Ref. 3, only fatal accidents were considered.  This is 
because these tend to be the more serious incidents, and are generally more 
rigorously documented as a consequence. 
In order to provide continued validation for the choice of area of research, 
a part of the project has been dedicated to generating a database of all fatal 
airliner accidents for the period 1999-2011 (Appendix A).  This has also 
allowed the previously defined criteria for airliner to be used to filter the 
fatal accident data to ensure the relevance of the analyses. 
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2.1.3. Sources of Data 
Since the widespread introduction of flight data recorders (FDRs) in the 
1960s, a wealth of information has been collected relating to air accidents.  
In the event of an accident, the data is often analysed by a number of 
parties, including: 
 The operator of the aircraft 
 The manufacturer of the aircraft 
 A government agency of the country in which the accident 
occurred 
 A government agency of the country in which the aircraft was 
registered 
 Independent safety organisations 
For this reason, there is an abundance of pre-analysed data available for 
any given accident.  For example, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
is an organisation tasked with “Ensuring that UK civil aviation standards 
are set and achieved” [26].  The CAA produces aviation statistics reports 
approximately every four years, which include accidents both in the UK 
and worldwide.  The main advantage of such reports for the purposes of 
this study is the depth of analysis involved, which enables details such as 
causal factors to be established.  However, the complexity of such analyses 
means that the final conclusions may be reached a number of years after 
the accident occurred.  For this reason, information from CAA publications 
was used for the analysis of causal factors presented in this Chapter, but an 
additional data source was sought to provide up-to-date statistics for broad 
analysis of trends in flight safety. 
The Aviation Safety Network (ASN) is an independent organisation with 
the aim of "Providing everyone with a (professional) interest in aviation 
with up-to-date, complete and reliable authoritative information on 
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airliner accidents and safety issues" [4].  The main advantage of this 
source is that, although the accident reports are initially sparse in detail, it 
is regularly updated from a number of primary sources as new information 
becomes available.  For basic information such as aircraft type and number 
of casualties, therefore, this was deemed to be an appropriate source of 
data.  In addition, the ASN is not a government body of a particular 
country, and so gives equal priority to worldwide incidents regardless of 
their location [4].  Although the ASN itself provides yearly statistics 
reviews, it was decided that a more consistent and project-relevant review 
could be constructed by analysing individual accident reports.  This 
resulted in the generation of a airliner fatal accident database (Appendix A) 
upon which the analyses in this Section are based. 
2.1.4. Phase of Flight 
One of the significant conclusions of the aviation safety statistics review 
reported in Ref. 3 was that the approach / landing phase accounted for the 
majority of fatal commercial air accidents.  One of the first objectives of 
this new review, therefore, was to update the phase of flight statistics for 
the years 1999 – 2011 and to verify that the approach / landing phase was 
appropriate for further pilot aid development. 
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Figure 5.  Fatal airliner accidents by phase of 
flight 1999 - 2011.  Data from Ref. 4. 
Figure 5 shows fatal airliner accidents by phase of flight for the years 1999 
– 2011 [4].  The statistics feature a downward trend in the overall number 
of fatal accidents during the eleven year period, with the number in 2011 
being less than half the 1999 figure (20 vs. 45).  Indeed, Ref. 27 states that 
2011 was, with a few notable exceptions, the safest ever year for air travel.  
This concurs with the downward trend in number of fatal air accidents 
since the mid 1990s identified in Ref. 3.  For nine of the last thirteen years, 
the majority of fatal air accidents have occurred in the approach / landing 
phase of flight.  Indeed, for the years 2008 – 2011, accidents in this phase 
accounted for half of the total worldwide figure.  This result is not 
necessarily unexpected, as operations close to the ground inevitably carry a 
higher risk than others.  For this reason, it seems appropriate to conclude 
that there is further scope for improvement in the safety measures for this 
phase of flight. 
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2.1.5. Aircraft Type 
The definition of an airliner given in Section 2.2.1 encompasses a wide 
range of aircraft and mission types.  For the purposes of this review, the 
range of airliners currently in service worldwide was divided into the 
following categories: 
 Commuter Airlines (CA) – The smallest type of airliner, with a 
capacity of approximately 15-20 passengers and crew.  Typical 
examples include the de Havilland Canada DHC-6 and the 
Beechcraft 1900 [25].  Such aircraft are generally used for short 
flights over remote or otherwise inaccessible terrain.  Note this 
category also includes private and executive aircraft types which 
fulfil the capacity criteria (Figure 6a). 
 Regional Airlines (RA) – This is a wider category, including 
aircraft with a capacity of up to 100 passengers and crew, for 
example the ATR 42 and the Fokker F27 Friendship [25].  
Regional airlines generally include domestic or short-haul 
international flights, often to destinations which cannot be served 
by larger aircraft due to runway length restrictions.  Turboprop 
engines are the most common propulsion type for this class of 
aircraft (Figure 6b). 
 Narrow-body jets (NB) – The popular perception of an airliner is 
very much focused on the NB and Wide-body (WB) aircraft 
categories.  NB includes single aisle (referring to the internal 
seating configuration) jets with a capacity of approximately 100 – 
250 passengers and crew.  Typical missions include longer 
domestic and short-haul international routes.  Traditionally, this 
class of aircraft was dominated by the large US companies, most 
notably Boeing.  However, in recent years the European 
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conglomerate Airbus has made significant inroads into this market, 
with over 3800 “A320 Family” aircraft sold [28] (Figure 6c). 
 Wide-body jets (WB) – The first flight of the Boeing 747 in 1969 
marked the creation of the wide-body, multi-aisle jet class of 
aircraft [25].  The design and role of these aircraft is an evolution of 
the NB concept – larger aircraft, higher passenger density or longer 
flights.  The market situation is similar to the NB class, with 
Boeing traditionally dominating but Airbus making significant 
gains since the 1990s [28].  Other aircraft in the WB class include 
the Airbus A330 / A340 and A380, as well as the Boeing 777 
(Figure 6d). 
 Supersonic transport (SST) – Passenger-carrying aircraft which are 
capable of sustained supersonic cruise.  The highly publicised 
incident of July 2000 described in Ref. 29 is the sole instance of a 
fatal air accident involving an in-service supersonic passenger 
aircraft.  With the retirement of the Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde in 
2003, the safety statistics for this class of aircraft are unlikely to 
change for the foreseeable future.  The only other aircraft in this 
class to enter service was the Tupolev Tu-144, but this was retired 
in 1978 following a number of incidents (one fatal) in pre-delivery 
testing [30] (Figure 6e). 
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Figure 6.  Examples of commercial airliners 
types.  Images from Ref. 31 
Safety statistics were analysed for each of these aircraft types, in terms of 
number of fatal accidents (Figure 7).  In order to incorporate the variation 
in passenger capacities for the different aircraft types, statistics for the total 
numbers of fatalities were also analysed.  The purpose of this was to 
identify the aircraft type with the maximum scope for improvement in 
safety. 
 
Figure 7.  Worldwide fatal airliner accidents 
by phase of flight 1999 – 2011.  Data from 
Ref. 4. 
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Figure 7 shows worldwide fatal airliner accidents by phase of flight 1999 – 
2011 [4].  The statistics are dominated by the smaller aircraft types, with 
RA and CA accounting for 67% of the fatal accidents during the 1999 – 
2011 period.  In order to explain this, the following contributory factors 
should be considered: 
 The unit cost of a typical RA aircraft is significantly lower than for 
larger aircraft types.  For example, the unit price of a Bombardier 
Dash 8 Q400 (80 seats) is approximately $27m [31], compared 
with approximately $62m for an Airbus A318 (109 seats) [31].  For 
this reason, the onboard safety equipment is often less advanced, 
with a lower degree of automation and redundancy.  Specifically, 
many RA aircraft  operating in the USA are subject to FAA 
(Federal Aviation Authority) FAR 23 (Federal Airworthy 
Requirement), which includes requirements for “Normal, utility, 
aerobatic and commuter category airplanes” [9].  By contrast, the 
FAA airworthiness requirements for larger aircraft such as the 
Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 are defined by FAR 25 “Transport 
category airplanes” [9].  An example of how these two 
specifications differ is that FAR 25 states that cockpit 
instrumentation must have “Two or more independent sources of 
electrical energy”, whereas there is no such requirement in FAR 
23.  Such differences are common throughout the specifications, 
the summation of which represents a significant difference in safety 
standards between aircraft adhering to the respective requirements. 
 Pilot training and competence has been highlighted as a potential 
safety issue for regional airliners, and the accident report Ref. 32 
includes a number of recommendations to the FAA on this subject.  
Specifically, it was stated that pilots must disclose information 
relating to previously failed assessments and examinations to the 
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airline to allow provision of extra training.  In addition, it was 
found that best practice for sterile cockpit conditions are routinely 
not adhered to by aircrew employed by regional airlines.  Crew 
fatigue was also highlighted as a factor likely to affect 
performance.  Ref. 33 found that up to 80% of regional airline 
pilots admitted to having unintentionally fallen asleep during a 
flight.  Ref. 33 proposed changes to crew management practices to 
reduce the risks associated with fatigued aircrew.  The fact that 
these recommendations were aimed exclusively at regional airlines 
rather than larger carriers suggests that this is an issue which is 
specific to RA aircraft operations. 
 The mission profile of RA / CA aircraft types often involves flights 
to relatively small or remote airports, which may feature a lower 
standard of safety infrastructure than a larger airport.  For example 
the most advanced ILS (Instrument Landing System), CAT IIIC, is 
capable of facilitating fully automatic landings in 0m visibility [3].  
However, once the aircraft is on the ground, further ILS guidance is 
required to allow safe navigation of taxiways, making the necessary 
infrastructure extremely expensive and therefore limited to major 
airports.  In addition, conventional ILS is only capable of assisting 
“straight in” approaches due to the sensitivity of the system to 
variations in terrain [3]. Such approaches are not always feasible at 
airports in mountainous or densely populated urban environments 
which are most commonly used by CA and RA aircraft types, for 
example Tenzing-Hillary Airfield in Nepal (Figure 8).  In this 
instance, the terrain obstructs the area directly in line with the 
runway, resulting in a modified approach path. 
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Figure 8.Tenzing-Hillary Airport, Lukla, 
Nepal.  (Photo: Author). 
In order to gain a better understanding of the typical mission profiles of the 
various aircraft types specified by this review, aircraft utilisation statistics 
were analysed (Figure 9).  For the purposes of this analysis, it can be 
assumed that “turboprop” aircraft equate approximately to CA and RA 
aircraft types, and that “jet” equates approximately to NB and WB types. 
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Figure 9.  Utilisation data for jet and 
turboprop aircraft 1997 - 2006.  Data from 
Ref.4. 
Figure 9 shows utilisation data for jet and turboprop aircraft 1997 - 2006 
[4].  The statistics show that turboprop operations accounted for 
significantly fewer flights and hours flown than for jet aircraft.  
Conversely, it was shown in Figure 7 that CA and RA types accounted for 
the majority of fatal accidents over a similar time period.  A possible 
explanation for this is that that turboprop aircraft perform a greater number 
of landings per flight hour than jet aircraft – 0.52 for jet and 1.1 for 
turboprop [4].  It was previously shown that the approach and landing 
phase of flight is one of the most dangerous in terms of fatal accident 
numbers (Figure 5) leading to the conclusion that more time spent in this 
phase of flight would be expected to yield a greater number of fatal 
accidents. 
The aircraft in the RA class most commonly involved in fatal accidents are 
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1.  Regional airliners by number of 
fatal accidents 1999-2011 (top five).  Data 
from Ref.4. 
Manufacturer Model Nationality Capacity Fatal Accidents Fatalities 
Antonov AN 24/26/28 UA 44 30 659 
Antonov AN 12 UA 90 22 160 
Embraer 110/120 BR 37 13 116 
Fokker F27 
Friendship 
ND 56 11 145 
Antonov AN 32 UA 50 10 138 
The statistics show that the figures are dominated by one particular aircraft 
family (Antonov AN 24/26/28), which accounted for 35% of the fatal 
accidents in this category.  This significant number of accidents is partly a 
consequence of the large number of this aircraft type produced – 
approximately 2900 [31] between 1959 and 1993.  In comparison, 
approximately 850 examples of the Embraer 110/120 were manufactured, 
giving a higher number of fatal accidents per unit produced.  An additional 
contributory factor to the large number of Antonov aircraft crashes in the 
chosen time period is the age of aircraft – many of the 2900 examples 
produced would be nearing the end of their operational lifespan during the 
1999-2011 period.  This increases the probability of mechanical / structural 
failure compared to a newer aircraft. 
The exploded segments in Figure 7 represent the aircraft types considered 
to be “large transport” by Ref. 3.  In terms of fatal accident numbers this 
represents a total of 33%, suggesting that greater safety gains would be 
made by directing research towards other aircraft types.  However, as there 
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is a large variation in passenger capacity between the aircraft types, it is 
also necessary to consider the number of fatalities relating to these 
accidents.  This is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Worldwide fatalities from airliner 
accidents by phase of flight 1999 – 2011. 
Data from Ref. 4. 
The most significant feature of the data shown in Figure 10 is the high 
number of fatalities due to airliner accidents in the given period - a total of 
11,181.  Although this figure may appear low compared to the total 
number of passengers who completed safe flights (2011 estimate: 2.75 
billion [34]), it is still a significant number of lives lost.  This can be 
emphasised by considering the Air France Concorde crash of July 2000, in 
which 109 people were killed (plus 4 ground casualties) [29].  At the time 
this received high profile coverage in the international media, and criminal 
proceedings against employees of both Aerospatiale and Continental were 
ongoing for many years after the accident [29].  On this basis, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that society does not accept such incidents in the 
same way as, for example, fatal road accidents (2010 estimate of UK road 
fatalities: 1901 [35]).  The fact that this incident represents less than 1% of 
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the total fatalities for the period 1999-2011 highlights the magnitude of the 
total figure. 
By considering the number of fatalities rather than the number of fatal 
accidents, the trend observed in Figure 7 has been reversed; the statistics 
are dominated by the “large transport” types (NB and WB).  Such a finding 
supports the context of the research selected by Ref. 3, which focused on 
large transport aircraft.  To further explore the relationship between aircraft 
capacity and total fatalities, the largest contributions to the fatality statistics 
in Figure 10 are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Airliner fatalities – large transport 
aircraft 1999-2011 (top 5).  Data from Ref. 4 
Manufacturer Model Nationality Capacity Fatal Accidents Fatalities 
Boeing 737 US 215 32 2108 





US 172 10 818 
Airbus A320 EU 180 5 598 
Boeing 727 US 189 7 385 
As was the case for the RA class of aircraft, the statistics are dominated by 
a particular aircraft type; in this case the Boeing 737.  This can be 
attributed to the large market share associated with this aircraft, with 
approximately 6000 units produced since 1968, compared with just 919 
examples of the Tupolev Tu-154 (production of which commenced in the 
same year) [31].  With such a large number of aircraft in service, it is 
perhaps surprising that only 27 fatal accidents have occurred to date.  
However, 2108 fatalities over a twelve year period is still a significant 
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figure and suggests that further work is required in this field to increase 
safety of large transport aircraft operations. 
2.1.6. Causal Factors 
In order to form a complete picture of the current situation with regard to 
fatal airliner accidents, it was necessary to investigate the reasons behind 
the statistics shown in this review.  As stated in Section 2.1.2, the depth of 
investigation required to determine the causal factors of an air accident, it 
was not feasible to construct a custom database of this information within 
the timescales of this project.  For this reason, existing statistical reviews 
were used as the data source for the statistical summary shown in Figure 
11.  Note that the due to the use of a different data source, the time period / 
aircraft included in the following data do not correspond directly to those 
of fatal accident / fatalities data. 
 
Figure 11.Causal factors of worldwide fatal 
airliner accidents 1997 – 2006 (data from 
CAA publication [37]) 
Figure 11 shows causal factors of worldwide fatal airliner accidents 1997 – 
2006 [37].  The dominant causal factor in fatal airliner accidents for this 
period was specified as “flight crew” (66%), defined as “an accident whose 
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primary cause was an error of omission or commission on the part of the 
on-board operators of the aircraft” [37].  Such an overwhelming majority 
in comparison with any other factor suggests that there is great scope for 
safety gains in this area, and also concurs with the findings of Ref. 3, 
which concluded that loss of control was the primary causal factor in fatal 
airliner accidents.  Recent findings from two high profile airliner accidents
1
 
suggested that even experienced pilots can make fundamental aircraft 
handling errors in emergency scenarios [32,33].  Moreover, Ref. 33 
proposes that there is no simple solution to such scenarios, for example 
with reference to incorrect stall recovery: “It’s a reflex that’s almost 
uncontrollable - this is not something everyone is able to do after the 
second, third or maybe even the fourth try”.  Indeed, this problem has been 
deemed sufficiently serious for a dedicated working group to be 
established specifically to address it.  The International Committee for 
Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) seeks to reduce the 
number of accidents due to loss of control through novel pilot training 
techniques [38].  It should be noted, however, that on some occasions the 
actions of the aircrew have been credited with mitigating the severity of the 
incident.  Ref. 4 outlines an incident in 2009 during which an Airbus A320 
was forced to ditch in the Hudson river following a bird strike on takeoff. 
Summarising the actions of the flight crew, investigators concluded that 
“These people knew what they were supposed to do and they did it; and as 
a result, nobody lost their life” [4].  Such a statement suggests that correct 
application of existing procedures is crucial in such situations. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Air France Flight 447, Airbus A330, 2009 & Colgan Air Flight 3407, 2009 
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Table 3.  Primary causal factors of 
worldwide airliner accidents 1997 - 2006 
(top 5).  Data from Ref. 37. 
Causal Group Primary Causal Factor % Contribution 
Flight Crew Omission of action / inappropriate 
action 
22.3 
Flight Crew Lack of positional awareness 14.1 
Flight Crew Flight handling 13.8 





Maintenance or repair error / 
oversight / inadequacy 
4.2 
Analysis of specific causal factors gives some preliminary design 
objectives of any potential pilot aid.  For example, Table 3 shows that a 
large proportion of fatal accidents have occurred due to omission of action 
by flight crew.  A potential pilot aid could therefore provide appropriately 
scheduled cues for a specific flight task to reduce the chance of a pilot 
omitting a critical action.  Alternatively, a pilot aid could be developed to 
ensure the crew are better able to maintain situational awareness regardless 
of environmental conditions. 
Some other items of interest featured further down the list of causal factors.  
For example, 7
th
 on the list (contributing 1.8% of the fatal accidents in this 
period) was the factor “Deliberate non-adherence to procedures”.  This is a 
demonstration of the complexity of the human-machine interface (HMI) of 
a modern airliner.  This statistic shows that even if a pilot aid is giving the 
crew critical information, they may choose to intentionally disregard it. 
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2.1.7. Safety Statistics Conclusions 
The findings of this review of aviation safety statistics can be summarised 
as follows: 
 The trend in the total number of worldwide fatal airliner accidents 
has been in steady decline over the period 1999 – 2011. 
 The approach and landing phase of flight has accounted for over 
half the total number of fatal accidents for the period 2008-2011. 
 Smaller aircraft types accounted for the majority of fatal airliner 
accidents.  However, due to their greater passenger capacity, larger 
aircraft types such as wide and narrow-body jets accounted for the 
majority of fatalities over the period 1999-2011. 
 Analysis of causal factors showed that issues relating to flight crew 
accounted for 66% of fatal airliner accidents over the period 1997-
2006.  Within the flight crew causal group, “omission of action / 
inappropriate action” accounted for the largest proportion of 
accidents (22.3%). 
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2.2. Tau Theory of Visual Perception 
One of the underlying concepts of this study is the use of the tau theory of 
visual perception.  For this reason the development of the theory is outlined 
in the following Sections, with particular emphasis on the previous 
applications of tau theory to guidance in aerospace contexts. 
2.2.1. Theories of Visual Perception 
Despite advances in pilot aids, certain piloting tasks are heavily dependent 
on the pilot’s view of the outside world.  Examples of such tasks include 
low-level terrain following tasks and landing [21].  The study of visual 
perception has produced a number of theories relating to how animals use 
visual information to interact with their environment.  In order to provide a 
context for tau theory, the main approaches to visual perception are 
outlined in this Section. 
 Gestalt Theory: This approach originated from consideration of the 
question “why do things look as they do” [40].  The answer 
proposed by Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffa was that the stability of 
visual objects in our everyday experience is imposed by 
subconscious processes [40].  For example, it was suggested that 
the brain organises raw visual data into patterns and configurations 
in order to construct the scene.  A common example of this is the 
predisposition in humans to “see” other human faces in visual 
patterns; such a visual illusion is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Typical demonstration of Gestalt 
Theory by visual illusion.  Image from Ref. 
40. 
Visual illusions such as that shown in Figure 12 form the core of 
the Gestalt theory.  In this example, a bearded human face can be 
seen in the top centre of the image.  Although it can be initially 
difficult to identify, once the face has been recognised its presence 
obvious with each subsequent observation.  According to Gestalt 
theory, this is a demonstration of the active nature of visual 
perception – i.e. cognitive processes are arranging the raw visual 
data into something the observer might expect to see.  This is a 
strongly psychological approach, and as such presents considerable 
difficulties to any attempt to emulate the perception process 
artificially.  According to this theory, in order to artificially recreate 
the human system of visual perception, much of the human brain 
would also need to be emulated. 
 Empiricism is a modern extension of the Gestalt theory which 
hypothesises that visual perception is reliant on cognitive processes 
(as opposed to a mechanical process reliant purely on the visual 
stimulus).  The main concept in this area is the theory of 
hypothesis, which suggests that subjects observing a scene 
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construct a “perceptual hypothesis” about what they are seeing 
based on experience and/or knowledge [41].  Thus, it is proposed 
that the visual scene viewed by the observer is actually generated 
by their own cognitive processes, rather than by external stimulus.  
As was the case for the Gestalt theory, artificial recreation of such 
processes could be prohibitively complicated by the need to 
emulate knowledge / experience capture. 
 The neurophysiological approach seeks to explain visual perception 
in terms of known neural processes [41].  For example, a typical 
experiment would consist of providing the subject with a simple 
visual stimulus (i.e. a target moving on a screen) and then 
measuring what effect this stimulus has on the relevant neurons.  
This concept has the potential advantage that neurons can be 
modelled as logic gates [41] meaning that once the neural processes 
have been correctly identified, artificial emulation should be 
feasible.  However, the main weakness of this theory is that a 
property of a neuron cannot necessarily be equated directly to its 
function [41].  The level of complexity involved in these neural 
processes is such that there is a large degree of uncertainty the 
identification of their function. 
2.2.2. Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 
The ecological approach to visual perception was pioneered by J.J. Gibson 
in the years following the Second World War.  Gibson investigated the 
feasibility of using motion picture (video) technology for training and 
assessment of military pilots, but the findings of his work had wider 
implications in the area of visual perception [13].  Previous theories had 
hypothesised that animals (including humans) make use of their experience 
and intuition to visually recognise objects and govern their motion.  
However, ecological theories differ from this by proposing that the animal 
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is not a detached observer attempting to make sense of an impoverished 
retinal image, but is inextricably immersed in a rich visual environment.  A 
key concept to arise from this school of thought is that of optical flow – 
“the pattern of apparent motion of objects, surfaces, and edges in a visual 
scene caused by the relative motion between an observer and the scene” 
[13] (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Optical flow for a pilot flying 
over an airfield.  Image from Ref.13. 
Gibson proposed that some of the information perceived by the observer 
was in fact transmitted by the combination of light rays entering the eye (as 
shown in Figure 13), rather than being imposed post-observation by a 
cognitive process.  By removing the requirement for conscious intelligence 
from this process, it is possible to envisage visual perception as a 
mechanical action which can be emulated by artificial observers, for 
example Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 
2.2.3. Conception of Tau Theory 
Tau theory is based on the hypothesis that animals can perceive time-to-
contact, “tau” ( ) with objects in their environment directly from their 
optical flow.  Within the optical flow, certain properties may remain 
constant over time; these are known as optical invariants.  For example, 
when directly approaching a surface, the image will expand or “loom” 
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around a central focal point.  An example of this is demonstrated by the 
star symbol in Figure 14c and Figure 14d which, as the focus of optical 
expansion, remains visually unchanged over time.  Conversely, Figure 14d 
shows that the apparent size of the runway increases, and that the nearer 
end of the runway moves towards the bottom of the image (from green 
lines to orange line in Figure 14d). 
 
Figure 14.  Example of optical looming 
whilst approaching an airfield. 
In this example, there are a number of potential optical invariants.  For 
example, the position of the focal point remains constant provided the 
angle of approach to the airfield does not vary.  In addition, certain objects 
are obscuring the view of other, more distant, entities; i.e. an area of 
hillside remains hidden behind the airport buildings in both images.  This 
phenomenon is known as optical occlusion. 
Lee, the pioneer of tau theory, hypothesised that animals are able to 
perceive information about time-to-contact with objects in their 
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environment directly from the optical flow [14].  It was further proposed 
that certain properties of tau could be invariant in the optical flow, for 
example the rate of change of time-to-contact,  ̇: 
 ̇  
 
  
    Equation 1 
Subsequent studies demonstrated the use of this parameter for guiding 
motion in manoeuvres with clearly defined initial and final conditions.  
This Section outlines the development of this concept. 
In engineering terms, the use of tau theory as a basis for guidance law 
development is a relatively recent concept.  Indeed tau theory itself is a 
comparatively new theory of visual perception, having been established in 
the latter half of the 20th century [14].  For this reason, it is possible to 
trace the development of tau theory from a novel hypothesis about how 
animals perceive the world around them to a basis for guidance laws in 
aerospace applications (Figure 15).  Note that this is by no means an 
exhaustive list of sources on tau theory, but rather a selection of milestones 
in its development.  The following Section outlines the contribution of 
each of these studies to the development of tau theory. 
 
Figure 15.  Tracing the development of tau 
theory. 
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2.2.4. Tau-based Guidance 
A major milestone in the development of tau theory was the definition of 
how the observer makes use of tau-based parameters to control movement.  
One of the key concepts of this theory is the “gap”, i.e. the region between 
the initial and desired finish conditions of a manoeuvre.  The most basic 
example is a spatial gap between two positions, and a number of case 
studies were considered.  The first such study was performed on humans 
performing the task of braking to a halt in a car [14].  In this case, the 
drivers were found maintain a constant value of rate of change of time-to-
contact,  ̇, throughout the braking manoeuvre.  Refs. [16,18] defined the 
gap as the distance between a bird and a perch / feeder on which it was 
about to land (Figure 16).  These studies concluded that both 
hummingbirds and pigeons also control their deceleration by manipulation 
of  ̇  (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16. The constant  ̇ guidance strategy. 
It was found that the birds (subconsciously) assigned different constant 
values to  ̇ depending on the desired motion.  One major difference 
between the two experiments was that whereas the pigeons were landing 
on a simple perch, the hummingbirds were landing on a feeding tube.  This 
introduced an additional objective to the task, as if the birds landed with 
enough residual velocity they were rewarded with food.  The result was 
that the hummingbird tended to set a constant  ̇ value of approximately 
0.71, whereas the strategy used by the pigeons varied between  ̇   0.5 and 
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 ̇  1.  For the case of Ref. 14, in which the car drivers were attempting to 
brake to a halt before a collision occurred, the value of   ̇ selected was 
approximately 0.425. 
These studies have shown the selected  ̇ value has a significant effect on 
the kinematics of the resultant motion.  The relationship between the 
selected  ̇ value and the motion can be explored analytically by 
considering this simple example of bird landing on a perch.  In the first 
instance, the bird is assumed to maintain a constant velocity throughout the 
gap closure: 
   ̇     Equation 2 
The tau parameter is therefore given by: 






   Equation 3 
Differentiation with respect to time yields: 
 ̇  





      Equation4 
If the bird maintains a strategy of  ̇=1, its vertical velocity will not change 
between the approach and touchdown – i.e. no deceleration occurs. This 
could result in a heavy landing or a collision, depending on the value of 
vertical velocity.  
If it is instead assumed that the bird decelerates at a constant rate during the 
approach, the following gap closure parameters apply: 
 ̈    
 ̇      ̇  
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  ̇      Equation 5 
At the start of the gap closure ( =0), the following conditions apply: 
    
 ̇   ̇  
     
 
As the bird is applying a constant deceleration, at the point of touchdown 
on the perch these boundary conditions become: 
    
 ̇    
    
 
where   is the total manoeuvre duration.  Application of these boundary 
conditions to Equation 5 gives: 
  
   
 
  ̇      Equation 6 
 ̇      Equation 7 
By substitution: 
 ̇         Equation 8 




       Equation 9 
Considering the tau parameters for Equation 9: 
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      Equation 10 
 ̇  
 
 
 Equation 11 
Equation 11 shows that if the bird were to maintain a  ̇  value of 0.5 the 
resultant motion would be a constant deceleration towards the perch, 
arriving with no residual velocity. 
A further special case of this strategy can be achieved by setting  ̇   .  
In this instance, the rate of change of time to contact is 0, implying a 
constant value of   .  In terms of the motion of the bird, this corresponds to 
an exponentially reducing distance to the perch; albeit one which never 
actually results in completion of the gap closure.  However, in practice it is 
unlikely that the bird would be able to control its trajectory with sufficient 
precision to adhere to this strategy towards the end of flight.  
The implications of the selected value of  ̇  on the resultant motion are 
summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Summary of constant  ̇ control 
strategy 
Strategy Resultant Motion Event at Gap Closure 
 ̇  > 1.0 Acceleration Collision 
 ̇  = 1.0 Constant velocity Collision 
0.5 <  ̇  < 1.0 Deceleration Controlled collision 
 ̇ = 0.5 Constant deceleration Stops at 
0 <  ̇  < 0.5 Deceleration Stops at 
 ̇  = 0 Exponential approach Never occurs 
In addition to the three strategies derived above, Table 4 shows that 
strategies exist in the regions 0 <   ̇  < 0.5 and 0.5 <  ̇ < 1.0.  Ref. 11 
demonstrated that it is possible to derive the equations of motion 
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corresponding to the  ̇    strategy, and examples of these are shown in 
Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17.  Normalised theoretical trajectory 
for motion under the constant  ̇ strategy, 
based on findings of Ref. 11. 
Figure 17a shows the trajectories that would theoretically result from 
maintaining  ̇    for a distance gap of -1 to 0 (normalised distance), with 
initial velocity -1 (normalised velocity).  As was demonstrated in Equation 
11, maintaining a value of  ̇        results in a constant deceleration 
throughout the manoeuvre (red line in Figure 17c).  Similarly, maintaining 
 ̇        results in no change to the velocity from the initial value 
during gap closure (yellow line in Figure 17b).  Selection of a value in the 
range 0 <   ̇  < 0.5, as was the case of car drivers in Ref. 14, results in a 
large initial deceleration which decays throughout the manoeuvre.  In 
practice, the vehicle dynamics will restrict the level of adherence to the 
theoretical trajectory.  For example, Ref. 14 showed that, when limits were 
applied to the available range of acceleration, selection of higher values of 
 ̇ (approaching 1) resulted in high residual velocity at gap closure.  
Similarly, it is unlikely that car drivers would be able to control their 
velocity with enough precision to follow the strategy with low values of  ̇ 
(<0.5) towards the end of the manoeuvre without coming to a halt.  This 
would explain the strategy of  ̇        observed in Ref. 14, which 
resulted in cars achieving zero velocity before the completion of gap 
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closure.  These studies highlighted how the selection of the  ̇ control 
strategy depends on the nature of the task.  The fact that subtle changes to a 
single, constant parameter can have a significant effect on the motion of an 
animal / vehicle demonstrates the potential of tau theory for engineering 
applications. 
In the six degrees-of-freedom world, it is often necessary to manoeuvre in 
such a way as to close multiple gaps simultaneously.  An example from 
nature is given by a bat swooping to land on a perch (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.  Coupled gap closure example. 
This varies from the previous examples of birds landing in which only one 
axis of motion was considered, whereas in this case the bat is closing both 
a distance gap (measured by echolocation) and an angular gap 
simultaneously due to the swooping motion.  In order to achieve this, it is 
hypothesised that the bat maintains a constant ratio of the taus of the two 
gaps [19].  As with the constant  ̇ control strategy, the constant value 
selected determines the nature of the bat’s motion during gap closure.  
Specifically, the value of the coupling constant, k, determines the level of 
aggression used in closing the angular gap  .  For example, setting 0.0 < k 
< 0.5 will result in a steadily reducing rate of angular gap closure.  
Conversely, setting 0.5 < k < 1.0 will result in an angular gap closure rate 
which gives a positive final closure rate, resulting in a more “aggressive” 
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manoeuvre.  Other examples of multiple gap closure by tau-coupling 
include striking a chord on a piano using two hands and target interception 
on a computer screen by human observers [11]. 
The next stage in the development of tau theory was an expansion the 
definition of a “gap”.  For certain manoeuvres it has been hypothesised that 
a physical motion gap is coupled to an intrinsically generated “tau guide”, 
rather than to another physical gap.  An example of this is a musician 
playing in company with a number of others, anticipating their next note 
[11].  In order to strike the note at the correct time and with appropriate 
force, it is suggested that the musician generates a second, intrinsic gap by 
extrapolating the timing of the most recent notes played by the other 
musicians.  This is then coupled to the motion of the musician’s hands to 
form the control strategy: 
       Equation 12 
where    is the intrinsic tau guide and   a the coupling constant.  The 
mechanism which generates this tau guide is as yet unknown (and beyond 
the scope of this study); however it has been hypothesised that it could be a 
function of electrical discharge within the brain or nervous system [17].  
The nature of the intrinsic tau guide selected depends on the type of 
manoeuvre being undertaken.  Ref. 17 defines two examples: the constant 
deceleration tau guide for motions beginning with an abrupt deceleration 
(Equation 13), and the constant acceleration tau guide for motions 
beginning with an abrupt acceleration (Equation 14). 
   
 
 
      Equation 13 
   
 
 
   
  
 
  Equation 14 
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These intrinsic tau guides allow a wide variety of manoeuvres to be 
modelled through use of simple functions of time.  By application of the 
guidance law defined in Equation 12, it is possible to determine the 
resultant motion behaviour for both the constant deceleration (Figure 19) 
and constant acceleration (Figure 20) tau guides for a variety of values of 
coupling constant   [17]. 
 
Figure 19.  Motion tau, gap distance, 
velocity and acceleration when following the 
constant deceleration tau guide.  
 
In practice, one would expect to observe transient phases when initiating 
and terminating the tau-guided motion.  However, once guidance is 
established the resultant trajectories are very simple to follow (assuming 
appropriate vehicle dynamics) and, according to tau theory, require no 
further cognitive action [17].  The potential benefits of this nature-inspired 
approach made tau theory an attractive proposition for the study of visual 
perception in aircraft piloting tasks. 
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Figure 20.  Motion tau, gap distance, 
velocity and acceleration when following the 
constant acceleration tau guide. 
2.2.5. Aerospace Applications 
Having studied how flying creatures such as pigeons, hummingbirds and 
bats make use of tau, the research effort expanded to the area of human 
flight.  The first example of the use of tau theory in an aerospace 
application was a study of rotorcraft nap-of-earth (NoE; i.e. low level, 
visually guided) flight [21].  Although aircraft have become increasingly 
autonomous in recent years, this is one area in which pilots are often in 
direct control of their aircraft, flying on “instinct and intuition” [21].  The 
main objective of the study was to quantify exactly how pilots make use of 
the visual data available to them, with the eventual aim of replicating some 
of this data in times of degraded visibility.  By restoring the relevant visual 
cues to pilots flying in a degraded visual environment (DVE), it was 
proposed that the number of accidents in the NoE phase of flight could be 
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reduced.    An experiment was undertaken by Ref. 20 to investigate the use 
of tau based strategies in a simplified acceleration-deceleration 
(accel/decel) manoeuvre.  Six (non-pilot) participants performed this 
manoeuvre in a two degrees-of-freedom helicopter simulation model for a 
range of aggression levels.  Importantly, the experimental results suggested 
that humans piloting aircraft may well make use of the same tau-based 
control strategies as their animal counterparts.  Specifically, pilots were 
found to employ the constant  ̇ control strategy during the deceleration 
phase of the accel/decel manoeuvre, and the strategy employed over the 
range of test cases was “remarkably similar” [21].  In an additional 
experiment, a terrain avoidance climbing manoeuvre was investigated, and 
was found to have a strong correlation to the constant acceleration tau 
guide defined in Section 2.2.4 (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.  Comparison of control activity 
(a) and resultant trajectory (b) with the 
constant acceleration tau guide for a 
simulated climb manoeuvre [20]. 
Figure 21 shows a sample of results from Ref. 20, in which pilots were 
required to perform a climb manoeuvre in order to avoid a hill in a 
simulated environment.  The results show that, following an initial 
transient phase, the trajectory of the aircraft (Figure 21b) is very strongly 
correlated to that generated by the constant acceleration tau guide 
(Equation 14).  This finding added weight to the argument that human 
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pilots make use of tau-based control strategies when performing visually 
guided manoeuvres.  However, it should be noted that Ref. 20  made use of 
non-pilot participants, and that all of the experiments were performed using 
reduced degree-of-freedom simulation models.  Although this provided a 
useful starting point for aerospace applications of tau theory, further work 
was proposed in order to test whether such strategies are representative of 
real-life piloting tasks. 
A subsequent study [23] developed a tau-based guidance system for the 
Bell 412 helicopter (Figure 22).  The design concept was to compute a 
reference trajectory based on the intrinsic tau guide (Equation 14), and then 
to use a conventional translational rate command (TRC) control system to 
minimise the error between this and the actual position of the aircraft.  This 
novel system was shown to provide appropriate guidance for both 
simulated ship deck landings and lateral repositioning manoeuvres.  
Implementation into the real-life aircraft (Figure 22) was also discussed, 
and recommended as a near-term objective.  This would represent the first 
such use of a tau-based system. 
 
Figure 22.  Advanced Systems Research 
Aircraft, National Research Centre, Canada.  
Image from Ref. 23. 
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It should be noted that, to date, no similar study has been undertaken for 
fixed-wing aircraft.  It may be appropriate, therefore, to investigate 
whether the potential benefits of the rotary-wing system developed in Ref. 
23 could be transferred to fixed-wing flight.  A further conclusion of Ref. 
23 was that, based on the strong correlation between the tau-generated 
trajectory and the flight test data, the tau-model was “eminently suitable for 
extension to other manoeuvres”. 
2.3. Tau Theory and the Flare Manoeuvre 
Certain piloting fixed-wing piloting tasks involve guiding the aircraft based 
on the view from the cockpit windscreen in a similar way to the NoE 
manoeuvres investigated by Ref. 21.  In the final moments before 
touchdown, the pilot of a fixed-wing aircraft will apply an aft longitudinal 
stick input in order to reduce the vertical velocity to an appropriate value.  
In addition to this reduction in vertical velocity, the flare manoeuvre also 
increases the pitch angle of the aircraft, enabling touchdown to occur on 
the main gear first.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this manoeuvre is often 
performed manually on civilian large transport aircraft, and it is vital to the 
safety of the aircraft that the flare is executed correctly.  If the flare is 
initiated too late, touchdown may occur at a high vertical velocity, 
resulting in structural damage.  An example of such an incident is outlined 
by Ref. 44, during which an experienced pilot (approx. 3500 hours) flying 
a modern aircraft (Airbus A321) in benign weather conditions performed a 
late flare that resulted in damage to the aircraft.  This damage consisted of 
a crack in one of the landing gear support struts, and is shown in Figure 23 
(circled in red). 
  50 
 
Figure 23.  Structural damage resulting from 
a hard landing due to late flare initiation 
[44]. 
Although no injuries occurred as a result of the hard landing, the structural 
damage shown in Figure 23 was not detected until an unrelated inspection 
four days after the incident. During this time the aircraft undertook two 
scheduled flights whilst carrying uninspected damage; a fact that was 
highlighted as a significant potential source of risk by Ref. 44.  The 
incident was not reported by the pilots as, following informal discussions 
with company engineers, it was decided that the touchdown was “firm but 
not hard”.  In fact, the vertical velocity at touchdown (later retrieved from 
recorded flight data) was approximately 14ft/sec, which was rated as a 
“severe hard landing” [44].  This discrepancy suggests that pilots may 
have difficulty both in determining when to initiate the flare and in 
determining whether the manoeuvre was appropriately executed.  The 
accident report concluded that the primary cause of the accident was an 
error of judgement by the pilot in command. 
Alternatively, if the flare is initiated too late there is a chance that the 
aircraft will “balloon”, causing it to overshoot the runway.  Such an 
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incident led to the loss of an Air France Airbus A340 at Toronto Airport, 
Canada in August 2005 [38] (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24.  Aftermath of Air France flight 
358 incident, August 2005.  Image from Ref 
38.  
Although this incident was not fatal, it did result in the loss of a large, 
modern aircraft (2011 estimate unit cost £168.25 million [31]) and a $12 
million compensation settlement between the operator and a group of 
passengers [45].  Given that such a costly incident was a direct result of a 
fundamental piloting error, it seems reasonable to conclude that this area 
warrants further investigation. 
2.3.1. Visual Cueing & the Flare Manoeuvre 
A questionnaire-based survey was conducted as part of Ref. 8, which 
investigated pilot perception of difficulty of a number of typical phases of 
flight.  A sample of 134 pilots was divided into three levels of experience 
as follows: 
 Novice pilots (55), who were currently training for the Private 
Pilots Licence (PPL) 
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 Intermediate pilots (45), who had achieved PPL and were training 
for Instrument Rating (IR) 
 Expert pilots (34), who were qualified flying instructors actively 
engaged in teaching 
The pilots were asked to rank the respective difficulty levels of a number 
of typical manoeuvres, with a higher score corresponding to a higher 
perceived difficulty.  The results are summarised in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.  Pilot-perceived difficulty of 
typical phases of flight.  Data from Ref. 8. 
The results show that pilots perceived the landing flare to be the most 
difficult phase of flight (mean score = 3.1).  The perceived difficulty of the 
flare manoeuvre also varied significantly between the three experience 
groups, suggesting that practice is a factor in achieving a successful flare.  
Other factors which may explain the high perceived difficulty of the flare 
manoeuvre include: 
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 Close proximity to the ground 
 Flight in congested airspace 
 Flight close to the stall speed of the aircraft 
 The desire to “get it right first time” 
 The potential consequences of making a mistake 
The findings of the study concur with the high proportion of fatal accidents 
during the approach/flare phases of flight highlighted in Figure 25, as a 
difficult manoeuvre in close proximity to the ground would be expected to 
produce a large number of accidents.  Ref. 8 also investigated the factors 
which pilots considered contributed most significantly to their ability to 
perform a satisfactory flare manoeuvre (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26.  Pilot opinion of visual cue utility 
for the flare manoeuvre.  Data from Ref. 8. 
The data was obtained in a similar way to the phase of flight difficulty 
comparison, by means of a pilot questionnaire.  Perhaps the most 
significant result is that a large proportion of the pilots were unsure of 
which visual cues were the most important during the flare manoeuvre.  
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This highlights the subconscious nature of visual perception, and suggests 
that pilots are not necessarily aware of how they perform manoeuvres such 
as the flare.  A major criticism of this study is the validity of asking 
conscious questions about a subconscious process, as it is unlikely that 
pilots would know the direction of their gaze with any certainty. 
An attempt was made in by Ref. 3 to directly record the gaze position of 
the pilot during the flare manoeuvre, in order to demonstrate which visual 
cues were the most significant.  This was achieved using an eye tracking 
camera which recorded gaze position relative to the wearer’s head, and a 
forward-facing head mounted camera which effectively recorded the 
orientation of the head.  The test was repeated for various degraded visual 
conditions.  Sample results for the pilot’s eye position (relative to the head) 
are shown in Figure 27.  Note that V1 corresponds to good visual 
conditions and V5 corresponds to degraded visual conditions. 
 
Figure 27.  Pilot fixation point analysis for 
the flare manoeuvre.  From Ref. 3. 
The analysis was useful for highlighting basic trends in pilot gaze position 
during the approach and flare.  For example, after the point of flare 
initiation, pilots tended to look out of the window rather than at the 
instrument panel (higher numbers corresponding to downwards gaze in 
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Figure 27).  It also showed that in some cases the pilot assigned a greater 
proportion of their gaze to the instrument panel when visual conditions 
were degraded.  However, no practical method was devised for 
determining the gaze direction relative to the cockpit of the flight simulator 
rather than to the pilot’s head.  The level of complexity involved in 
determining the gaze direction of the pilot relative to a moving reference 
point (such as the end of the runway) is a limitation of these results, and 
does not enable a validation of the pilot opinion survey in Ref. 8.  In 
addition results were only recorded for a sample of two pilots, who 
appeared to exhibit different strategies for the same manoeuvre.  This 
further demonstrates the difficulties associated with understanding piloting 
strategies for the flare manoeuvre. 
2.3.2. A Tau-based Flare Strategy 
Ref. 3 represented the first application of tau theory to fixed-wing flight, 
proposing both the constant  ̇ strategy and intrinsic gap coupling. In this 
case, the motion gap was defined as the height of the aircraft centre of 
gravity (c.g.) above the runway for a large transport aircraft performing the 
flare manoeuvre.  Sample results from this study are shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28.  Sample results from Ref. 3, 
showing flare manoeuvre trajectory 
conforming to the constant  ̇ strategy. 
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Figure 28 shows how tau-based strategies were identified from flight test 
data by comparison with tau-generated trajectory (Figure 28b) and a 
straight line (Figure 28c).  Crucially, the use of tau-based strategies was 
much more apparent for landings in a good visual environment, supporting 
the case for a vision-based control strategy consistent with the ecological 
approach to visual perception.  The selection of a constant value of rate of 
change of time to contact with runway,  ̇ , was shown to determine the 
characteristics of the flare.  Two distinct strategies were found to exist 
when closing the motion gap in this case.  Firstly, a so-called “type 1” flare 
(Figure 29). 
 
Figure 29.  Schematic of type 1 tau-based 
flare strategy. 
In this case, a constant vertical approach velocity ( ̇ =1) was reduced to 
the touchdown velocity by selecting some value of  ̇ <1, resulting in a 
continuous but not necessarily constant deceleration to touchdown.  An 
alternative, “type 2” strategy was also observed (Figure 30). 
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Figure 30.  Schematic of type 2 tau-based 
flare strategy. 
Here, the constant vertical velocity of the approach is reduced 
approximately exponentially ( ̇   0). In theory, this would result in the 
aircraft never reaching the runway surface. As such, a third phase in which 
 ̇  is some value greater than zero is observed which results in the 
remaining distance being closed at an  approximately constant rate.  
Analysis of data from both simulated and real-world flare manoeuvres 
indicated that, in terms of touchdown velocity, the type 1 technique was 
more predictable whilst the type 2 strategy gave consistently lower but less 
predictable touchdown velocities.  It should be noted that these strategies 
were not consciously performed by the pilot, i.e. the flare was not initiated 
with the intention of using one of the two techniques.  In addition, the 
pilots featured in Ref. 3 were shown to employ both strategies whilst 
performing the flare.  This demonstrates that the process is not necessarily 
fully understood and that, given the importance of flare performance, 
warrants further investigation.   
The predictability of the type 1 flare led to the development of a novel flare 
guidance algorithm based on a constant  ̇  strategy [3].  A flight path angle 
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cue was generated to command a  ̇ =1 (approach at constant vertical 
velocity) and  ̇ =0.75 (flare), as defined in Equation 15: 
       
 





   ̈
   ̇ 
     ] Equation 15 
where   is the vertical flight path angle,   is the pitch angle,  is the roll 
angle and   is the forward body velocity.  This flare algorithm was used to 
drive a basic symbology set on a Head Up Display (HUD) for the purposes 
of piloted evaluation.  The results of this evaluation demonstrated that, in 
good visual conditions, the novel tau-based algorithm produced results 
comparable to an in-service example HUD.  There was also an 
improvement in performance in a degraded visual environment compared 
with a baseline case using only a Head Down Display (HDD); although 
this was not as consistent as for the in-service example.  It seems 
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that an algorithm based on the type 2 
strategy could provide further benefits in terms of touchdown performance.  
An additional conclusion of Ref. 3 was that the performance of the novel 
design was adversely affected by the ergonomics of the HUD symbology 
set used.  Specifically, it was found that the “look and feel” of the 
symbology used was inferior to that of the in-service example (as would be 
expected for a development-standard design).  For this reason, a fairer 
evaluation of the tau-based flare strategy could be performed by use of 
display symbology that is more similar to the in-service HUD. 
2.4. Flare Initiation 
In addition to executing the flare correctly, the manoeuvre must also be 
initiated at an appropriate moment.  The concept of initiating a manoeuvre 
in order to decelerate, of which the flare is an example, is common in the 
natural world.  For example it has previously been shown that birds and 
insects perform manoeuvres analogous to the flare when landing [11].  As 
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an animal moves, the self-observed visual scene changes creating an 
optical flow, within which objects move in a correlated manner over time.  
A key feature of this theory is that animals seek optical invariants (i.e. 
features with one or more optical properties which remain constant over 
time) within the visual scene in order to control their movement [13].  A 
number of studies have sought to identify which (if any) invariants are 
used to initiate various manoeuvres.  For example, it has been shown that 
humans approaching a corner while walking turn their heads in anticipation 
of changing direction.  It has been shown that this action occurs at a 
constant, critical value of either time [46] or distance to the corner [47] for 
a range of approach velocities.  The following Sections outlines a number 
visual cues, invariant values of which have previously been proposed as 
the for flare initiation strategies. 
2.4.1. Height Above Runway 
Given that the objective of the landing manoeuvre is defined in 
certification specifications such as EASA CS-25 [48] as commencing at a 
height of 50ft, it would seem intuitively correct to assume that pilots make 
use of an estimation of height to judge flare initiation.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that flying instructors teach student pilots to initiate the flare at a 
familiar reference height, for example “the height of a bus or truck”[5].  
Additionally, many large fixed-wing aircraft feature audio callouts to alert 
the pilot when the aircraft descends below a certain height [10,49].   Such a 
hypothesis has been supported by previous investigations into flare 
initiation.  For example, Ref. 50 displayed simulated imagery of 
approaches to a runway to both pilot and non-pilot observers to test the 
hypothesis that flare initiation occurs at a critical value of height, runway 
width angle or time-to-contact.  The participants indicated their chosen 
flare initiation point by pressing a button, which triggered a predefined 
flare manoeuvre over which the participants had no further control.  The 
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results suggested that the height above runway at flare initiation was the 
most consistent parameter across a range of participants and visual 
conditions.  However, this study used a simplified visual scene (Figure 31) 
that did not include representative runway markings, and this scene was 
presented on a standard computer monitor which the subjects viewed from 
a fixed distance (through use of a chin rest). 
 
Figure 31.Example of the visual scene from 
Ref. 50. 
Although these are common features of psychological studies, they are not 
representative of the cockpit environment of an actual aircraft.  This limits 
the extent to which the findings can be considered applicable to the real-
life task. 
A potential disadvantage of a height-based flare initiation study is that it 
does not account for variation in vertical velocity during the approach.  For 
example, one would expect that an aircraft approaching the runway at a 
higher than average vertical velocity would require an earlier flare 
initiation.  A strong wind shear acting on the aircraft during the approach 
phase can result in such an increase in vertical velocity.  The effects of 
such a case have been the subject of a number of studies, including Ref. 51.  
This focused on a simulation of the KC-135 “Speckled Trout” aircraft of 
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the United States Air Force (USAF) – a military variant of the Boeing 707 
upon which the GLTA simulation model developed by Ref. 3 is based 
(Figure 32).   
 
Figure 32.  KC-135 "Speckled Trout".  
Image from Ref. 51. 
In the presence of simulated logarithmically decreasing headwind from 
30kts at 510ft to 0kts at 10ft, the automatic landing system produced 
touchdowns which were 721ft short of the no-wind touchdown case.  In 
addition, the vertical velocity at touchdown increased from 2.1ft/sec in the 
no-wind case to 6.2ft/sec in the wind shear case.  The performance was 
improved by manipulation of the control law during the flare manoeuvre; 
however the initiation point was not varied.  This conflicts with subsequent 
findings such as Ref. 50, which showed that pilots initiate the flare 
manoeuvre at different heights, depending on the approach angle of the 
aircraft. 
2.4.2. Tau as a Flare Initiation Cue 
Previous research involving tau theory and the flare manoeuvre has 
primarily focussed on guidance following flare initiation.  However, the 
tau-based pilot aid developed in Ref. 3 made use of a time to contact with 
the runway, τh, to trigger flare initiation with some success.  In this case, the 
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motion gap is defined as the distance between the c.g. of the aircraft and 
the runway surface (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33.  Motion gap definition for the 
flare manoeuvre. 
A subsequent study found that helicopter pilots performing runway 
traverse manoeuvres in both simulated and actual aircraft made use of a 
constant value of tau (in this case time-to-contact with runway boundary) 
to judge the initiation of their turns [52].  The study in Ref. 55 showed that 
seven non-pilots initiated the flare manoeuvre using a tau-based strategy 
when presented with simulated imagery similar to that used in Ref. 50.  An 
additional finding was that the initiation strategy changed to one based on 
perceived height when the ground texture was removed from the scene.  
This contradicts the findings of Ref. 53, which demonstrated that pilots in a 
flight simulator with a night-only visual scene used tau to initiate the flare.  
A potential explanation for this could be that pilots have (subconsciously) a 
number of different strategies available to them, and that the strategy 
selected depends on the visual information available. 
2.4.3. Runway Geometry 
The runway geometry perceived by the pilot evolves throughout the 
approach to an airfield, from a small and distant feature to one which 
dominates the view from the cockpit.  Since this visual information is 
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directly available to the pilot it seems intuitive to assume that this is a 
parameter used to judge flare initiation.  Previous studies have highlighted 
the runway width angle     as a potential cue for flare initiation [55, 56].  
This is defined as the angle formed between the left and right edges of the 
runway at the aiming line (Figure 34). 
 
Figure 34.Runway width angle.  Background 
image from Ref. 58. 
The study in Ref. 8 tested a flare initiation strategy based on a critical value 
of     using simulated imagery of two approach angles, γ.  It was found 
that pilots tended to initiate the flare at a larger    (≈27.5
0
) for steep 
approaches (6
0) compared to the critical value (≈21.40) for the “standard” γ 
of 3
°
.  This parameter can be expressed as a function of the line-of-sight 
range between the pilot and the runway aiming point: 
            (
      
    
) Equation 16 
A potential barrier to this strategy being used universally by pilots 
performing the flare manoeuvre is that the value of     is a function of 
runway width.  Hence the value of     at which the flare was initiated 
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would not necessarily be constant over approaches to different runways, as 
runway width varies considerably from airfield to airfield [58]. 
As a variation on this strategy, it has been proposed that the flare could be 
initiated at a critical value of the rate of change of runway side angle     
( ̇ RW).  The runway side angle,    , is defined as the angle formed 
between the two sides of the runway from the point of view of the pilot 
[57] (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35.  Runway side angle.  Background 
image from Ref. 58. 
A potential advantage of this parameter, as with τh, is that it is a function of 
both aircraft height and vertical velocity – the two primary physical 
parameters in the landing task: 
 ̇   (
   
    
        
 )       Equation 17 
It should be noted that, as with the previous cue,    , this value is also a 
function of runway geometry and is therefore subject to the same potential 
limitations.  Additionally of the two pilots tested in Ref. 57, only one was 
shown to make use of the  ̇   parameter to initiate the flare. 
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On the basis of the conflicting conclusions from these previous studies, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is scope for further investigation in 
this area. 
2.5. Sensing Tau 
The underlying concept of tau theory is that all the information required to 
govern motion is available directly from the retinal image of the observer.  
However, all studies to date have used alternative methods for calculating 
tau parameters, for example the time to contact of the bird to the perch in 
Figure 16.  In this case,    was computed as a function of the bird’s 
velocity and distance from the perch.  However, it is not envisaged that the 
bird would use this method of computing tau, but rather would perceive it 
directly from the optical flow.  A number of attempts have been made to 
develop synthetic vision-based guidance systems.  The primary 
justification for this is that optical sensors tend to be relatively small and 
inexpensive, making them well suited for applications such as small 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  The majority of these systems are 
concerned with navigation as opposed to guidance, i.e. comparing the view 
from the aircraft with a reference map to determine its position [59].  The 
study in Ref. 59 outlined the design of a small UAV which was able to 
interpret the optical flow from an array of video cameras in order to avoid 
(with varying success) collisions with nearby objects (Figure 36). 
 
Figure 36.  Example optical flow analysis for 
a small UAV. Image from Ref. 59. 
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A 3D system of angles was defined, featuring a 45 degree sphere of 
interest (red).  Image processing software detected occurrences of items 
penetrating this boundary, and then instructed the aircraft to change course 
accordingly.  The nature of the response was determined by a weighting 
function which gave priority to occurrences at the front of the sphere, as 
these corresponded to objects appearing in the path of the aircraft.  
Although the guidance method used was not consistent with tau theory, 
this study did demonstrate that it is possible to interrogate the optical flow 
by use of such a sensor, something that would be essential to any potential 
tau-based system. 
It is notionally possible to derive the optical flow on surfaces in a visual 
scene through use of a standard video camera (assuming sufficient 
resolution and frame rate).  This would in term allow interpretation of the 
optical invariants in the scene, and thence the tau parameters.  A simple 
example is shown in Figure 37, with the tree looming as the aircraft 
approaches it [17]. 
 
Figure 37.  Deriving tau from the optical 
flow.  Image from Ref. 17. 
Assuming no change in height or velocity and a constant observer frame 
rate,   , the rate of change of growth of the image can be derived from the 
series of images.  In this way, the tau parameter is defined as: 
    
  
 ̇
 Equation 18 
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 ̇
 Equation 19 
For small variations in   (which would be achieved by use of an 
appropriately high frame rate, as this determines the resolution of the   
measurement [17]),      .  Thus: 
    
  
       
 
Equation 20 
This simple example demonstrates that it is fundamentally possible to 
extract tau information from the optical flow, albeit based on a number of 
assumptions.  A “tau sensor” has been in the laboratory testing stage of 
development for a number of years [60].  The main design challenge is 
determining the location of the focus of optical expansion within the 
optical flow, something which is very much a subconscious process for 
animal observers.  Although recent studies have shown promising results in 
controlling small robots [60], it is unlikely that any such system would be 
available for use in aerospace applications in the near future. 
2.6. Alternatives to Tau 
Tau theory is by no means the universally accepted solution to how 
animals govern collision-type manoeuvres.  For example, a psychological 
study [61] suggested flaws in both the analysis and interpretation of some 
of the most compelling evidence for tau theory.  The main criticism 
forwarded is that a number of tau-based experiments have focused on the 
use of flat-screen displays to investigate the motion control of the observer.  
It is argued that some of the most significant visual cues associated with 
depth perception are therefore missing and hence the results are invalid.  
However, this is not applicable to some of the real-life experiments 
conducted on a variety of different animals, for which various other 
critiques were suggested.  The remaining counter-arguments focused on 
the more sophisticated applications of tau theory, such as interceptive 
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timing of human acrobats [61].  It was hypothesised that spatial variables 
such as relative distance estimates are used to govern movement rather 
than temporal parameters such as  .  It is beyond the scope of this review 
to give a definitive answer to the spatial vs temporal argument, other than 
to state that the previous aerospace applications of tau theory have 
produced some compelling results.  One conclusion which can definitely 
be drawn from the debate is that the processes governing motion in the 
human (and animal) brain are extremely complicated and difficult to 
define.  It may be that a combination of temporal and spatial cues are used 
for complicated interceptive actions such as acrobatics; however for 
modelling relatively simple manoeuvres such as decelerating to a halt, tau 
theory appears to provide a practical solution which has been validated by 
a number of previous studies [3, 14, 16, 21]. 
2.7. Technical Review Conclusions 
Having performed an analysis of recent airliner safety statistics, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
 In the period 1999 – 2011, a significant proportion of fatal airliner 
accidents occurred during the approach and landing phase of flight.  
Indeed, since 2003 this phase of flight has accounted for over half 
of the total number of fatal airliner accidents. 
 The largest number of fatal accidents over this period was 
attributed to the “regional airliner” aircraft type.  This was 
potentially due to the less sophisticated nature of some of these 
aircraft (relative to larger, jet-powered aircraft), and the typically 
more hazardous mission types undertaken (i.e. more frequent 
takeoffs/landings).  Additionally, aircrew on these aircraft types are 
typically less qualified compared to large transport types. 
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 Due to the larger capacity of “narrow-body” and “wide-body” jets 
(collectively referred to as “large transport aircraft”), the greatest 
proportion of fatalities was attributed to these aircraft types.  This 
validated the findings of Ref. 3, which elected to focus on safety 
improvements for large transport aircraft. 
 Further validation of this area of research was shown by 
investigation into causal factors of fatal airliner accidents.  
Specifically, it was found that flight crew action / inaction was the 
primary causal factor for 66% of fatal airliner accidents over the 
period 1997 – 2006.  This percentage included the causal factor 
“loss of control in flight”, which was highlighted as an area of 
interest by Ref. 3. 
A number of sources relating to tau theory and the landing flare manoeuvre 
were also analysed, which has produced a number of research questions: 
1. A number of recent studies have produced contradictory 
conclusions regarding the strategy used by pilots to determine the 
point of flare initiation.  For example, previous studies have 
demonstrated that pilots initiate the manoeuvre based on their time-
to-contact with the runway, whereas FCOMs (Flight Crew 
Operations Manuals) instruct pilots to do so at a specific height.  
Other studies have suggested that the flare initiation point is 
determined based on the perceived runway geometry as the aircraft 
approaches the airfield.  A potential limitation of these previous 
studies was also identified, in that flare initiation was typically 
investigated in isolation, without considering the subsequent 
manoeuvre.  Given the large number of fatal accidents in this phase 
of flight, it seems reasonable to assume that further gains can be 
made by investigating the visual cues used to initiate the flare 
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manoeuvre.  For these reasons, it was concluded from the 
Technical Review that a new study should be conducted into flare 
initiation strategy which considers the implications for the whole 
manoeuvre and addresses the limitations of the previous studies. 
2. For the flare manoeuvre, two strategies were identified: a two-stage 
technique (“type 1”) and a three-stage technique (“type 2”).  Ref. 3 
focussed on the type 1 flare, even though the alternative strategy 
was shown to result in consistently lower (although less 
predictable) touchdown velocities.  For this reason, the possibility 
of implementing a pilot aid based on the type 2 flare should be 
investigated. 
3. The landing strategies identified by Ref. 3 were both exhibited by a 
number of pilots performing the same task in the same aircraft, and 
the reasons for this are not well understood.  Further investigation 
should be made in this area to establish whether there is scope for 
improving performance or safety through better understanding of 
the strategies employed.  
4. Recent studies have demonstrated the use of tau-based control 
systems for performing specific manoeuvres in rotary-wing flight.  
Such systems offer potential benefits in terms of robustness and 
adaptability compared to existing solutions.  To-date, no such 
systems have been developed for fixed-wing applications, and so it 
would be appropriate to investigate the possibility of developing 
such a system.  This would also enable investigation into whether 
the tau-based strategies demonstrated for the flare manoeuvre 
would also be appropriate for other phases of fixed-wing flight. 
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These research questions were used to define the specific objectives 
required to satisfy the overall objectives of the project defined in Chapter 
1.  Chapters 4 to 7 each address one of these research questions, and their 
implications on the broader project aims are discussed in Chapter 8.  
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C h a p t e r  3  
EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
In order to address the research questions identified in the previous 
Chapter, a number of experiments were undertaken.  Each of these 
experiments featured a number of common elements in terms of 
equipment, software and facilities, and these are documented in this 
Chapter.  Modifications made to equipment for the purposes of this study 
are also documented.  Equipment and methods specific to each experiment 
are detailed in their respective Chapters. 
3.1. Simulation Facilities 
3.1.1. HELIFLIGHT Simulator  
The Flight Science & Technology Research Group (FST) at UoL operates 
two six degrees-of-freedom flight simulators: HELIFLIGHT and 
HELIFLIGHT-R (Figure 38).  HELIFLIGHT features a single-place 
cockpit with six visual and two audio channels [62].  Three of the visual 
channels are used to give a 140° lateral field of view.  The controls 
available to the pilot are a centre control column (with a number of 
programmable buttons), interlinked rudder pedals, a single throttle, a right-
mounted sidestick and a left-mounted collective lever.  HELIFLIGHT-R 
features a two-place cockpit and a projector-based visual system with a 
270°x70° field of view [62].  An aircraft model library featuring rotary-
wing, fixed-wing, and novel configurations is common to both 
HELIFLIGHT and HELIFLIGHT-R.  Both simulators feature hexapod (“6 
leg”) motion bases which can provide motion cues in six degrees-of-
freedom.  The purpose of this motion capability is to augment the fidelity 
of the simulation by reducing the conflict between optical and vestibular 
cues experienced by the pilot.  However, it should be noted that this study 
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was primarily concerned with the investigation of visual perception of 
motion cues, rather than with the vestibular cues provided by the 
simulation. 
 
Figure 38.  HELIFLIGHT (left) and 
HELIFLIGHT-R (right) simulation facilities 
at the University of Liverpool. 
HELIFLIGHT was selected as the primary simulator facility for the 
purposes of this study.  The justification for this selection was as follows: 
 The previous Prospective Sky Guides project [3] made use of this 
facility.  As such, a number of relevant tools were readily available 
for use with this project. 
 Although HELIFLIGHT-R provides a wider field of view, the view 
afforded by HELIFLIGHT is more representative of a large (fixed-
wing) transport aircraft, as the 3 OTW (“out the window”) channels 
approximate to the windscreen of such an aircraft.  Given that one 
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of the objectives of this project was the investigation of vision-
based strategies, having a representative visual system was a high 
priority. 
 At the time of commencement of this study, HELIFLIGHT-R was 
in the process of being commissioned.  By contrast, HELIFLIGHT 
had been in use for a variety of research projects for a number of 
years [62], including a number of those outlined in Chapter 2.  
Making use of a facility with this high level of system maturity 
would allow the study to focus on the novel aspects of the research 
rather than platform development. 
The modelling software used by the HELIFLIGHT simulator is 
FLIGHTLAB.  FLIGHTLAB is a flight vehicle modelling and analysis 
tool which allows users to interactively produce models from a library of 
components.  Aircraft-specific data can then be assigned to these 
components to enable the development of high-fidelity simulation models 
[64].  Custom control systems can be added to these aircraft models 
through the use of Control System Graphical Editor (CSGE), a block 
diagram based software package.  This was used extensively for the 
development of both the HUD algorithm described in Chapter 5 and the 
pilot modelling exercise described in Chapter 7.   
In addition to model development, FLIGHTLAB also allows real-time 
simulations to be conducted through the use of a suitable interface.  For the 
purposes of this study, PILOTSTATION [62] was used to provide an 
interface between FLIGHTLAB and the physical elements of the 
HELIFLIGHT simulator.  This included handling signals from the cockpit 
controls, driving the motion base and defining the simulated physical 
environment in which the tests were performed (i.e. providing simulated 
solid surfaces with which the aircraft models could interact). 
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FLIGHTLAB also enables data logging for a range of user-specified 
variables; for example acceleration, velocity and position data.  The start 
and end points for a particular data set are defined by the user during the 
real-time simulation, and as such can be matched to a specific flight task or 
run.  These data were captured and post-processed to enable the 
computation of pseudo-physical variables of interest to each of the 
investigations described in Chapters 4 to 7.  Additionally, FLIGHTLAB 
enables the degrees of freedom for real-time simulation to be specified by 
the user, allowing certain states being “locked”; i.e. removing their 
dynamic behaviour from the simulation.  For example, this enabled the 
lateral dynamics of the aircraft to be locked for the simplified flare task 
used in Chapters 4 to 6, isolating the (vertical) axis of interest. 
The level of customization available made FLIGHTLAB eminently 
suitable for the model development, display development and piloted 
evaluation phases of this study.  Ref. 3 outlines the development of the 
Generic Large Transport Aircraft (GLTA) model using FLIGHTLAB.  The 
aircraft is based upon data from the Boeing 707, and as such falls under the 
narrow-body jet (NB) category defined in Section 2.1.5.  For this reason, it 
was deemed to be an appropriate baseline aircraft for the piloted simulation 
aspects of this project. 
3.1.2. Visual Environment  
Both the outside world visuals and instrument panel in HELIFLIGHT were 
generated by BAE Systems’ Landscape software [65].  Landscape includes 
some features of particular relevance to this project; firstly the ability to 
create customised visual conditions, and also to freely move the viewing 
angle.  One of the outputs of Ref. 3 was a set of predefined visual 
configurations for Landscape corresponding to real-world ILS conditions.  
Examples are shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40, with the visibility 
degrading from 60000ft in ‘V1’ and 150ft in ‘V7’.  
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Figure 39.  Visual condition V1. 
 
Figure 40.  Visual condition V7. 
Note that the observer position in Figure 39 and Figure 40 is identical, but 
the degraded visual conditions constituting V7 cause the runway and 
horizon to be obscured.  Also note that the visual scenes shown in Figure 
39 and Figure 40 are 2D representations of wrap-around images.  As such, 
the splaying of the runway at the bottom of Figure 39 resulted in a 
correctly displayed runway image when projected onto the imaging system 
of the HELIFLIGHT simulator.  The visual properties of the above 
conditions were defined with reference to the aircraft operating minima for 
the approach and landing manoeuvre [22].  The primary parameter of 
interest was the Runway Visual Range (RVR).  RVR is the distance over 
which an observer on the runway centre line can identify the runway 
surface markings, and as such corresponded to the visibility distance 
setting in Landscape.  A summary of the visual condition presets used for 
this study is shown in Table 5. 
  77 
Table 5.  Summary of visual condition 





Day / Night Comment 
V1 60000 Day Good Visual Environment (GVE) 
V7 150 Day Equivalent to Category IIIb ILS RVR 
It should be noted that Figure 39 and Figure 40 show amalgamated images 
from the 3 OTW channels in HELIFLIGHT, but that in practice the pilots’ 
view was obstructed by the framework of the simulator.  The result of this 
was the division of the visual scene into three windows, analogous to those 
of a real aircraft, as shown in Figure 38.  These two visual conditions were 
chosen based on the findings of Ref. 3, which demonstrated that levels of 
degraded visibility between V1 and V7 had little effect on task 
performance.  These two visual conditions were designated Good Visual 
Environment (GVE) and Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) for the 
purposes of the display evaluation exercise described in Chapter 5.  
In order to create custom displays for the HELIFLIGHT simulator, Ref. 3 
utilised a method for integrating objects created in Engenuity 
Technologies’ VAPS (Virtual Avionics Prototyping Suite) into Landscape.  
VAPS enables the development and modification of custom display 
symbology, which can then be animated using data from the aircraft 
simulation model [66].  As this method was successfully demonstrated by 
Ref. 3, it was selected for the display development aspects of this project. 
3.1.3. Simulink  
For the purposes of “offline” systems development and testing (i.e. not 
pilot-in-loop), MathWorks’ Simulink software was used.  Simulink is a 
development tool which enables the implementation of a wide range of 
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dynamic systems from a library of customisable components [67].  The 
block-diagram based interface is analogous to that of CSGE (a component 
of FLIGHTLAB) but without the necessary complexity associated with the 
other components of the aircraft model.  For this reason, Simulink was 
considered appropriate for use as a prototyping and systems development 
tool for this project. 
3.2. Generic Large Transport Aircraft 
3.2.1. Flight Physics Model 
Certain aspects of the experimental work described in this study required 
an aircraft model that was capable of performing steep approaches, i.e. 
vertical flight path angles in the range -3.5° to -5°.  The characteristic of a 
fixed-wing aircraft which dictates the maximum approach angle is the lift-
to-drag ratio, as the aircraft must have sufficient drag to overcome the 
tendency to accelerate as the approach angle increases.  In order to achieve 
trimmed flight at a given angle, therefore, the drag force generated must be 
at least equal to the forward component of the gravitational force.  The 
difference between the drag force and the forward-acting component of the 
aircraft’s weight dictates the required throttle position.  The variation in 
throttle setting for a range of approach angles for the GLTA is shown in 
Figure 41. 
  79 
 
Figure 41.  GLTA throttle setting for 
trimmed flight at a range of flight path 
angles. 
Figure 41 shows that for a standard 3° approach angle the GLTA requires a 
throttle setting of approximately 26%.  This value decays rapidly as the 
approach angle becomes steeper to approximately 4% at -4°, beyond which 
point trimmed flight is not achievable as the throttle setting is limited to the 
range 0-100%.  For this reason, it was necessary to make some 
modifications to the aerodynamic characteristics of the GLTA model to 
enable trimmed flight at angles steeper than -4°. 
The aerodynamic modelling theory used to implement the wings of the 
GLTA by Ref. 3 was the “Lifting Line” method.  This method allows the 
adaptation of two dimensional aerofoil data to wings of finite span by the 
introduction of a deficiency factor e [68].  The e parameter is a measure of 
the similarity of the wing in question to a perfectly elliptical plan form, on 
the basis that optimal lift distribution is achieved by this geometry [68].  
For example, a highly elliptical wing would correspond to an e value  1, 
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whereas a simple rectangular wing would correspond to e  1.  Typical 
values of e are shown in Table 6 (data from Ref. 68) 
Table 6.  Example values of wing deficiency 
factor, e. 
Aircraft Aircraft Type Approximate Deficiency Factor e 
Boeing 247D Regional Airliner 0.75 
Douglas DC-3 Regional Airliner 0.785 
Boeing 727 Narrow-body Jet 0.7-0.8 
Boeing 747 Wide-body Jet 0.8-0.85 
 
The value of e selected for use on the GLTA model by Ref. 3 was 0.95, 
which is somewhat higher than those shown in Table 6.  This value was 
based upon subjective pilot assessment of the aircraft’s flight 
characteristics for the approach and landing phase.  The relationship 
between e and the drag generated by the wing is defined as follows: 
     
  
 
    
 Equation 21 
where      is the coefficient of induced drag,    is the coefficient of lift and 
AR is the aspect ratio of the wing.  Equation 21 shows that, all other 
parameters being equal, a high value of e will result in less drag being 
generated by the wing.  For this reason the value of e was reduced to 0.85 
for the modified GLTA, bringing it closer to the typical values shown in 
Table 6 and resulting in more induced drag being generated by the wings. 
The total drag generated by an aircraft is the summation of that generated 
by the various components, of which the wings are an example.  Another 
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source of drag for the GTLA model was the fuselage, which was defined 
through a single fuselage airloads file in FLIGHTLAB.  This file specifies 
the body-referenced force and moment coefficients generated by the 
fuselage over a range of values of angle of attack ( ).  By modifying the 
values of these coefficients it was therefore possible to increase the drag 
generated by the fuselage. Following a number of iterations, the original 
values for coefficients of force in the x-direction (forwards / aft along the 
fuselage) were increased by a factor of 1.7 to give the desired steep 
approach performance.  The modified fuselage force coefficients are 
shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42.  Fuselage x-force coefficients for 
GLTA model before and after modifications. 
Figure 42 shows that, for the range of   values within which the aircraft 
would typically be expected to operate (-20<    <20), the value of x-force 
coefficient has been significantly increased.  The effect of these two 
modifications on the trimmed (longitudinal) control positions of the aircraft 
is shown in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43.  Trim control positions for GLTA 
model before and after modifications. 
The throttle position trace in Figure 43a is analogous to the drag 
characteristics of the aircraft over a range of airspeeds.  The upwards 
displacement of the data demonstrates the effect of the modifications to the 
aerodynamic properties of the aircraft, showing that increased throttle 
setting is required to achieve the desired airspeed.  The close correlation 
between the before / after modification data in Figure 43b shows that there 
has been little effect on the longitudinal stick trim position.  Such a 
correlation is desirable as it indicates that the pitch axis characteristics of 
the aircraft have not been significantly changed from those validated by 
Ref. 3. 
The analysis of throttle setting for a range of approach angles shown in 
Figure 41 was repeated for the modified aircraft model (Figure 44). 
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Figure 44.  Comparison of GLTA throttle 
setting for trimmed flight at a range of flight 
path angles before / after modification. 
The results show that the modified GLTA model was capable of achieving 
trimmed flight at approach angles of up to 5° due to the additional drag 
generated by the wings and fuselage components. 
3.2.2. Visual Model 
In addition to the modifications to the flight physics model, changes were 
made to the visual representation of the GLTA in the HELIFLIGHT 
simulator.  This was done to enable its use for the flare strategy 
investigation described in Chapter 6.  Firstly, improvements were made to 
the visual fidelity of the undercarriage to make it more closely 
representative of the real aircraft.  The circumference of the wheels was 
modelled as a number of straight edges, and this number was increased 
from the original value of 8 to 16.  This resulted in a wheel which looked 
markedly more circular and hence more natural than that of the original 
model.  Cosmetic changes were also made to the structures surrounding the 
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wheels, again to enhance the visual fidelity.  As the aircraft would be 
primarily be used for the landing phase of flight, the flaps on the visual 
model were set to the appropriate position of 50°. 
The second major modification to the visual scene was the addition of an 
aircraft shadow on the surface of the runway.  Since Landscape has no 
native capability to generate shadows of custom 3D objects, the aircraft 
shadow was imported as a new graphical model (Figure 45). 
 
Figure 45.  Aircraft shadow graphical model. 
Figure 45 shows that the shadow model was generated as a flattened 
silhouette of the aircraft.  The assumption was made that the sun would be 
directly above the aircraft throughout the test manoeuvres, and that the 
shadow would be directly below the aircraft.  On this basis, the shadow 
object was configured such that it’s lateral and longitudinal position 
matched that of the aircraft, with the vertical position locked to the terrain.  
The result was a shadow which was always directly below the aircraft and 
always on the ground, which was deemed to be a satisfactory basic 
approximation of the real-life scenario. 
A comparison of the visual model before and after the modifications is 
shown in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46.  Demonstration of modifications 
to GLTA visual model.  View of 
undercarriage before (a-b) and after (c-d). 
Figure 46c-d demonstrates the effect of the visual modifications to the 
wheels, undercarriage, flaps and the addition of the shadow. 
3.2.3. Audio Model 
A pilot comment reported by Ref. 3 was that it was difficult to determine 
whether main gear touchdown had been achieved, especially following 
touchdowns at low vertical velocity.  HELIFLIGHT is capable of 
providing cues through visual, motion and audio channels.  Of these 
channels, both visual and motion were provided in Ref. 3 and have been 
used in a number of previous studies [3, 17, 21].  It remained, therefore, to 
introduce some representative aural cues to the GLTA model.  The method 
used for this was a custom application which enabled the triggering of a 
number of pre-recorded sound effects to be triggered by variables within 
the aircraft model.  These are summarised in Table 7. 
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Table 7.  Summary of GLTA audio model. 








Tyre squeal sound for each instance of 





Ground roll sound whilst aircraft is on 






Engine sound – one per engine.  Pitch 








Sound of landing gear hydraulics / 
locking mechanism. 
The continuous / discrete property of each of the audio cues shown in 
Table 7 refers to the nature of the trigger event.  For example, the tyre 
squeal sound occurred once per instance of a wheel coming into contact 
with the runway, whereas the ground roll sound was continuous whilst the 
aircraft was on the ground and moving.  Both of these sound effects 
provided enhanced cues for the determination of main gear touchdown.  
The volume level of the respective sound effects was tuned in accordance 
with subjective pilot assessment. 
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3.3. Grob Tutor Model 
3.3.1. Flight Physics Model 
For the purposes of the pilot model development exercise described in 
Chapter 7, a simulation model representing a light aircraft was required.  
The aircraft library of the HELIFLIGHT simulator included a model of the 
Grob Tutor; a single-engine, two-seat light training aircraft [69]. 
 
Figure 47.  Grob 115 Tutor.  Image from 
Ref. 69. 
A prerequisite for the implementation of one of the pilot models described 
in Chapter 7 was the presence of a stability control augmentation system 
(SCAS) on this aircraft model to give the appropriate response type.  
Specifically, it was necessary for the aircraft to feature an Attitude 
Command Attitude Hold (ACAH) response type in the roll axis.  As such a 
system was not present on the standard aircraft model, it was deemed 
necessary to implement a simple SCAS.  In order to allow rapid 
prototyping of such a system, a linear approximation of the Grob Tutor 
FLIGHTLAB model was developed in Simulink (Figure 48). 
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Figure 48.  Simulink implementation of 
linear Grob Tutor aircraft model. 
Figure 48 shows that inputs from any of the four controls (lateral and 
longitudinal stick, throttle and rudder pedals) were passed to a state-space 
model of the aircraft dynamics.  This block contained matrices describing 
the linear dynamics of the aircraft model for a particular flight condition, 
relating each of the inputs to a number of model outputs.  These matrices 
were obtained from the full, non-linear FLIGHTLAB model of the Grob 
Tutor through the linearization process defined in Ref. 62.  Note that in this 
instance the control inputs fed to the aircraft dynamics block were purely a 
function of their respective stick inputs, with no feedback from the aircraft 
response.  For this reason, it is referred to as an open-loop system. The 
model outputs shown in Figure 48 include aircraft body rates ( ,  ,  ), 
angles ( ,  ,  ) and velocities (  ,   ,   ).  From these, it was possible to 
obtain the response of the unagumented baseline aircraft model to a step 
input in any of the four controls.  An example is shown in Figure 49 for a 
unit amplitude step in lateral stick from straight and level flight at 90kts. 
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Figure 49.  Response of linear and non-linear 
aircraft models to a unit step in lateral stick. 
Figure 49 shows the response of both the nonlinear FLIGHTLAB model 
and the linear Simulink model to a unit step in lateral stick.  The results 
demonstrate that this lateral stick input caused the aircraft to roll at an 
approximately constant rate of 0.4deg/sec following a short transient 
period.  This shows that the unagumented aircraft featured a rate response 
type in the roll axis, as a constant stick displacement resulted in a constant 
roll angle.  The close concurrence of the linear and nonlinear results 
demonstrates that the linear model shown in Figure 48 was an appropriate 
basis for further controller development. 
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake a 
full controller design exercise, with its associated measures of 
controllability, observability and robustness.  Instead, the intention was to 
implement a simple system which would sufficiently augment the flight 
dynamics of the aircraft model for the purposes of the pilot modelling 
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exercise described in Chapter 7.  As such, the SCAS described in this 
Section is not proposed as an alternative to more sophisticated existing 
solutions, but rather as a simplified version.  The fundamental design 
principle for this simplified roll axis SCAS can be summarised as follows: 
1. Measure current roll angle 
2. Compare current roll angle with commanded roll angle 
3. Generate a command signal as a function of the difference between 
the current roll angle and the commanded value 
4. Feed control signal to the lateral control channel 
5. Return to step 1 
Fundamentally, therefore, if the difference between the lateral stick 
command and the roll angle is minimised by the SCAS, a constant 
amplitude lateral stick input would result in a constant roll angle being 
held.  This is referred to as Attitude Command Attitude Hold (ACAH).  
Figure 50 shows the Simulink implementation of the basic system 
architecture (defined by Ref. 15) required to achieve this form of aircraft 
response. 
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Figure 50.  Simulink implementation of 
ACAH SCAS to linear Grob Tutor aircraft 
model. 
Figure 50 shows that the control inputs to the aircraft dynamics block were 
augmented with signals fed back from the outputs.  For example, the roll 
axis input signal contains feedback from both the roll rate   and roll angle 
  in addition to the lateral stick signal.  Typically both of these loops are 
used to give a stable ACAH type response [15].  The behaviour of this 
closed-loop system was determined by the values of the controller gains in 
the rate (  ) and attitude (  ) channels.  These determine the relative 
amplitude of the three contributions to the control signal; small controller 
gains typically give a system which is responsive to pilot control input but 
lightly damped.  Conversely, high controller gains increase the relative 
amplitude of the stabilising command, thus reducing the responsiveness to 
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pilot control input but increasing stability.  On this basis, it was possible to 
tune the system to give an appropriate response for the pilot model 
development exercise described in Chapter 7.  Note that for reasons of 
simplicity, the controller gains used for this exercise were defined as 
proportional gains, whereas a more advanced system would typically 
feature more sophisticated controller types such as proportional-integral 
(PI) [15].  However, it was found that a satisfactory aircraft response could 
be achieved without the need for this added complexity (Figure 51). 
 
Figure 51.  Response of baseline and ACAH-
enabled aircraft models to a unit step in 
lateral stick. 
Figure 51 shows a comparison between the response of the baseline and 
ACAH-enabled aircraft models to a unit step in lateral stick.  The results 
demonstrate that the ACAH SCAS suppressed the roll rate response of the 
aircraft after an initial increase.  Consequently, the roll attitude achieved 
and sustained a constant value of approximately 1°, essentially emulating 
the shape of the control input.  Thus, it was demonstrated that the dynamics 
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of the aircraft model had been augmented to give an attitude response type 
with a 1:1 relationship between lateral stick and roll angle (i.e. 1% stick 
resulted in 1° of roll angle).  This SCAS was subsequently implemented in 
CSGE to enable its use with the nonlinear FLIGHTLAB model for the 
pilot modelling exercise described in Chapter 7. 
3.3.2. Visual Model 
In order to enable real-time simulation of the pilot model concepts 
described in Chapter 7, the Grob Tutor FLIGHTLAB model was used to 
drive a visual representation (Figure 52). 
 
Figure 52.  Visual representation of the Grob 
Tutor test aircraft [70]. 
The purpose of the visual representation shown in Figure 52 was to provide 
a visualisation of the route flown by the aircraft during the circuit of the 
airfield (a requirement defined in Section 7.1.2).  This was a useful method 
for subjectively verifying that the aircraft was behaving correctly during 
the manoeuvres controlled by the pilot models, as undesirable behaviour 
was not always easily identifiable during the (offline) development phase.  
The scenery database was provided through use of the Visual Flight Rules 
(VFR) photographic database of the UK [70].  This provided the aircraft 
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with a suitable test environment consisting of scenery that was both 
textured and contained representative geographical features such as hills, 
coastline and sea.  Elevation data from the visual database was fed back 
into the FLIGHTLAB model in order to allow ground interaction.  This 
allowed the aircraft to take off and land on any areas of interest within the 
scenery database; a requirement for the circuit task defined in Section 
7.1.2. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
FLARE INITIATION 
One of the key conclusions of the Technical Review (Chapter 2) was that 
the flare manoeuvre is difficult to execute, and that the consequences of 
incorrect execution can be very serious; for example hard landings or 
runway overshoots.  Training literature suggests that there are two aspects 
of the flare that must be performed correctly to ensure a safe touchdown 
[5].  Firstly, the flare must be initiated at the appropriate moment; and 
secondly the correct amount of aft longitudinal stick must be applied.  This 
Chapter is concerned with the former of these two aspects, and outlines an 
experiment which was undertaken to investigate how pilots determine the 
appropriate point for flare initiation. 
4.1. Background 
4.1.1. Limitations of Previous Studies 
A number of previous studies have sought to identify the parameters that 
pilots use to determine the flare initiation point.  Whilst it is generally 
accepted that initiation is triggered by arrival at a threshold value of a 
certain parameter, there is no clear consensus as to the nature of this 
parameter.  The body of evidence from previous studies has focused on the 
following as potential initiation cues: 
 Height above runway  : The distance between the main landing 
gear and the surface of the runway (Figure 53a)[10, 49, 50].  
 Time-to-contact with runway   : The predicted time to main gear 
touchdown at the current descent rate (Figure 53b) [3, 53, 55].  
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 Runway width angle    : The angle formed by the apparent 
expansion of the edges of the runway at the aiming point as the 
aircraft approaches it (Figure 53c).  This parameter can be 
expressed as a function of the line-of-sight range between the pilot 
and the runway aiming point,     ,  as shown in Equation 22 [50, 
56]. 
            (
      
    
) Equation 22 
It should be noted that     is also a function of runway width, 
   .  This parameter varies from one airfield to another, from 
approximately 23m for a small (general aviation) aerodrome 43m 
for a regional airport in the UK, to 50m for an international hub 
[58].  As such, the value of     at which the flare is initiated 
would not necessarily be expected to remain constant over 
approaches to different runways, potentially limiting the value of 
    as a universal cue for flare initiation. 
 Runway side angle rate  ̇  : As the aircraft approaches the 
runway, the angle described by its sides increases.  It has 
previously been proposed that the rate of change of this angle,  ̇  , 
could be used as a cue for flare initiation (Figure 53d).   ̇   can be 
defined as a function of the height of the height of the pilot’s eye 
above the runway,     , and    (Equation 23) [57]. 
 ̇   (
   
    
        
 )       Equation 23 
Equation 23 shows that, as was the case for    ,  ̇   is a function 
of the geometry of the runway being approached.  As such, it is 
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subject to the same potential limitations as     in terms of being 
the basis of a universal flare initiation cue. 
 
 
Figure 53.  Potential cues for flare initiation. 
Studies investigating the parameters shown in Figure 53 are discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.3.3.  It was found that each of these studies 
featured limitations which reduced the similarity of the experiment to the 
real-world scenario.  Firstly, Refs 50, 53 and 55 did not require the pilot to 
actually perform the flare manoeuvre, but rather to initiate a predefined 
flare by pressing a button.  This method was used in order to simplify the 
experiment by removing the requirement for piloting ability, but is clearly 
not representative of the real task.  Additionally, the predefined manoeuvre 
used by Ref. 53 was a simple exponential flight path, whereas Ref. 3 
previously demonstrated that piloted flares do not usually conform to such 
a trajectory.   A related limitation in Refs. 50, 53 and 55 was that the 
participants involved in the experiment were non-pilots.  Although it is not 
always practical for large numbers of participants, when conducting an 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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investigation into a piloting task, clearly it is preferable to use qualified 
pilots as test subjects. 
Whereas Refs. 50, 53 and 55 investigated the effect of varying approach 
angle on flare initiation strategy, Refs. 56 and 57 used only a single 
approach angle; a “normal” 3° scenario.  Although it is true that standard 
operating procedures [10] define a standard approach as being 
approximately 3°, the dynamics of the aircraft and the atmospheric 
conditions can often result in an unintentional variation in approach angle 
(as reported in Ref. 51).  Additionally, the geography of certain airfields 
necessitates non-standard approaches.  For example London City Airport 
mandates a nominal approach angle of 5.5° due to noise abatement 
requirements related to its urban location [58].  For this reason, it is 
necessary to include variation in approach angle when investigating flare 
initiation strategy, rather than assuming the nominal 3° scenario. 
The visual scene presented to the pilots in Refs. 50, 53 and 55 were 
simplified or sparse.  A comparison between such a simplified scene and 
one which is typically used in the Heliflight simulator at UoL is shown in 
Figure 54. 
 
Figure 54.  Comparison of visual scene used 
by Ref. 53 (a) and a typical scene from the 
Heliflight simulator (b). 
a) b) 
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One of the fundamental principles of the ecological approach to visual 
perception is that the observer makes use of the information received from 
the optical flow.  If the content of the flow were to become in some way 
reduced (as in Figure 54a), it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
perceptual mechanisms of the pilot would be affected.  Indeed, Ref. 50 
demonstrated that the flare initiation strategy used by the pilot changed 
when the scene content was varied.  For this reason, a visual scene which is 
closely representative of the real-life situation is clearly desirable.  In 
addition, a number of previous studies [50, 55] restrained the pilots’ heads 
through the use of a chin rest to restrict their fields of view.  Although this 
is a common feature of psychological experiments, it is clearly not 
representative of the real-life cockpit environment, in which the pilots are 
able to move their heads freely. 
A key objective of this experiment, therefore, was to address the 
limitations of previous studies whilst investigating flare initiation.  In order 
to achieve this, the following features were included in the experiment 
reported in this Chapter: 
 Four qualified pilots of varying experience levels were used for the 
simulated flight tests (Section 4.2.2). 
 A detailed visual scene including a representative runway with 
appropriate markings was used (Figure 54b). 
 The field of view and cockpit environment were representative of 
the real-life scenario, in that the pilot’s head was not restrained and 
the visual scene was presented through a wrap-around visual 
system. 
 The pilots were required to control the aircraft throughout each 
flight, including manually performing the flare manoeuvre. 
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4.1.2. Hypothesis 
A number of previous studies at UoL have provided compelling evidence 
for the use of tau-based control strategies for a variety of piloting tasks.  
For this reason, the hypothesis of this experiment was that pilot make use 
of a constant value of time-to-contact with the runway (  ) to initiate the 
flare.  In addition, it was hypothesised that this strategy would remain 
unchanged for a range of approach angles (and hence vertical velocities), 
which would demonstrate the universal nature of such a strategy.  Finally, 
it was hypothesised that directing pilots to initiate the flare at a threshold 
value of   would result in superior flare performance than directing flare 
initiation based on other constant cues.  The method used to command the 
flare initiation point is described in Section 4.2.2. 
4.2. Experimental Set-up 
4.2.1. Initial Conditions  
The experiment was divided into two tasks, each of which was repeated for 
approach angles of 2, 3, 4 and 5 degrees at a slant range of 2 nautical miles.  
The view from the centre visual channel of the simulator for each of these 
start conditions is shown in Figure 55.  This approach distance was 
selected as it provided a compromise between the more representative case 
of a full approach (4-7nm [58]) and the least time consuming case of a very 
short approach (<1nm).  Selection of this 2nm value was validated by 
subjective pilot comments before testing began, with the pilot reporting 
that a longer approach would not significantly affect the task.  The nominal 
approach angle was varied by manipulation of the longitudinal and vertical 
position of the aircraft prior to each test, as shown in Table 8. 
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Figure 55.  Start positions corresponding to 
2° (a), 3° (b), 4° (c) and 5° (d) approaches. 
Table 8.  Positions of runway and start 
conditions for approach and landing task. 
Description X-position 
[ft] 
Y-position [ft] Z-position [ft] Comment 
Runway aiming 
point 
0 0 0 Runway 36L 
2° Approach -12145 0 898 
Corresponds to 
Figure 55a 
3° Approach -12136 0 1110 
Corresponds to 
Figure 55b 
4° Approach -12122 0 1322 
Corresponds to 
Figure 55c 
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The 0 values in the Y-position column of Table 8 show that the aircraft 
was laterally aligned with the runway centreline at the start of each test.  
The vertical (z) position of the aircraft was varied to give the desired 
approach angle, and the longitudinal (x) position was adjusted to maintain 
the 2nm line-of-sight range to the runway aiming point.  A method was 
developed to automatically position and trim the aircraft at the selected 
start point, which minimised the time delay between test points.  
4.2.2. Task Description  
The experiment was divided into two tasks, which both utilised the start 
conditions detailed in Section 4.2.1.  Task 1 was intended to form a 
baseline scenario, in which the pilots were free to fly the approach and 
perform the flare at their discretion.  The longitudinal stick was used to 
control the angle of the elevators and a single lever was used to collectively 
control the thrust of the four engines.  The pilots were briefed to attempt to 
achieve main gear touchdown on the runway aiming point, shown in 
Figure 56. 
 
Figure 56.  Schematic of runway markings 
implemented in HELIFLIGHT  simulator. 
A key to the labels in Figure 56 are shown in Table 9. 
 
1 2 3 4 
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Table 9.  Key to runway symbols. 
Label Description Notes 
1 Overrun area “Keep clear” area 




Runway 36L corresponds to the 
leftmost runway on a 360° heading 
4 
Touchdown markers 
Desired longitudinal touchdown 
position, 1000ft from threshold 
The four parameters defined in Section 4.1.1 were recorded for each flight, 
with the aim of analysing their respective values at the point of flare 
initiation.  Each flight was deemed to have ended at the moment of main 
gear touchdown on the runway, at which point the simulation was paused 
before being configured for the next test point. 
To enable the pilots to accurately maintain the appropriate glide slope, an 
ILS glideslope indicator was provided on the Primary Flight Display 
(PFD).  This indicated the relative vertical situation of the aircraft 
compared to the ideal flight path required to reach the runway threshold.  
The ILS glideslope indicator was implemented as a Head Down Display 
(HDD) (Figure 57), as was the case for the flight test campaign described 
in Ref. 3.  Airspeed, altitude, pitch angle and other standard flight data 
were also displayed on the PFD. 
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Figure 57.  Primary Flight Display (PFD).  
See Table 10 for annotations. 
The PFD shown in Figure 57 was enabled for each of the test runs, and a 
description of its layout was included in the pilot briefing.  All elements of 
the display were functional, however not all of these were relevant to this 
task; for example the compass was rendered irrelevant due to the lateral 
states of the aircraft model being disabled.  The elements of the PFD which 
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Table 10.  Description of PFD features. 
No. Description Comment 
1 Airspeed (kts) Indicated airspeed in knots 
2 Throttle (%) Position of cockpit throttle lever position 
3 
ILS glide slope deviation 
indicator (°) 
Deviation from nominal glide slope.  Full range 
+/- 1.5°   
4 Radar altimeter (ft) Radar height above terrain in feet 
5 
Distance Measuring Equipment 
(DME) 
Distance to runway threshold in nautical miles 
6 Flap position (°) Position of main wing flaps in degrees (0-50°) 
7 Gear position 
Status of landing gear.  Green = down, red = 
extending / retracting, grey = up 
8 
ILS glide slope deviation 
indicator (°) 
Repeat of item 3 
9 Pressure altimeter (ft) Height above sea level in feet 
The pilots were instructed to perform the flare manoeuvre and land the 
aircraft at their discretion.  This was to be done visually, i.e. without 
reference to the instruments and without any artificial guidance.  The task 
was performed four times for each of the pilots. 
Task 2 was similar to task 1, except that a visual command (“FLARE”) 
was displayed via a HUD to command the flare initiation point, rather than 
this being at the discretion of the pilot.  This HUD symbology used is 
shown in Figure 58.  
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Figure 58.  Visual flare initiation cue 
displayed via a HUD. 
This visual cue was triggered by the aircraft satisfying one of the 
conditions shown in Table 11.  The message was displayed until main gear 
touchdown was achieved, at which point the message switched to 
“Derotate”.  The purpose of this was to provide an additional touchdown 
cue to the pilot, and to indicate that the test was complete. 
Table 11.  Flare initiation cues used to drive 
the visual flare command. 
Parameter Threshold Value 
h 50ft 
   4 sec 
    30° 
Note that  ̇   has been omitted from Table 11.  Time constraints and pilot 
availability limited the number of test points that could be performed for a 
given task, and the  ̇   based flare strategy was the least well supported 
by the body of  evidence from previous studies (Section 2.4).  As such, this 
parameter was not used for driving the initiation cue in task 2. 
For a given test point, the pilot was unaware of which cue was being used, 
and the HUD symbology was identical in each case.  The value of   =4 sec 
was selected initially based on a tuning exercise for a novel pilot aid 
developed by Ref. 3 for this aircraft.  The value of h=50ft is approximately 
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the height which corresponds to   =4 sec assuming a forward airspeed ( ) 
of 140kts and and γ of 3°, as shown in Equation 24. 




 ̇           
    
 
       
 Equation 24 
    
  
          
          
The 50ft figure is also representative of standard operating procedures for 
large transport aircraft – for example the standard flare height for both the 
Boeing 747 and 767 is stated their respective operating manuals as 
“approximately 50ft” [10, 49].  The value of     shown in Table 11 was 
initially selected based on the findings of Ref. 55, which found that pilots 
initiated the flare with          .  However, this value was changed to 
30° following a tuning exercise undertaken by P1, who reported that 
setting the flare cue to           resulted in an earlier than expected 
flare initiation.  The necessity of this change in     can be attributed to 
the fact that this parameter is dependent on the associated runway 
geometry, as shown in Equation 22 (Ref. 55 used a narrower runway than 
was the case for this study).  As such, it is implied that different runway 
types require a different value of    ; the implications of this are 
discussed further in Section 4.3.3. 
In order to isolate the parameter of interest (reduction of vertical velocity 
by performing the flare), the aircraft model was set to allow motion in the 
longitudinal and vertical axes only.  For this reason, all of the approaches 
were initiated with the aircraft directly aligned runway centreline and on 
runway heading.  The pilots were able to physically move the lateral 
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controls (control column and pedals), but this had no effect on the motion 
of the aircraft.  A further simplification to the simulated flare task was that 
the atmospheric conditions were set to nil wind and nil turbulence, 
removing the requirement for the pilot to compensate for any such 
perturbations. 
4.2.3. Pilots 
Pilots with varying experience levels were selected for this experiment.  
The primary rationale for this was to increase the level of confidence in the 
conclusions drawn in the case that different pilots displayed similar control 
strategies.  Additionally, any differences in the strategies observed could 
potentially be linked to pilot experience or aircraft type currency.  The 
experience level of each pilot (at the time of the flight tests) is summarised 
as follows: 
 P1:  Airline pilot and former military test pilot, currently flying 
Airbus A320/A319/A318 for a major carrier.  Approximately 
12500 hours flown on 37 fixed-wing aircraft types. 
 P2:  Former military test pilot with experience of many fixed-wing 
(approx. 2000 hours) and rotary-wing (approx. 3000 hours) aircraft 
types.  
 P3:  Current military pilot in training.  74 hours flown on fixed-
wing aircraft. 
 P4:  Airline pilot and former military test pilot, currently flying 
Boeing 747 for a major carrier.  Approximately 9000 hours flown 
on a large variety of fixed-wing transport aircraft. 
Each pilot was briefed (Appendix B) and given an opportunity to become 
familiar with the aircraft dynamics by performing a number of practice 
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landings.  Once the pilot was able to consistently perform satisfactory 
landings (established through subjective pilot performance assessment) the 
flight test campaign was completed in a single session. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Flare Initiation Point Identification 
In order to analyse the parameters of interest at the flare initiation point for 
the task 1 flights, it was first necessary to identify this point from the 
recorded data.  Three methods of potentially achieving this were identified 
from previous studies: 
 Use of a pilot-activated flare initiation indicator, for example a 
button to be press in the cockpit of the simulator.  For example, the 
only control available to the pilots in the experiment described in 
Refs. 8, 50 and 53 was such a button, which triggered a predefined 
flare manoeuvre when pressed. 
 Visual inspection of the longitudinal stick (  ) time-history [57].  
The flare is initiated by the pilot applying a large amplitude aft 
stick input, the start point of which can be identified manually by 
this method. 
 Trend analysis of the longitudinal stick time-history.  Ref. 53 
proposed the use of a moving average filter to identify the flare 
initiation point.  This method was based on the assumption that the 
pilot would make a number of small corrective inputs whilst 
maintaining the glide slope during the approach phase, the mean of 
which would be approximately zero.  By contrast, the flare would 
be characterised by a large amplitude input in one direction (aft), 
causing a change in the mean stick deflection away from zero.  Ref. 
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53 used a threshold value of change in mean stick deflection to 
determine the time at which the flare was initiated. 
The first of these methods would have required an addition to the piloting 
task performed by the pilots at the point of flare initiation (i.e. pressing a 
button).  Such a task would not be representative of the real-life task, and 
as such was deemed inappropriate for the purposes of this study.  The 
second method had the advantage of being the simplest, as manual 
identification of the flare initiation point from the longitudinal stick time-
history is a trivial task for a given flight.  The main disadvantage of this 
method is that its subjective nature introduces a small degree of uncertainty 
into the selection process.  Additionally, given the number of flights (72 
flights per pilot, 4 pilots), manual inspection of data from was a time 
consuming process.  The moving average analysis method was tested on 
sample data from this experiment, and was shown to provide a reasonable 
solution for identification of the flare initiation point in some cases.  
However, the varying levels of aggression associated with the different 
pilots (and approach angles) used for this study meant that a different 
threshold value of mean stick deflection for each pilot / approach angle 
combination.  This both increased the complexity and reduced the 
consistency of this approach, thereby removing two of its potential 
advantages.  Additionally, it was found that other stick activity could give a 
false indication of flare initiation when using this method; for example the 
pilot making a positive glideslope correction after noticing a deviation 
from the desired approach angle.  The visual inspection method was 
therefore selected due to its relative simplicity and consistency.  Figure 59 
shows sample flare data from each pilot for task 1. 
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Figure 59.  Sample data for each pilot from 
task 1 showing flare initiation point 
identification. 
Inspection of the longitudinal stick (  ) time history in Figure 59 shows 
that the flare initiation point was characterised by an aggressive aft stick 
movement which coincided with the beginning of the aircraft’s vertical 
deceleration.  The time at which this stick movement began for each flight, 
      , corresponded to the flare initiation time, sample values of which 
(for the data shown in Figure 59) are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Sample        values selected 
from data shown in in Figure 59. 
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The value of        for each flight was then used as an index value with 
which to identify the values of other parameters of interest from the data at 
this point.  The results of this analysis are presented in Section 4.3.2.  It 
should be noted that the stick movement following the flare initiation point 
was analysed to investigate its conformity to a tau-based strategy.  This 
preliminary analysis did not identify any such conformity, but its effect on 
the resultant motion of the aircraft is discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.3.2. Task 1 Results 
The main objective of the flare manoeuvre is to reduce the aircraft’s 
vertical velocity,   , from the approach value to an appropriate touchdown 
value.  As such the value of    at touchdown,     , was used as a metric 
of flare performance.  Performance criteria for this manoeuvre were 
defined by Ref. 71 as 5ft/sec and 3ft/sec for adequate and desired 
performance respectively.  The value of      for each flight was identified 
by capturing the value of    at the point at which the main gear first came 
into contact with the runway surface.  Figure 60 shows a comparison of the 
values of      for each of the pilots in task 1 and the specified 
performance criteria. 
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Figure 60.  Comparison of flare performance 
for 4 pilots at 4 approach angles (task 1) 
Note that the box plot format shown in Figure 60 was used as it provided a 
medium through which to display both the performance and consistency of 
each pilot in terms of     .  A key to this notation is shown in Figure 61. 
 
Figure 61.  Key to box plot notation. 
Figure 61 shows how a range of relevant statistical properties of a group of 
results can be represented on a single figure using the box plot notation.  
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Note that the statistical outliers were defined as values falling outside the 
upper or lower interquartile ranges by a factor of 1.5, a method described 
in Ref. 72.  In terms of the flare task, therefore, ideal performance would 
be represented by the minimum and maximum (and therefore median) 
values on Figure 60 falling upon or below the desired performance 
criterion.  Inspection of the results, however, shows that this was not the 
case for any of the pilots during task 1.  P1 was the closest to achieving this 
level of performance, with both median and 75th percentile range falling 
within desired performance.  Of the pilots tested, P1 was most current on 
aircraft types similar to the GLTA model and therefore potentially more 
familiar with the task.  However, it should be noted that the least 
experienced pilot, P3, achieved performance comparable to that of P1.  
This suggests that experience is not necessarily a factor for flare 
performance, although additional testing would be required to investigate 
this assertion further.  P2 exhibited the largest spread of     values, which 
covered the desired, adequate and outside of adequate performance criteria.  
This pilot reported difficulty in adapting to the cockpit height of the 
aircraft, which at 13.7ft was significantly higher than the aircraft types 
familiar to him (small fixed-wing aircraft / military rotorcraft).  This could 
have affected P2’s ability to accurately estimate the relative situation of the 
aircraft and the runway, and therefore the timing of the flare.  Conversely, 
at the time of the experiment P4 was current on very large transport aircraft 
types (Boeing 747 / Airbus A380), and therefore reported some difficulty 
in adapting to the smaller aircraft represented by the GLTA model.  This 
was reflected in the results shown in Figure 60, with P4’s median value 
falling outside of the desired performance criterion.  It should also be noted 
that both P1 and P2 experienced instances of touchdowns with      values 
well outside of the adequate performance criterion.  This demonstrates the 
high level of difficulty associated with this task, that was previously 
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reported by Ref. 8, as two highly experienced pilots were not consistently 
able to achieve adequate performance. 
P1 and P3 both reported difficulty in maintaining the target approach speed 
of 145kts for the steep approach cases (    ), as the aircraft tended to 
accelerate towards the runway. As such, a number of the flares represented 
by the results in Figure 60 were performed at a speed higher than the 
nominal manoeuvre speed, a factor which the pilots reported to have an 
adverse effect on their performance.  Additionally, it was reported that 
even in the cases where the appropriate speed was maintained accurately, 
the unusually steep nature of the 5  cases made the initiation point difficult 
to judge.  This offers a potential explanation for the presence of the outliers 
in Figure 60, as the steep approach angle may have resulted in higher      
values.  In order to investigate this further, the analysis of      values was 
divided into those relating to “standard” 3° approaches and steeper 5° 
cases.  The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 62. 
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Figure 62.  Flare performance analysis for 
3°(a) and 5°(b) approach angles. 
Figure 62a shows that, for the 3  cases, three of the four pilots were able to 
achieve median touchdown values within the desired approach criterion.  
The exception to this was P2, whose median value of      (4.2ft/sec) fell 
within adequate performance.  This result can be attributed to the 
aforementioned difficulty that this pilot experienced in adapting to the 
cockpit height of the GLTA model.  P1 achieved desired performance for 
all of the 3  flights in task 1, with a median     value of 1.05ft/sec, and 
commented that this approach angle was the most representative of the 
standard real-life task.  This, combined with P1’s previous experience with 
both the HELIFLIGHT simulator and the GLTA model, suggests that task-
specific experience is a factor in determining flare performance. 
When the approach angle was increased to 5 , the most obvious effect on 
the results (Figure 62b) was to increase the spread of     values for P1 
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and P2.  In the case of P1, this had a negligible effect on the median value, 
suggesting that this pilot was still capable of achieving desired 
performance in spite of the steeper approach angle.  Indeed, P2 
demonstrated a reduction in median value of      from 4.2ft/sec to 
3.0ft/sec for the 5  flights, in spite of a large increase in the spread of 
values.  The results for these two pilots suggest that increasing the 
approach angle increases the difficulty of the task, but that desired 
performance is still attainable if the pilot executes the manoeuvre in a 
suitable manner.  However, it should be noted that P3’s performance 
actually improved in terms of both median value and spread of      when 
the approach angle was increased.  P3 commented that he was being 
“cautious” in his piloting strategy for the 5  flights, initiating the flare 
slightly earlier than he felt necessary in order to sufficiently reduce the 
aircraft’s    well before touchdown.  This compensatory strategy was 
clearly effective, as Figure 62b shows that P3’s      values for the 5  
approach cases were almost entirely within the desired performance 
criterion.  For P4, the increased approach angle displaced the median 
    value from desired performance (2.8ft/sec) to adequate performance 
(4.55ft/sec).  This result supports the comments made by this pilot that it 
was more difficult to achieve desired performance when approaching at the 
steeper 5  angle.  It should be noted that a similar trend was also evident 
for the 4  cases, with P1, P2 and P4 all experiencing landings with 
    values outside of the adequate performance criterion.  Conversely, all 
pilots achieved adequate performance for the 2  cases. 
With the flare initiation points and baseline levels of touchdown 
performance established for each pilot, the next stage of the analysis was to 
compare the values of the four parameters of interest (Figure 53) at the 
point of flare initiation.  For a particular parameter to be considered an 
invariant trigger for initiation of this manoeuvre, its value would be 
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expected to remain approximately constant regardless of the approach 
angle.  In order to test this, the variation of each of the parameters of 
interest with approach angle is shown in Figure 63.  Note that the values 
shown are the mean of each of the flights in task 1 for a given approach 
angle. 
 
Figure 63.  Variation of height, time-to-
contact with runway, runway width angle 
and runway side angle rate at flare initiation 
with approach angle. 
Figure 63a shows the variation in height above runway,  , at flare initiation 
with varying approach angle  . The        values show a clearly 
increasing trend with   for all pilots, suggesting that the pilots initiated the 
flare at a greater height when approaching at a steeper angle.  Such a trend 
suggests that although h is related to the flare initiation point (this is 
intuitively obvious, as a steeper approach gives a higher vertical velocity 
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and so an earlier initiation is required to decelerate sufficiently), it is not 
used as an invariant trigger value for this manoeuvre.  Figure 63a also 
shows that P2 consistently initiated the flare later than the other pilots, 
which supports the comments previously reported by this pilot regarding 
the cockpit height of the aircraft.  In order to determine the degree of 
linearity of the relationship between   and each of the variables of interest, 
a least-squares regression analysis was conducted.  The resultant 
correlation coefficients are shown in Table 13, with large values 
(approaching unity) indicating a strongly linear correlation. 
Table 13. Linear correlation coefficients of 
normalised parameters at flare initiation to 
approach angle  . 
Parameter P1 P2 P3 P4 
       0.9753 0.9703 0.8950 0.8224 
         0.0462 0.5023 0.4339 0.7708 
          0.4328 0.6130 0.7162 0.8991 
 ̇         0.9843 0.9912 0.9823 0.9832 
 
Figure 63d and Table 13 show that the parameter with the strongest 
relationship to   was found to be the runway side angle rate,  ̇        , 
with a mean linear correlation coefficient of 0.9853 across the four pilots 
tested.  The results show that the value of  ̇         increased in an 
approximately linear relationship with   for all four pilots, and such a 
result strongly implies that an invariant value of  ̇   is not used as the 
basis of a strategy for flare initiation.  However it should be noted that, for 
the standard 3° approach, the values of  ̇         were approximately 
constant across the four pilots.  This supports the findings of Ref. 57, 
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which proposed  ̇         as an invariant cue for flare initiation on the 
basis of simulated approach and landing manoeuvres at a single, standard 
3° angle. 
The variation in          with   is shown in Figure 63b.  For this 
parameter, the clear relationship with approach angle that was observed 
with        (Figure 63a) was absent, and this is reflected in the lower linear 
correlation coefficients for this parameter shown in Table 13.  For 
example, the          values for P1 remained approximately constant at -
3.5 seconds for each of the approach angles tested.  This result suggests 
that this pilot could have been making use of a constant          initiation 
strategy for this task.  However, the relationship between          and   is 
less clear for the other three pilots.  For example, P3 demonstrated an 
approximately constant value of          ( -5 seconds) for the 2°, 3° and 
4° approaches, but a value of -4.2 seconds for the 5° case.  In terms of 
variation of          values, it should be noted that the y-axis of Figure 63b 
covers a range of only 3.5 seconds.  For this reason, a small variation in 
piloting strategy would have a large effect on the appearance of the results 
on this Figure.  Conversely, the      values shown in Figure 63c cover a 
range of approximately 10° to 325°, which corresponds to a significant 
difference in the respective visual scenes.  Specifically, a value of     = 
10° represents a narrow perceived runway width, whereas     = 180° 
represents a scenario in which the runway is dominating the visual scene 
(note that values of           greater than 180° correspond to flares 
initiated after the aircraft had overflown the runway aiming point marker).  
As the maximum horizontal field of view capability of the HELIFLIGHT 
simulator is 140°, it should be noted that values greater than this represent 
a situation in which the outside edges of the runway are beyond the lateral 
extremities of the visual scene presented to the pilot.  To enable a 
comparison of the significance of the spread of the 4 parameters at flare 
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initiation, the data were normalised by their respective means.  For 
example, the expression used to obtain the normalised values of        is 
shown in Equation 12: 
 ̅      
      
            
 Equation 25 
This process was repeated for each of the 4 parameters for each of the 
pilots at the point of flare initiation, and the resulting values are shown in 
Figure 64. 
 
Figure 64.  Normalised parameter values at 
flare initiation. 
The standard deviation of each of these normalised parameters is shown in 
Table 14. 
  122 
Table 14.  Standard deviation of normalised 
parameters at flare initiation. 
Parameter P1 P2 P3 P4 
       0.3995 0.5359 0.4956 0.5513 
         0.1785 0.4126 0.2955 0.3891 
          0.2154 0.8396 1.1251 0.9587 
 ̇         0.2279 0.4283 0.2278 0.2809 
The normalised results shown in Figure 64 and Table 14 enabled a direct 
comparison between the relative consistencies of the four parameters for 
the range of flights undertaken by each pilot.  The results show that        
varied widely for all four pilots, and was the least consistent parameter for 
P1 with a standard deviation of 0.3995 compared to 0.1785 for         .  
This supports the previously stated assertion that        is directly 
correlated to  , and is thus not an appropriate invariant cue for flare 
initiation (as was proposed by Ref. 50).           was shown to be the most 
consistent parameter for P1 and P2, with standard deviation values of 
0.1785 and 0.4126 respectively.  The fact that P2’s standard deviation 
value for this parameter was approximately 2.3 times larger than P1’s 
value demonstrates that P2 was not as consistent as P1 in terms of initiation 
point selection.  This supports the previous finding that P1’s recent and 
relevant experience of this task resulted in more consistent performance 
than that of the other pilots.  Furthermore, the fact that the pilot who 
exhibited the best overall flare performance was also the most consistent in 
terms of initiation point selection emphasises the importance of appropriate 
initiation to the success of the manoeuvre. 
For P3 and P4, Figure 64 shows that          and  ̇         were 
approximately equal in terms of consistency.  However, the strong 
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correlation between  ̇         and   shown in Figure 63d precludes the 
possibility of  ̇         being used as an invariant cue for flare initiation.  
The fact that           was shown to be independent of   (Figure 63b) and 
relatively consistent for all four pilots supports the hypothesis that this is an 
appropriate basis for a flare initiation strategy.  Such a strategy would 
further benefit from being independent of runway geometry, meaning that 
a single value of           would potentially be valid for any runway / 
approach angle combination for a given aircraft. 
Figure 64a shows that     was far more consistent for P1 than for the 
other three pilots.  Indeed, for P2, P3 and P4,     was actually the least 
consistent parameter.  This suggests that either P1 was using a different 
strategy to the other pilots, or that a feature of this pilot’s strategy resulted 
in consistent values of     at flare initiation.  A key property of the     
parameter is its dependence on longitudinal position (Equation 22).  In 
order to evaluate whether the variation (between pilots) in longitudinal 
position at the point of flare initiation        had an effect on   , the 
values of         were found for each flight.  The collated results are shown 
in Figure 65. 
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Figure 65.  Longitudinal position at flare 
initiation for each pilot, task 1. 
Note that in Figure 65, 0ft on the y-axis corresponds to the centre of the 
touchdown position marker on the runway, with negative values denoting a 
short touchdown and positive values denoting an overshoot.  The results 
show that P3 and P4 initiated the flare over a similar range of 
approximately 3000ft to 500ft before the target touchdown point.  The 
results for P2 show that this pilot tended to initiate the flare later (in terms 
of longitudinal position) than the other pilots.  This finding is in agreement 
with those for height at flare initiation (Figure 63a), which showed P2 to 
consistently perform lower flares than the other pilots.  The results for P1 
show that this pilot was more consistent in longitudinal positioning of the 
flare than the other three pilots, with a        range of 1214ft.  By contrast, 
the next most consistent pilot was P3 with a        range of 2491ft, 
representing approximately double the spread of P1.  This can again be 
attributed to the fact that P1 had both the most recent and relevant real-
world experience to this task, in addition to being the most experienced in 
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the use of the HELIFLIGHT simulator.  Thus, it would be expected that 
this pilot would be highly proficient, and therefore consistent, at this 
simplified flare task.  P1 also commented that achieving appropriate 
longitudinal touchdown (   ) performance was especially important for 
larger aircraft types (e.g. Boeing 747) to ensure that sufficient stopping 
distance is available after touchdown.  Indeed, it was reported that for some 
landings the performance in terms of      was compromised in order to 
achieve adequate performance in    .  This, in addition to the difficulty of 
the task, offers a potential explanation for P1 not consistently achieving 
desired      performance (Figure 60).  As it was previously shown in 
Equation 22 that           is a function of       , it is possible that P1’s 
consistent values of           (shown in Figure 64) are a result of P1’s 
consistent        performance. 
4.3.3. Task 2 Results 
The objective of task 2 was to investigate the relationship between flare 
initiation strategy and touchdown performance.  To this end, the pilots 
were instructed to initiate the flare by a HUD, which was activated when 
the value of one of the potential flare cues reached a predefined threshold 
value shown in Table 11.  It was thus hypothesised that a successful flare 
initiation strategy would result in desired touchdown performance being 
achieved.  The touchdown performance analysis for task 2 is shown in 
Figure 66.  Note that due to time constraints and pilot availability, it was 
not feasible to test all four parameters for this task, as discussed in Section 
4.2.2. 
  126 
 
Figure 66.  Comparison of flare performance 
for 4 pilots at 4 approach angles (task 2). 
Figure 66 shows the combined values of     for all approach angles for 
each pilot in task 2.  The results show that the type of flare initiation cue 
used had a marked effect on the performance of the subsequent manoeuvre.  
For example, the results for P1 (Figure 66a) show that the median value of 
     fell within the desired performance criterion for each of the flare 
cues.  However, the spread of values was much larger for the   and     
flights than for the    cases, with values falling outside of the adequate 
performance criterion.  P1 commented that the  -cued flares for the 5° 
approaches were commanded significantly later than expected, and that the 
subsequent manoeuvre had to be performed with high aggression to 
compensate for this.  It was reported that if such a manoeuvre was 
attempted in a real aircraft (of the same type as the GLTA model), then the 
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high pitch angle incurred would likely result in the tail of the aircraft 
striking the runway surface.  The GLTA model was implemented based on 
the assumption that only the landing gear (and no other part of the aircraft) 
was able to come into contact with the ground, and as such tail strike was 
not modelled.  Thus, it can be concluded that in the real-life task, the 
consequences of the late initiation resulting from the  -cued flares would 
have been more serious than the hard landings shown in Figure 66.  This 
could be investigated further by the addition of a ground contact point on 
the tail of the GLTA model to enable the simulation of tail strike on 
landing. 
The   -cued flares were also shown to be the most consistent and 
successful for pilots P2 and P3 (Figure 66b - Figure 66c).  For P4, (Figure 
66d) the results were less conclusive, although it was clearly demonstrated 
that the   cued flights gave the least consistent flare performance, with a 
number of      values well outside of the adequate performance criterion.  
These findings overall, therefore, support the hypothesis that a constant 
value of    is an appropriate flare initiation cue for a variety of approach 
angles.  It should be noted that the   and    -cued flares did produce 
some landings which fell within the adequate performance criteria for each 
pilot.  This result suggests that, although    was shown to be the most 
appropriate flare initiation cue, the other cues were not totally 
inappropriate.  Thus, it is not proposed that the findings of the previous 
studies [8, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57] were erroneous, but rather that certain 
simplifications of the task (e.g. using a single approach angle) result in a 
preference for different initiation cues.  Indeed, the findings of Ref. 57  
(that  ̇         is approximately constant for a standard 3° approach) were 
supported by the results reported in this Chapter.  Additionally, the 
behaviour of the           initiation cue was reported by P1 and P4 to be 
highly dependent on the longitudinal position of the aircraft in the 
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moments leading up to flare initiation.  As P1 was shown to be the most 
consistent in terms of        in task 1, this pilot also experienced the most 
successful    -cued flares in task 2.  The study which proposed     as a 
flare initiation cue did not allow the pilots any degree of control over the 
longitudinal position of the aircraft, resulting in a constant value of         
for every flight.  Had such a limitation been imposed on the task presented 
in this Chapter, it is entirely possible that the results would have 
corroborated the findings of Ref. 55. 
It should be noted that, due to time constraints and pilot availability, the 
sample of results gathered was of insufficient size to undertake any formal 
analysis of the statistical significance of the results.  As such, there is a 
possibility that some of the observed differences in flare performance could 
be a result of statistical variation, rather than effects of the experiment.  
However, the fact that the relationship between      and flare initiation 
cue in task 2 was consistent across 3 of the 4 pilots tested suggests that the 
result is statistically significant.  This could be validated in a future 
extension of the experiment by increasing either the number of pilots or the 
number of test points (or indeed both).  A greater number of pilots could 
have been recruited for this experiment though the use of novice pilots.  
However this would have reduced the degree to which the findings could 
be applied to the real-life task; a limitation of some related previous studies 
identified in Section 2.4. 
4.4. Conclusions & Recommendations 
The experiment presented in the Chapter was undertaken to test the 
hypothesis that pilots use a single, invariant value of    to initiate the flare 
manoeuvre when approaching from a variety of angles.  A secondary 
hypothesis was that performance would be improved when the pilots were 
directed to initiate the flare at a constant value of    compared to at a 
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constant value of   or    .  Following analysis of the results, the 
conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
 Both        and  ̇         were shown to exhibit an approximately 
linear relationship to   for all four pilots.  As such, it is concluded 
that a single, invariant value of either of these parameters is not 
used as the basis of a flare initiation strategy.  Conversely, the value 
of          was shown to be relatively consistent across the range of 
approach angles.  This finding supports the primary hypothesis of 
the experiment. 
     was shown to provide an appropriate flare cue for cases in 
which the aircraft was positioned accurately (longitudinally) 
relative to the touchdown marker on the runway.  However, for 
cases in which the aircraft overflew the touchdown marker, the 
          based cue did not provide appropriate guidance.  The 
pilot with the most recent and relevant experience of the real-world 
equivalent task was shown to have the most consistent performance 
in terms of longitudinal position at flare initiation.  As such, the 
value of            was relatively consistent for this pilot (though 
not to the same extent as         ).  A further potential limitation of 
a flare initation strategy based on a constant value of           is 
this parameter’s dependence on the width of the runway in 
question. Indeed, this was highlighted by Ref. 55 as a potential 
source of accidents, as pilots incorrectly apply an initiation strategy 
learned at one airfield whilst approaching an unfamiliar runway. 
 Flares initiated at a constant value of    (4 sec) were shown to be 
more successful than those at constant values of   or           for 
3 of the 4 pilots tested.  This was measured in terms of      against 
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the performance criteria defined by Ref. 71.  Such a finding 
supports the previously stated secondary hypothesis. 
 When flying the manoeuvre without flare initiation guidance, the 
four pilots were not always able to achieve desired performance in 
terms of vertical velocity at touchdown,     .  This demonstrates 
the high level of task difficulty of this task, supporting the findings 
of Ref. 55. 
The recommendations for further work arising from this Chapter are 
summarised as follows: 
 In terms of the development of pilot aids, the constant          
based initiation strategy was shown to be appropriate, and as such 
should be integrated into the design of any future tau-based pilot 
aid for the flare manoeuvre. 
 The experiment focussed on the timing of the flare initiation, and 
its effect on the subsequent manoeuvre.  However, the actions of 
the pilot between initiation and touchdown also clearly have an 
effect on flare performance.  For this reason, the piloting strategy 
during the flare itself should be investigated further. 
 Although this experiment sought to address the limitations of some 
of the previous studies outlined in Chapter 2, it should be noted that 
a number of simplifications were still incorporated into the design 
of the experiment.  Most notably, the lateral dynamics of the 
aircraft and wind / turbulence effects were not modelled.  It is 
therefore recommended that a further iteration of this experiment 
could investigate the effects of these factors on the selection of 
flare initiation strategy.  Additionally, a larger sample of pilots or 
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an increased number of test point repetitions would allow 
conclusions to be made as to the statistical significance of the 
findings. 
 Pilots of varying levels of experience were used during the course 
of this investigation, and some differences in performance and 
strategy implementation were evident.  However, it would be 
necessary to test additional pilots with a broader range of 
experience levels to form any firm conclusions on the effects of 
experience on flare initiation strategy.  It may also be of interest to 
test non-pilots, to enable a direct comparison with the results of 
Refs 50, 51, 53 and 55. 
 The tests used a single runway of dimensions representative of a 
large civilian airfield.  Two of the previously proposed flare 
initiation cues,     and  ̇   were shown to be defined as 
functions of the runway geometry.  Ref. 8 suggested that pilots 
attempting to execute a    -based flare initiation strategy (learned 
at their home airfield) at an unfamiliar airfield with different 
runway geometry is a potential cause of accidents.  This could be 
investigated by repeating the experiment described in Chapter 4 
with a variety of runway geometries.  If    is truly runway-
independent, then a   -based flare initiation strategy would be valid 
for any runway (or indeed any surface).  Such a finding would 
further support the appropriateness of the tau parameter for use in 
this area of flight. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
PILOT AID DEVELOPMENT 
The previous Chapter presented an investigation into the factors used to 
determine the appropriate flare initiation point for a large transport aircraft, 
and one of the key conclusions was that selection of an appropriate 
initiation point is required to achieve a adequate performance.  However, 
appropriate flare initiation alone does not necessarily guarantee a 
successful touchdown, implying that the actions of the pilot during the flare 
itself can influence the outcome of the manoeuvre.  For this reason, 
Chapter 5 details an investigation into the piloting strategies used in the 
period between flare initiation and touchdown.  A related investigation was 
previously conducted as part of Ref. 3, which included the initial stages of 
development and evaluation of a pilot aid for the flare manoeuvre.  This 
demonstrated that a tau-based strategy provided appropriate guidance for 
this phase of flight, and provided recommendations for further 
development.  The work presented in this Chapter, therefore, builds upon 
these recommendations to enable the development of a new pilot aid, 
featuring both a novel tau-based guidance strategy and a novel method of 
implementation.  
5.1. Background 
5.1.1. Previous Findings 
The high proportion of fatal airliner accidents in the approach and landing 
phase of flight, reported in Chapter 2, indicates that there is scope for 
improvement of safety in this area.  As such, Ref. 3 reported on the 
development and evaluation of a tau-based guidance algorithm for the flare 
manoeuvre.  The findings of this previous study are briefly summarised in 
this Section. 
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The motion gap selected as the control parameter for the guidance strategy 
in Ref. 3 was the distance between the aircraft c.g. and the runway.  It had 
previously been demonstrated that pilots made use of the constant  ̇  
strategy for the flare, and so this was to be commanded by the guidance 
algorithm.  Specifically, this was achieved by commanding a constant 
value of rate of change of time to contact with runway ( ̇ ) for each of the 
two phases of the type 1 flare (Figure 67). 
 
Figure 67.  Schematic of the type 1 flare 
strategy. 
Figure 67 shows that a constant vertical approach velocity ( ̇ =1) was 
reduced to the touchdown velocity by selecting some value of  ̇ <1, which 
results in a continuous but not necessarily constant deceleration to 
touchdown.  For the algorithm developed in Ref. 3, the value of  ̇  for the 
flare phase was set to 0.75 based upon subjective pilot opinion.  In order to 
evaluate this concept, the guidance strategy was used to drive the set of 
HUD symbology shown in Figure 68.  This was achieved by converting 
the constant values of  ̇  into a flight path angle command as shown in 
Equation 12: 
  134 
        
 





   ̈
   ̇     
     ⌋ Equation 26 
where   is the vertical flight path angle,   is the pitch angle,  is the roll 
angle and   is the forward velocity of the aircraft.  The value of     was 
thus derived from parameters relating to the current position / orientation 
of the aircraft and the predefined guidance strategy.  It was then used to 
determine the onscreen position of the guidance cue symbol, which is 
shown in Figure 68 (symbol 2). 
 
Figure 68.  HUD symbology for piloted 
evaluation in Ref. 3. 
Figure 68 shows both the guidance cue (2) and the Flight Path Vector 
(FPV)(5) symbols.  The FPV displayed the current flight path angle of the 
aircraft, which enabled the pilot to determine whether the current trajectory 
of the aircraft matched that commanded by the guidance cue.  This was 
achieved by application of longitudinal stick inputs, which caused the FPV 
symbol to move up (aft input) or down (forward input) the screen.  The 
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other symbology shown in Figure 68 was used to provide additional 
primary flight information to the pilot.  The purpose of this was to emulate 
some of the secondary functions of the in-service example HUD (Section 
5.3.2) so as to enable a fair comparison between the respective guidance 
cues.   
The results of Ref. 3 demonstrated that, in good visual conditions, the 
novel tau-based algorithm produced results comparable to the in-service 
example HUD.  There was also an improvement in performance in a 
degraded visual environment compared with a baseline case using only a 
Head Down Display (HDD); however this was not as consistent as for the 
in-service example.  This suggests that tau-based guidance can be 
appropriate for use in the flare manoeuvre.  However, two key limitations 
of this novel tau-based flare algorithm were identified by Ref. 3: 
 The type 1 strategy was selected as the basis of the flare guidance 
algorithm as it was shown to produce more predictable 
performance when flown manually.  It was also deemed to be the 
simpler of the two strategies to implement as it features two distinct 
phases rather than three.  However, the type 2 flare strategy was 
shown to result in consistently lower, albeit less predictable, 
touchdown velocities. 
 The display symbology was not initially intuitive, resulting in some 
confusion as to which symbol the pilot should be following.  This 
was reflected in the pilots’ assessment of the display, resulting in 
poorer controllability and workload ratings due to the ergonomics 
of the symbology rather than the behaviour of the guidance cue. 
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5.1.2. Hypothesis 
The objectives of this study were divided into two elements, the first of 
which was to implement a tau-based flare guidance algorithm to command 
the type 2 strategy.  It was hypothesized that, based on the findings of Ref. 
3, such an approach could also provide appropriate guidance for the flare 
manoeuvre.  It was proposed that the use of the type 2 strategy could give a 
performance benefit compared to the type 1, as flares of this type were 
shown to result in consistently lower touchdown velocities when 
performed manually.  Secondly, the display symbology used for piloted 
evaluation of this flare algorithm was to emulate the “look and feel” of an 
in-service example as closely as possible, in order to allow a more 
objective comparison between the guidance of the novel and in-service 
algorithms.  
5.2. Display Development 
5.2.1. Algorithm Design 
The type 2 flare strategy, as defined by Ref. 3 , is summarised in Figure 69. 
 
Figure 69.  Schematic of type 2 flare 
strategy. 
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In this case, the constant vertical velocity of the approach is reduced 
approximately exponentially ( ̇ ≈0, as demonstrated in Section 2.2.4.), 
shown in phase 2 of Figure 69.  In theory, this would result in the aircraft 
never touching down on the runway surface, although it should be noted 
that in reality this would be limited by the acceleration capability of the 
aircraft.  As such, a third phase in which  ̇  is some value greater than zero 
is observed.  This corresponds to a phase of approximately constant 
vertical velocity which is maintained until touchdown ( ̇    corresponds 
to constant velocity, as shown in Section 2.2.4).  This strategy was shown 
by Ref. 3 to result in consistently lower touchdown velocities than the type 
1 flare, albeit with a less predictable relationship between  ̇  and     . As 
such, the type 2 flare was used as the basis for the new tau-based flare 
guidance algorithm presented in this Chapter. 
In order to provide guidance cues to effectively communicate this strategy 
to the pilot, a number of design decisions were required.  Initially, the 
following parameters needed to be defined: 
 A method for converting the commanded value of  ̇  into an 
appropriate command for the pilot to follow. 
 The flare initiation point (i.e. the transition point from phase 1 to 
phase 2 in Figure 69). 
 The value of  ̇  in the deceleration phase. 
 The termination point of the deceleration phase (i.e. the transition 
from phase 2 to phase 3 in Figure 69). 
 The value of  ̇  in the final phase. 
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Note that in order to focus on the parameter of most interest for this 
manoeuvre (i.e. the vertical gap closure), the algorithm provided guidance 
in the vertical axis only.  As was the case in the experiment detailed in 
Chapter 4, the lateral states of the aircraft model were disabled for the 
flight tests. 
Investigation into the flare initiation point was the subject of Chapter 4, 
which demonstrated that a value of      seconds provided an 
appropriate initiation cue.  Since the test aircraft and the task were 
unchanged for the purposes of display evaluation, this constant    flare 
initiation strategy was adopted into the design of the algorithm.  Similarly, 
the desired performance criterion for vertical velocity at touchdown,     , 
was defined by Ref. 71 as 3ft/sec for this task.  For this reason, the point at 
which the command changed from phase 2 to phase 3 was set to occur 
once the aircraft’s vertical velocity had been reduced to below 3ft/sec.  At 
this point, the commanded value of  ̇  was set to 1 in order to command a 
constant vertical velocity until touchdown. 
The method used by Ref. 3 to convert the constant  ̇  strategy into a 
command in vertical flight path angle,  , is shown in Equation 26.  The 
conversion of the tau-based command signal into a flight path angle 
command was shown to be the preferred method during the display 
development phase of Ref. 3, and as such was selected for this study.  
However, it was found that the relationship shown in Equation 12 was not 
valid for the type 2 flare strategy.  This was due to the necessity of 
commanding  ̇        for the third phase of the flare, which resulted in 
the denominator of one of the terms in Equation 12 becoming zero 
(   ̇     ).  As such, it was necessary to implement a new method of 
converting a command in terms of   ̇  into one in terms of  .  The 
relationship needed to satisfy the conditions is shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15.  Desired behaviour of command 
conversion relationship. 
Condition Command 
 ̇   ̇      Do nothing as desired trajectory is achieved 
 ̇   ̇      Aft stick to reduce    and consequently increase  ̇   
 ̇   ̇      Forward stick to increase    and consequently increase  ̇   
The difference between the commanded and actual values of  ̇  was 
therefore used to generate a flight path angle command, as shown in 
Equation 27: 
            ̇   ̇       Equation 27 
 
where      is the flight path angle in degrees,   is the current flight path 
angle in degrees and    is the conversion constant.  The value assigned to 
   determined the sensitivity of the flight path angle command to deviation 
from the commanded value of  ̇ , and as such had units of degrees per unit 
change in  ̇   ̇     .  The relationship described by Equation 27 enabled 
the value of  ̇      to be set to 1, which facilitated the use of the type 2 
flare strategy. Selection of the numerical value of    was the subject of a 
piloted tuning process undertaken by one of the evaluation pilots, P1 
(Section 5.3.5).  Note that, due to the nature of the command signal, the 
HUD was referred to as the “Tau Dot Error” (TDE) HUD. 
The TDE HUD algorithm was implemented into the GLTA simulation 
model using CSGE (Section 3.1.1).  The full block diagram 
implementation is included in Appendix C; however an overview of the 
functions of the various processes is shown in Figure 70. 
  140 
 
Figure 70.  Summary of the CSGE 
implementation of the TDE HUD algorithm. 
The processes shown in Figure 70 are summarised as follows: 
1. Compute current  ̇  : This value was computed based on current 
flight parameters.  The relationship used is described in Equation 
28[3]: 
 ̇     
  ̈
 ̇ 
 Equation 28 
 
where   is the height of the main gear above the runway,  ̈ is the 
vertical acceleration and  ̇ is the vertical velocity. 
2. Look up current  ̇     : The type 2 flare strategy shown in Figure 
69 was converted into a 3 phase time-varying  ̇      signal.  The 
previously defined values of      seconds and       ft/sec 
were used as the trigger points for the transitions.  A schematic of 
this signal is shown in Figure 71. 
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Figure 71.  Schematic of   ̇      signal for 
TDE HUD algorithm. 
Figure 71 shows both the damped and undamped versions of the 
command signal.  It was found that although the intention of the 
pilot may be to capture and hold a discrete, constant value of 
 ̇      (undamped command), the dynamics of the aircraft would 
not necessarily allow this to occur.  For example, the step change in 
 ̇      following flare initiation resulted in an instantaneous 
vertical displacement of the guidance cue symbol on the HUD.  
This command would be impossible for the pilot to follow due to 
the limitations imposed by the pitch axis dynamics of the aircraft.  
In order to address this, the  ̇      signal was passed through a first 
order filter.  This ensured that any change would occur at a 
frequency lower than that of the short period natural frequency of 
the aircraft (found to be 1.24 rad/sec).  The response of this filter to 
a unit step input (at time=0s) is shown in Figure 72. 
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Figure 72.  HUD algorithm filter response to 
a unit amplitude step input. 
Figure 72 shows that the 1
st
 order filter had the effect of increasing 
the rise time of the response without altering the steady-state value 
(i.e. the response still reached unity amplitude).  Specifically, the 
response time constant can be approximated by observing the time 
required for the response to reach 63% of its final value [72].  On 
this basis, the response was shown to have a time constant of 
approximately 0.81 sec, adding a short delay between input and 
response.  As a further demonstration of the behaviour of the filter, 
the frequency-domain response is shown in Figure 73. 
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Figure 73.  Frequency-domain response of 
HUD algorithm 1st order filter. 
Figure 73 demonstrates that the magnitude of the response 
decreases at higher frequencies, in effect prioritising low frequency 
inputs.  The frequency at which the magnitude is attenuated to -3dB 
is referred to as the cutoff frequency [72], and represents the 
highest frequency of input that is passed to the response.  As such, 
values above this frequency are not passed through the filter.  In 
this case, Figure 73 shows that the cutoff frequency occurs at 
approximately 1.24 rad/sec, i.e. the short period natural frequency 
of the aircraft.  This resulted in the filter damping out commands 
whose frequency would be too high for the aircraft to physically be 
able to follow. 
3. Compute  ̇  error:  The difference between current value of  ̇  and 
the command value  ̇      was found by subtraction. 
4. Convert error to     : The error value found in the previous 
process was multiplied by the conversion constant    to give a 
flight path angle deviation command.  This command was then 
added to the current flight path angle to give a command relative to 
the aircraft’s current trajectory.  In addition, as the command signal 
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was to be used to drive a symbol on the HUD, the pitch angle of the 
aircraft was subtracted from the value of     .  This meant that the 
position of the symbol on the screen would be conformal with the 
visual scene presented to the pilot through the (simulated) 
windscreen. 
5. Limit range of     : In addition to the damping described in 
process 2, the range of the      was limited.  The reason for this 
was to ensure that the guidance cue symbol would remain within a 
sensible range during typical operation.  The way in which the 
HUD was implemented in HELIFLIGHT differed from a real 
aircraft implementation in that the symbology was integrated as 
part of the virtual visual scene, rather than being projected through 
a separate device.  Limits of ±10° were therefore applied to      to 
represent the physical limitations of the real-world implementation 
of the HUD.  In addition, restrictions were applied to the      
signal to ensure that a nose up command was not given following 
main gear touchdown, as was the case in Ref. 3. 
6. Convert      to HUD symbol position: The      value was 
converted to a symbol position in pixels using the following 
relationship: 
            (
    
    
) Equation 29 
where         is the vertical symbol position in pixels,      is 
the total number of pixels vertically (in this case 1024) and      is 
the vertical field of view of the visual scene (in this case 40°). 
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5.2.2. HUD Symbology 
With the guidance algorithm having been defined, it was necessary to 
develop a set of HUD symbology to enable piloted evaluation.  Based upon 
the hypotheses of this study, there were two objectives for this symbology 
set: 
 To provide the visual cues required to enable the pilot to follow the 
guidance algorithm. 
 To provide primary flight information (e.g. airspeed, altitude etc) in 
order to reduce the pilots’ reliance on the HDD.  This would enable 
a fairer comparison between the guidance aspects of the tau-based 
and in-service example HUDs, in accordance with the findings of 
Ref. 3. 
In order to emulate the symbology of the in-service example HUD, it was 
necessary to undertake a brief design review.  The UoL implementation of 
BAE Systems’ VGS HUD [22] was used for this purpose, and is shown in 
Figure 74. 
 
Figure 74.  UoL implementation of BAE 
Systems' Visual Guidance System (VGS) 
HUD. 
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The VGS HUD symbology of particular relevance to the approach and 
landing task are summarised in Table 16. 
Table 16.  Summary of VGS symbols. 
No. Description Comment 
1 Pitch Ladder (deg) Pitch attitude indicator 
2 Airspeed indicator (kts) IAS tape in knots 
3 Flight Path Vector (FPV) 
Conformal indication of current vertical flight 
path angle 
4 Guidance cue 
Displays the flight path angle required to 
achieve the trajectory commanded by the 
guidance algorithm 
5 Horizon indicator Conformal symbol displaying true horizon 
6 ILS glide slope indicator (deg) 
Displays deviation from nominal glide slope 
angle in degrees 
7 Barometric altimeter (ft) Displays pressure-derived altitude in feet 
8 Runway outline 
Displays a conformal representation of the 
runway outline.  Enabled only between specific 
heights AGL.  
The primary piloting task when using the VGS HUD for the approach / 
landing phase of flight was to position the FPV over the guidance cue.  As 
such, it was decided that in the interests of consistency, the same primary 
piloting task would be used for the novel tau-based display.  To achieve 
this, similar guidance cue and FPV symbols needed to be created in VAPS 
(Section 3.1.2) and associated with the appropriate parameters in the 
GLTA simulation model.  In addition, some of the secondary functions of 
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the VGS HUD (Table 16) were incorporated into the new symbology set.  
The HUD representation of the new tau-based flare algorithm is shown in 
Figure 75. 
 
Figure 75.  HUD symbology used for piloted 
evaluation of the tau-based flare guidance 
algorithm. 
Table 17 describes the function of the symbols labelled in Figure 75.  Two 
elements of the VGS HUD were not carried across into the design of the 
TDE HUD.  During the approach phase, the guidance cue symbol on the 
VGS HUD provided glide slope guidance from the ILS, making the 
separate indicator redundant.  For this reason, it was not incorporated into 
the design of the TDE HUD.  Secondly, the runway outline symbol was 
omitted, as it is a particular design feature of VGS HUD rather than a 
standard flight parameter.  Additionally Ref. 3 found that, as the runway 
outline symbol was automatically disabled below 100ft, its use during the 
flare manoeuvre was limited (it was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that, for the 
3° cases, the flare typically initiated at approximately 50ft). 
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Table 17.  Summary of TDE HUD 
symbology. 
No. Description Comment 
1 Pitch Ladder (deg) Pitch attitude indicator 
2 Airspeed indicator (kts) IAS in knots 
3 Guidance cue 
Displays the flight path angle required to 
achieve the trajectory commanded by the 
guidance algorithm 
4 Flight Path Vector (FPV) 
Conformal indication of current vertical flight 
path angle 
5 Flare phase indicator 
Numbers 1-3 corresponding to the 3 flare 
phases shown in Figure 69 
6 Barometric altimeter (ft) Displays pressure-derived altitude in feet 
7 Horizon indicator Conformal symbol displaying true horizon 
One of the features of the VGS HUD reported to be particularly useful for 
this task by Ref. 3 was the flare anticipation cue.  This provided the pilot 
with a visual warning that flare initiation was imminent, in this case 
through a symbol appearing at the bottom of the screen and approaching 
the guidance cue.  For the TDE HUD, a simplified version of this flare 
anticipation cue was implemented.  Specifically, text appeared displaying 
the message “STANDBY” when      seconds.  This gave the pilot a 2 
second warning (assuming no change in trajectory) before the flare 
initiation point at      seconds.  At this point, the message changed to 
“FLARE”, and remained unchanged until main gear touchdown was 
achieved. 
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5.3. Experimental Set-up 
5.3.1. Task Description 
A simplified approach and landing task was used for the purpose of 
evaluating the novel HUD algorithm.  The task started with the aircraft 
trimmed in a standard approach at -3° vertical flight path angle at 145kts 
IAS.  The pilots were required to maintain this approach condition through 
use of the airspeed indicator and ILS glide slope indicator, both of which 
were located on the PFD HDD.  For the flights using either of the HUDs, 
ILS glideslope guidance was also provided through the guidance cue 
symbols.  The flare manoeuvre was initiated either at the discretion of the 
pilot for the PFD-only flights (baseline case), or as directed by the HUD 
for the VGS and TDE flights.  In order to focus on the longitudinal and 
vertical axes (the primary axes of motion for the flare), the lateral states of 
the aircraft model were disabled for this experiment.  Therefore any lateral 
stick or pedal movements made by the pilot had no effect on the motion of 
the aircraft, as was the case for the investigation described in Chapter 4.  
Two visual conditions were used in order to evaluate the performance in 
both good and degraded visual environments (GVE / DVE). 
 GVE:   60000ft visibility, day 
 DVE: 150ft visibility (fog), day, equivalent to Cat IIIb Runway 
Visual Range (RVR) 
The DVE condition used corresponds to the V7 preset defined in Section 
3.1.2, and was the most highly degraded of the daytime visual conditions 
used by Ref. 3.  This visual condition was selected on the basis that Ref. 3 
found the less degraded presets (e.g. V5) to have little effect on the 
performance of the flare task.  Indeed, Ref. 1 reported that even in the most 
extreme visual condition (V7), the pilots were occasionally able to 
satisfactorily perform the flare manoeuvre with no artificial visual cues.  A 
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potential explanation for this was that the test pilots were able to adapt 
effectively to the limited visual cues available.  In spite of this, Ref. 3 
demonstrated that the visual condition V7 did cause degradation of flare 
performance compared to the GVE case (V1), and as such was considered 
appropriate for inclusion in this study. 
After each flight, the pilots rated both the task workload through use of the 
Bedford Workload Scale [73] and the dynamics of the display with the 
NASA Display Controllability Scale [75].  The Bedford Workload Scale 
provides a subjective measure of the workload experienced by the pilot to 
achieve an appropriate level of task performance.  The Display 
Controllability Scale is also a subjective measure, in this case to determine 
the adequacy of the display dynamics for the specified task.  Each of these 
scales is included in Appendix D. 
As was the case in Chapter 4, the vertical velocity at touchdown,     , was 
recorded to provide a measure of task performance.  Adequate and desired 
performance criteria were defined as 3ft/sec and 5ft/sec respectively as 
specified in Ref. 71.  Each pilot / display / visual condition combination 
was repeated 5 times. 
5.3.2. Displays 
Three display types were used for the flight tests: 
 PFD:  The Primary Flight Display was used as the baseline display 
type, providing the pilot with a standard set of flight information 
through a HDD.  The design of the display was the same as that 
used in the experiment detailed in Chapter 4.  Note that the PFD 
was also active for the flights using the HUDs in order to allow a 
direct comparison between HUD and non-HUD flights. 
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 VGS:  BAE Systems’ Visual Guidance System HUD was used as 
an in-service example HUD against which to compare the 
performance of the novel tau-based design. 
 TDE:  The “Tau Dot Error” display was implemented using the 
symbology set defined in Section 5.2.2. 
The GLTA simulation model was configured to output the necessary 
parameters to drive each display simultaneously.  This enabled the display 
type to be changed without making any changes to the aircraft model, 
minimising the time delay between each flight. 
5.3.3. Pilots 
Three pilots were selected for the evaluation exercise.  As the task was 
specifically related to flare performance of a large transport aircraft, the 
primary criterion for pilot selection was experience of such aircraft types. 
 P1:  Airline pilot and former military test pilot, currently flying 
Airbus A320/A319/A318 for a major carrier.  Approximately 
12500 hours flown on 37 fixed-wing aircraft types.  Note that this 
pilot was also used for the experiment described in Chapter 4 (P1). 
 P2:  Current civil and former military test pilot, with operational 
experience of military large fixed-wing transport aircraft. 
 P3:  Retired professional airline pilot with operational experience 
on a number of large transport aircraft. 
Both P1 and P2 had extensive previous experience of the HELIFLIGHT 
simulator.  All pilots completed a number of familiarization flights before 
commencing the display evaluation task to reduce the impact of 
unfamiliarity with the task on the results. 
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5.3.4. Display Tuning Exercise 
Some of the design parameters for the TDE HUD required tuning through 
piloted testing.  Therefore, in order to set the values of conversion constant, 
  , and commanded value of  ̇  in the deceleration phase, a display 
development exercise was undertaken.  Firstly, the value of    was tuned 
to give an appropriate flight path angle command.  On the basis that the 
notional range of the flight path angle command was from the approach 
angle (-3°) to horizontal on the runway (0°), an initial value of   =3 was 
used.  This would result in a nose up command of approximately 3° when 
the value of  ̇     changed from 1 to 0 at the point of flare initiation.  
Results from a test flight of the TDE HUD conducted by P1 in this 
configuration are shown in Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76.  Results of TDE HUD 
development flight with   =3. 
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Note that the x-axes of each of the plots shown in Figure 76 are defined in 
terms of time-to-touchdown, and as such T=0 sec represents the point at 
which main gear touchdown was achieved.  This parameter was used as it 
allowed for direct comparison of multiple flights on a single figure.  Figure 
76a shows that the TDE HUD commanded a three-phase trajectory 
consistent with the objectives of the design.  The first phase is 
demonstrated by the approximately linear relationship between height and 
time which ends at -6 seconds on Figure 76a.  This was followed by the 
vertical deceleration phase, characterised by the region between -6 and -2 
seconds on Figure 76c, in which the value of    was reduced from the 
approach value to the touchdown value.  The final phase lasted 
approximately 2 seconds, and is shown by the approximately linear region 
in Figure 76a between -2 and 0 seconds.  
Although the TDE HUD provided guidance which led to the execution of a 
type 2 flare, the vertical velocity trace (Figure 76c) shows that the change 
in trajectory was oscillatory, rather than the smooth transition commanded 
by the guidance strategy.  The oscillation was particularly evident for the 
 ̇  history shown in Figure 76d, in which the aircraft response (blue line) 
overshoots the command (red line) a number of times during the course of 
the manoeuvre.   This indicated that the value of    was too high, meaning 
that a small difference between  ̇  and  ̇     resulted in a large amplitude 
change in     , which is shown in Figure 77. 
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Figure 77.  Flight path angle command (red) 
and response (blue) for TDE HUD 
development flight. 
Figure 77 shows how the value of     (red line) varied in response to the 
trajectory of the aircraft (blue line).  The phase difference between the 
command and the response suggests that the command was over-sensitive, 
introducing a potential source of instability.  This was supported by the 
pilot comments, which reported that the guidance cue moved too quickly 
and was difficult to follow.  For this reason, the value of    was reduced 
from 3 to 0.5 in an attempt to test the sensitivity of the display dynamics to 
the value of this parameter.  Results from a test of the TDE HUD in this 
configuration are shown in Figure 78. 
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Figure 78.  Results of TDE HUD 
development flight with   =0.5. 
The  ̇  plot shown in Figure 78d shows that the value of  ̇  no longer 
overshoots the value of  ̇     as was the case for   =3.  However, the 
command generated for this case was not sensitive enough to command the 
pilot to accurately maintain the desired value of  ̇ .  This resulted in the 
aircraft touching down during the second phase of the flare, which was not 
the intention of the algorithm design.  However, the pilot commented that 
the symbol was much easier to follow in this configuration, in spite of the 
premature touchdown. 
Clearly, therefore, it was necessary to find an optimal value of    in the 
region 0.5<      to give a compromise between symbol controllability 
and adhesion to the guidance strategy.  Following a number of iterations, it 
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was found that a value of   =1.5 gave the best balance of these two 
factors, and was subsequently adopted into the design of the TDE HUD for 
the remaining tuning flights and the display evaluation exercise. 
The next phase of the HUD tuning was the definition of the value of 
 ̇     .  As a starting point for this the value of  ̇      was set to 0, 
corresponding to an exponential trajectory in the deceleration phase.  An 
example of such a strategy being implemented during a (simulated) manual 
flare is shown in Figure 79. 
 
Figure 79.  Example of the type 2 flare 
strategy from (simulated) manual flare data. 
The data shown in Figure 79 was recorded during the flight test campaign 
conducted as part of Chapter 4, and is typical of the type 2 flare strategy.  
The three phases of this strategy can be clearly observed in Figure 79d, 
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which shows the value of  ̇  throughout the manoeuvre.  Throughout the 
first phase, the value of  ̇   1, corresponding to the constant vertical 
velocity shown in phase 1 of Figure 79c.  In phase 2, the value of  ̇  is 
reduced to approximately 0, corresponding to the approximately 
exponential trajectory shown in Figure 79a.  Finally, the value of  ̇  
increases towards unity, leading to the phase of approximately constant 
vertical velocity evident in phase 3 of Figure 79c.  Touchdown was 
achieved with a vertical velocity of 3.5ft/sec, which corresponded to 
adequate performance. 
This strategy was, therefore, applied to the TDE HUD algorithm and tested 
as part of the display development exercise.  Figure 80 shows results from 
a test flight using the TDE HUD in this configuration. 
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Figure 80.  Example of the type 2 flare 
strategy being commanded by the TDE 
HUD. 
The commanded value of  ̇  is represented by the red line in Figure 80d.  
Comparison of the trajectory and vertical velocity plots with those of the 
manual flare shown in Figure 79 shows following the guidance of TDE 
HUD resulted in a similar (3 phase) trajectory to the manual case. The 
vertical velocity of the aircraft was also successfully reduced to give a 
     value of 2.1ft/sec, corresponding to desired performance.  However, 
the pilot commented that the behaviour of the guidance cue made it 
difficult to follow, particularly in the moments following flare initiation.  
Specifically, it was found that the symbol commanded an overly aggressive 
deceleration immediately after flare initiation, which led to the pilot 
“chasing” the symbol.  This can be observed in the flight path angle 
command history shown in Figure 81. 
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Figure 81.  Flight path angle command (red) 
and history (blue) for TDE development 
flight. 
The red line in Figure 81 shows the flight path angle commanded by the 
guidance cue of the TDE HUD, with the blue line showing the achieved 
value.  The “chasing” behaviour reported by the pilot is represented by the 
difference between the two lines on this Figure; in the ideal case of the 
pilot being able to perfectly follow the guidance cue, the lines would be 
superimposed.  In order to address this issue, the initial vertical 
deceleration commanded by the guidance cue needed to be reduced.  As 
such, the commanded value of  ̇  was increased from 0 to 0.2.  Sample 
results from a test flight with the TDE HUD in this configuration are 
shown in Figure 82. 
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Figure 82.  Example of the type 2 flare 
strategy being commanded by the TDE 
HUD, with  ̇      being commanded. 
Commanding a value of  ̇      had the effect of reducing the rate of 
change of vertical velocity (Figure 82c) compared to the  ̇    case 
(Figure 80c).  The pilot commented that, in this configuration, the guidance 
cue was easier to follow.  To investigate the validity of this comment, the 
flight path angle history is shown in Figure 83. 
  161 
 
Figure 83.  Flight path angle command (red) 
and history (blue) for TDE development 
flight with  ̇      being commanded. 
Figure 83 shows that the lag between the response of the aircraft and the 
commanded flight path angle was reduced compared to that of the  ̇    
command case (Figure 81).  For example, at -4 seconds to touchdown the 
response was lagging the command by approximately 1° in Figure 81, and 
does not coincide with the command at any point.  By contrast, the lag at -4 
seconds in Figure 83 was approximately 0.5°, and was reduced until it 
coincided with the command at approximately -2.5 seconds.  In terms of 
the HUD symbology, this meant that the guidance cue initially moved 
away from the FPV symbol, but that the pilot was able to recapture it 
before touchdown.  Since this configuration also resulted in a      value 
within desired performance (1.95ft/sec), this change was adopted into the 
final design. 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Good Visual Environment 
This Section presents an analysis of the flare performance, the primary 
metric for which was the value of      for each flight.  The results for the 
baseline scenario, in which the pilots had only the PFD and performed the 
flare manually in the GVE, are shown in Figure 84. 
 
Figure 84.  Performance analysis for 3 pilots 
performing manual flares in the GVE. 
The red and green lines in Figure 84 represent the adequate and desired 
performance criteria respectively [71].  As stated in Chapter 2, the flare 
manoeuvre is often considered to be one of the most difficult aspects of 
piloting a fixed wing aircraft [8], and this finding was supported by the 
results of the PFD flights.  Each pilot performed at least one “hard landing” 
(i.e. with a     > 5ft/sec) in spite of high levels of experience on large 
transport aircraft and practice in the simulated environment.  This was 
especially true for P3, who performed the greatest number of landings 
outside of the adequate performance criterion.  Investigation into the 
performance trend with the number of flights suggested that this was not 
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due to the pilot requiring more practice, as the     values did not reduce 
over time.  This was supported by the pilot comments, which suggested 
that the pilot believed that adequate performance was being achieved.  An 
explanation for this could be a difference in appropriate piloting strategy 
between P3’s most recent large transport aircraft type and the aircraft 
model used in this study.  Specifically, P3’s most recent experience of 
large transport aircraft was on the Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde, a 
supersonic transport aircraft with a delta-wing configuration.  P3 reported 
that this difference in configuration resulted in the GLTA model requiring 
a more aggressive aft stick input to sufficiently reduce the vertical velocity, 
as delta-wing aircraft tend to “float” due to their large wing area.  Of the 
three pilots, P1 achieved the lowest median      value (2.91), 
corresponding to desired performance.  P1 had the most recent experience 
of performing the real-life task, being operational on similar types of 
aircraft (Airbus A318/A319/A320) at the time of the flight tests.  This may 
have been a factor in the high level of proficiency exhibited by this pilot. 
In the next stage of the experiment, the VGS and TDE HUDs were 
introduced to the pilots.  Following an initial familiarisation phase with 
each display type, the order in which the flights were conducted was 
randomised to reduce the effect of practice on the results.  The      
analysis for these flights is shown in Figure 85, together with that of the 
baseline case. 
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Figure 85.  Performance analysis for 3 pilots 
performing flares with 3 display types in the 
GVE. 
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Figure 85a shows that the VGS HUD had only a small effect on the      
values for P1, with the median moving from 2.91ft/sec (for the PFD case) 
to 3.39ft/sec.  Although small, this change corresponded to a degradation 
of flare performance from desired to adequate for this pilot.  P2 (Figure 
85b) experienced the greatest performance benefit from the use of the VGS 
HUD, with a reduction of median      from adequate performance 
(4.2ft/sec) to desired performance (2.82ft/sec).  For P3 (Figure 85c), the 
introduction of the VGS HUD resulted in a negligible performance benefit, 
with a median      value outside of the adequate performance criterion 
(4.31ft/sec).  Thus it was demonstrated that the VGS HUD provided a 
performance benefit vs. the baseline case for only one of the three pilots 
tested. 
P1 demonstrated a reduction in both the spread and median values of      
(from 2.91ft/sec to 2.01ft/sec) when using the TDE HUD (Figure 85a).  
When compared to the results for the VGS HUD, the mean value of      
was reduced from adequate performance to desired performance when 
using the TDE HUD.  When using the TDE HUD, P3 also demonstrated an 
improvement in comparison to both the PFD and VGS tests, with the 
median value of      moving from outside of adequate performance to 
within adequate performance.  The only flare by P3 to achieve desired 
touchdown performance was performed when using the TDE HUD, with a 
     value of 2.33ft/sec.  P2 was the only pilot not to experience a 
performance benefit when using the TDE HUD compared to the VGS 
HUD flights.  However, P2 did demonstrate an improvement when using 
the TDE HUD compared to the PFD flights, with a reduction in median 
     value from 4.2ft/sec to 3.11ft/sec.  The overall effect of the TDE 
HUD was to improve performance for all pilots tested when compared to 
the baseline case involving the PFD HDD.  Furthermore, two of the three 
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pilots tested demonstrated a performance benefit when using the TDE 
HUD compared to the flights using the in-service example VGS HUD. 
In order to gain an understanding of the potential reasons for the flare 
performance results, Figure 86 shows the subjective ratings (display 
controllability and workload) awarded by the pilots for each of the three 
display types.  Note that for both the display controllability and Bedford 
workload rating scales, low numbers correspond to desirable 
characteristics.  As such, values close to the centre of the plots shown in 
Figure 86 represent desirable characteristics.   
The PFD was consistently awarded low ratings for both controllability and 
workload.  Pilot comments suggested that this was due to the simplicity of 
the design and their familiarity with the standard set of instruments.  The 
only objectionable characteristic reported was a slight oversensitivity of the 
ILS glide slope indicator.  For this study, this instrument was driven by a 
simple function of the aircraft position and the desired touchdown position, 
which may have been less well damped than an in-service implementation. 
P1 awarded markedly higher controllability values to both of the HUDs 
than to the baseline HDD.  One reason given for this was the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the guidance cue and FPV symbols.  At the time of 
the test the display hardware appeared to be functioning correctly, and P1 
fulfilled the eyesight requirements for the JAR class 1 pilot medical 
examination [76].  P2 and P3 were subsequently asked to comment on the 
clarity of the display, and reported no objectionable deficiencies.  As such, 
P1’s perceived difficulty with the clarity of the display is unexplained.   
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Figure 86.  Pilot ratings for 3 display types in 
the GVE.  Note that P3’s workload and 
controllability scores directly correlate, 
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Both P1 and P3 awarded higher workload ratings to the VGS HUD than to 
the TDE HUD.  In both cases, this was explained to be due to the large 
amount of information being presented to the pilots through the VGS 
HUD, much of which was not directly relevant to the flare manoeuvre.  In 
this respect, the relative simplicity of the TDE HUD symbology was 
advantageous for this task. 
Both P2 and P3 awarded similar controllability ratings for the VGS and 
TDE (note that P3’s workload and controllability scores directly correlate, 
hence only one line appears in Figure 86c), suggesting that the TDE 
algorithm provided guidance cue behaviour comparable with the in-service 
example.  The awarded controllability ratings of 2 and 3 correspond to 
display dynamics which are “satisfactory without improvement” on the 
display controllability scale (Appendix D).  This demonstrated that in 
addition to providing a performance benefit comparable to the in-service 
example HUD, the symbology used provided was appropriate in terms of 
workload and controllability for two of the three pilots tested in good 
visual conditions. 
5.4.2. Degraded Visual Environment 
In order to evaluate the performance of the TDE HUD in a degraded visual 
environment, the flight tests were repeated with the simulator visuals set to 
condition V7 (Section 3.1.2).  Note that due to time constraints and pilot 
availability, the DVE tests were only carried out with pilots P1 and P2.  
The      values achieved for the DVE flights are shown in Figure 87. 
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Figure 87.  Performance analysis for 2 pilots 
performing flares with 3 display types in the 
DVE. 
Figure 87 shows that both pilots performed a number of hard landings for 
the PFD cases, a result which was expected given the paucity of available 
visual cues.  Indeed, both pilots commented that, during normal operations, 
the manoeuvre would not be attempted in such conditions.  A number of 
the flights resulted in values of       which were actually higher than the 
nominal vertical velocity of the aircraft on the approach ( 12ft/sec), 
suggesting a highly unsuccessful flare (i.e. the performance was worse than 
would have resulted from the pilot taking no action at all).  P1 was able to 
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perform a single landing within the adequate performance criterion by 
initiating an “open-loop flare” at 50ft above ground level (AGL); i.e. 
estimating the required aft stick input based on the experience of the GVE 
flights rather than on the available visual cues.  It was commented that to 
make the task feasible using this display, modifications would have to be 
made to the PFD to incorporate guidance for the flare as the task could not 
be performed visually. 
The VGS HUD gave a clear improvement in performance for both pilots in 
this degraded visual condition.  This was mainly attributed to the runway 
outline symbology (Figure 74) restoring appropriate visual cues during the 
approach, and the pre-flare cue giving sufficient anticipation of the flare.  
One reported negative aspect of the runway outline symbology was that it’s 
disappearance below 100ft caused a brief disorientation as the pilot’s 
attention shifted from it to the guidance cue.  Clearly such disorientation is 
undesirable given the aircraft’s proximity to the ground at that time. 
The TDE HUD also gave a clear improvement in performance vs. the PFD 
cases, albeit marginally less than for the VGS flights.  The lack of a 
runway outline cue was highlighted as a deficiency of the TDE, in addition 
to the relatively basic flare anticipation and initiation cues.  The workload 
and controllability ratings for the three displays for the DVE tests are 
shown in Figure 88. 
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Figure 88.  Pilot ratings for 3 display types in 
degraded visual conditions 
The workload and controllability ratings shown in Figure 88 reflect the 
pilots’ preference for the VGS HUD in this visual condition.  P1 again 
awarded a high controllability rating (8) to the TDE, partly due to the 
aforementioned display clarity issue and partly due to the less predictable 
nature of the guidance cue.  It should, however, be noted that the pilot 
accompanied the rating with the comment “but it did get me down safely 
every time”.  P2 awarded controllability and workload ratings of 4 for the 
TDE HUD, corresponding to “minor but annoying deficiencies” and 
“Insufficient spare capacity for easy attention to additional tasks” 
respectively.  For the VGS HUD, P2 awarded lower ratings of 2 for both 
controllability and workload, corresponding to “negligible deficiencies” 
and “workload low” respectively”.  A potential explanation for this was 
a) 
b) 
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that the additional flight information provided by the VGS HUD (which 
was considered disadvantageous in the GVE flights) was useful in 
restoring the situational awareness of the pilots in the DVE.  In terms of 
controllability, both pilots commented that the guidance cue of the TDE 
HUD could move too quickly if the pilot deviated from the commanded 
trajectory, which added to the difficulty of the piloting task in some cases.  
From this it was concluded that although the TDE HUD provided 
appropriate guidance for this manoeuvre in degraded visual conditions, 
there is scope for improvement in the behavior of the on-screen 
symbology.  It should be noted that the tests were conducted in nil-wind, 
nil-turbulence conditions as stated in Section 5.3.1.  The addition of such 
atmospheric effects could further affect the behavior of the HUD 
symbology, and should therefore be considered in any future design 
iteration.  For example, this could be addressed by further tuning of the 
filter described in Section 5.2.1.  This filter was set to restrict the motion of 
the guidance cue to commands at or below the short period natural 
frequency of the aircraft as an initial tuning.  However, a lower filter cutoff 
frequency would increase the level of damping of the guidance cue, which 
could address the minor deficiencies reported by P2 and P3. 
5.4.3. Comparison c.f. Existing Tau-based HUD 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ref. 3 developed the first example of a tau-
based pilot aid for the flare manoeuvre, comprising of two variations 
“LEAD” /“LEAD*” (LEAD* was the identical to LEAD, with the addition 
of an airspeed indicator display).  The main difference between the concept 
described in Ref. 3 and the new concept described in this Chapter was the 
nature of the tau-based strategy commanded by the algorithm; Ref. 3 used 
a type 1 flare strategy, whereas this study used a type 2 strategy.  The type 
2 strategy was used for the purposes of this study as it was shown by Ref. 3 
to provide lower (although less predictable) touchdown velocities.  In order 
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to investigate this further, a comparison between the performance of the 
HUD described in Ref. 3 and the TDE HUD was undertaken.  Note that the 
piloting task used for display evaluation in Ref. 3 featured some minor 
differences compared to the task described in this Chapter, which are 
summarised as follows: 
 The aircraft model included lateral dynamics, increasing the task 
complexity by requiring the pilots to control lateral position. 
 The approach task used by Ref. 3 was significantly longer 
(approximately 5nm vs. 1nm). 
 Ref. 3 used two pilots, one of whom also participated in the 
evaluation of the TDE HUD (P1). 
 Although Ref. 3 also used the GLTA model, it should be noted that 
the aircraft dynamics were subsequently modified in order to 
enable steep approaches (Section 3.2.1). 
These differences prohibited a direct comparison of the performance of the 
two tau-based HUDs (i.e. the results for LEAD / LEAD* being plotted on 
the figures in Section 5.4).  However, it was possible to compare the 
overall performance levels with reference to the performance criteria 
defined by Ref. 71, which were also used for display evaluation by Ref. 3.  
To this end, the      analysis for the LEAD / LEAD* displays are shown 
in Figure 89. 
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Figure 89.  Vertical velocity at touchdown 
for 5 display types and two pilots from Ref. 
3. 
Note that Ref. 3 used the opposite sign convention for vertical velocity, 
hence the negative values shown in Figure 89.  Additionally, the red and 
black lines shown in Figure 89 each represent one of the two pilots tested.  
The PFD and VGS displays used by Ref. 3 were identical to those 
described in Section 5.2.3, and the HITS (“highways in the sky”) display 
was another concept evaluated by Ref. 3. 
For the GVE tests, Figure 89a shows that one of the pilots (red symbols) 
was unable to achieve adequate performance with either of the tau-based 
HUDs (LEAD / LEAD*).  The other pilot (black symbols) achieved 
adequate / desired performance for these displays.  In comparison, Figure 
82 shows that the median performance for all pilots fell at least within the 
adequate criterion when using the TDE HUD.  For the DVE flights, Figure 
89b shows that one of the pilots (red symbols) was unable to achieve 
adequate performance with either of the tau-based concepts.  The other 
pilot was able to achieve adequate performance with the LEAD* display.  
Figure 87 shows that the results for the TDE HUD were similar, with one 
pilot achieving adequate performance and the other failing to do so.  
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Overall, these result suggests that the displays provided comparable levels 
of performance, although it would be necessary to undertake a direct 
comparison (by addressing the previously listed differences in piloting 
task) to form firmer conclusions.  Similarly, in terms of the relative merits 
of the type 1 and type 2 strategies, it is not possible to form firm 
conclusions based on this comparison, other than that both can give 
appropriate guidance for the flare manoeuvre.  However, this subject is 
investigated further in Chapter 6. 
It should be noted that, as was the case for the investigations reported in 
Chapter 4 and Ref. 3, the quantity of test points undertaken was not 
sufficient to enable formal analysis of statistical significance.  This was due 
to reasons of pilot availability and time constraints.  However, the fact that 
the performance trends were generally consistent across the three pilots 
tested allows for a degree of confidence in the results.  This was especially 
true for the DVE cases, in which the TDE and VGS HUDs provided a clear 
performance benefit over the PFD for both pilots.  Additionally, the pilot 
comments and ratings were shown to be consistent with the measured 
performance levels.  A future iteration of the display evaluation exercise 
could address this issue by the inclusion of additional pilots and / or test 
point repetitions. 
5.5. Conclusions & Recommendations 
A study was undertaken to design and implement a flare guidance 
algorithm based on a three-phase constant  ̇  strategy (“Tau Dot Error” – 
TDE).   The primary hypothesis of this investigation was that a HUD based 
on such a strategy would provide appropriate guidance for the flare 
manoeuvre.   In order to perform piloted evaluation of this concept, the 
algorithm was used to drive a set of HUD symbology which was intended 
to emulate the “look and feel” of a conventional in-service example.  This 
study built on the findings of Ref. 3, which implemented a flare algorithm 
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based on a 2-stage constant  ̇  strategy with some success.  The TDE was 
evaluated against a baseline head down display (PFD) and an in-service 
example HUD (VGS).  Vertical velocity at touchdown,     , was used as 
the main performance metric for the flare manoeuvre, in addition to 
subjective pilot ratings for both controllability and workload.  The results 
of the piloted evaluation are summarised as follows: 
 The TDE HUD improved flare performance for all of the pilots 
tested in both good (GVE) and degraded visual (DVE) conditions 
compared with the baseline case (using only the PFD).  This 
finding supported the hypothesis that the type 2 strategy 
(commanded by the TDE HUD) would provide appropriate 
guidance for the flare manoeuvre. 
 For two of the three pilots tested in good visual conditions, the 
TDE HUD gave improved performance compared to the in-
service example VGS HUD. 
 In terms of pilot ratings, for the GVE flights two of the three 
pilots tested gave ratings which indicated the TDE HUD to be 
“Satisfactory without improvement”.  The third pilot reported 
problems with the clarity of both HUDs, which led to higher 
ratings being awarded.  These problems were not reported by the 
other two pilots and the equipment appeared to be functioning 
correctly at the time of the test.  As such, this issue remains 
unexplained. 
 For the DVE flights, the TDE HUD improved performance for 
both of the pilots tested compared to the PFD HDD, albeit not to 
the same extent as the VGS HUD.  The main reason attributed to 
this was the increased situational awareness facilitated by the 
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extra information provided by the VGS HUD.  Specifically, the 
runway outline symbology was reported to be a particularly 
useful visual reference, although its disappearance at 100ft AGL 
was reported to be objectionable. 
 A secondary objective of the study was to address the limitations 
of the flare command algorithm developed in Ref. 3.  
Specifically, the symbology used for the evaluation of the 
previous concept did not compare favourably to the in-service 
HUD example, leading to some confusion for the pilots when 
following the guidance cue.  Two of the three pilots tested in this 
study reported no issues with the symbology; the third reported 
clarity issues with both HUDs.  For this reason it can be 
concluded that this study made significant progress in fulfilling 
this objective. 
 The TDE HUD was shown to provide performance 
approximately comparable with that of the tau-based HUD 
previously developed by Ref. 3, although it was not possible to 
undertake a direct comparison due to differences in task 
definition, aircraft model and pilots. It was not possible, 
therefore, to form firm conclusions about the relative merits of 
the type 1 and type 2 strategies based on this comparison, other 
than that both can give appropriate guidance for the flare 
manoeuvre.  However, this subject is investigated further in 
Chapter 6. 
 In terms of novelty, it should be noted that both the flare strategy 
and method of implementation of the TDE HUD have not been 
demonstrated or evaluated in any previous study.  The fact that 
such a pilot aid provided performance comparable to a 
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significantly more mature solution (VGS) suggests that further 
performance benefits could be derived from further design 
iterations. 
The following recommendations for further work are proposed based on 
the findings of this experiment: 
 Although the TDE was able to provide adequate performance, 
there is still scope for improvement.  In particular it was reported 
that the simple text-based flare anticipation cue “STANDBY” 
was not as intuitive as the moving anticipation symbol on the 
VGS HUD.  For this reason, a future iteration of the TDE HUD 
should feature a more dynamic anticipation cue, such as that of 
the VGS HUD. 
 A secondary objective of the HUD development exercise was to 
compare the relative performances of the TDE HUD and the tau-
based HUD previously developed by Ref. 3.  Although a basic 
comparison was undertaken using the results reported in Ref. 3, it 
would be necessary to modify the task definition to match that 
used in Ref. 3 to allow a direct comparison. 
 The dynamics of the flare guidance cue were reported to be 
slightly unpredictable before the pilot became familiar with the 
TDE.  This suggests that further tuning may be required to 
improve the dynamics. 
 For reasons of simplicity, this experiment did not consider lateral 
guidance, concentrating instead on the vertical gap closure which 
occurs during the flare manoeuvre.  However, for the HUD 
algorithm presented here to be considered suitable for flight 
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testing on a real aircraft, guidance must also be provided in the 
lateral axis.   
 A number of assumptions were made for the implementation of 
the TDE HUD onto the GLTA model.  For example, the data 
sources for the HUD algorithm were based on “truth data”, i.e. 
without modelling the behaviour of the sensor (i.e. signal noise / 
bias) that would be required for implementation on the real 
aircraft.  For this reason, it would be beneficial to investigate the 
feasibility of implementing the TDE HUD onto a real aircraft.  
An appropriate intermediate objective would be to add 
representative sensor dynamics to the existing simulation model. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
FLARE STRATEGY INVESTIGATION 
A key result of Ref. 3 was the identification of two types of tau-based 
strategy exhibited by pilots when performing the flare manoeuvre.  
Although the relative benefits of these strategies were discussed (in terms 
of touchdown performance), no explanation was proffered as to why pilots 
elect to make use of either strategy.  This Chapter, therefore, outlines an 
investigation into the factors determining whether pilots perform a type 1 
or type 2 flare manoeuvre. 
6.1. Background 
6.1.1. Displaced Gap Closure 
One of the fundamental principles of tau theory is that time-to-contact 
information about objects in the observer’s environment can be directly 
perceived from the optical flow in the visual scene.   A number of previous 
studies (described in Section 2.2.4) have demonstrated the validity of using 
this principle as a method for modelling “gap closure” type manoeuvres.  
For the case of the constant  ̇ control strategy, previous studies have 
focussed on scenarios in which the observer is able to directly observe the 
motion gap in question for most of the duration of the manoeuvre.  For 
example, Ref. 16 reported the case of pigeons landing on a perch directly 
in front of them, and Ref. 14 investigated car drivers braking to a halt 
directly in front of an obstacle.  However, this simple case in which direct 
perception of the gap is possible is not necessarily appropriate for the 
landing flare task.  If it is assumed that the motion gap to be closed is the 
distance between the landing gear and the runway, then clearly it is not 
possible for the pilot to view the main landing gear from the cockpit 
(assuming an aircraft of conventional configuration).  Equally, although the 
  181 
runway ahead of the aircraft will be visible, the area directly below the 
main wheels is obstructed by the structure of the aircraft.  This is especially 
true for large transport aircraft types, for example the Airbus A380 shown 
in Figure 90. 
 
Figure 90. Scale outline of the Airbus A380.  
Image from Ref. 28 
Figure 90 shows that the distance between the main gear and the cockpit 
for this aircraft is approximately 30 metres [28].  In addition, the cockpit is 
located approximately 8 metres above the runway when the aircraft is on 
the ground.  During the flare manoeuvre, the nose of the aircraft is usually 
pitched up above the horizon, further adding to the height of the cockpit 
above the runway.  These factors result in a displaced gap closure, i.e. the 
pilot is not able to directly observe the motion gap.  For this reason, some 
degree of estimation must be required in order to relate the position of the 
main gear to the pilot’s “out the window” (OTW) view from the cockpit.  
This offers a potential explanation for the final phase of the type 2 flare 
strategy.  That is, if the pilot cannot accurately determine the height of the 
main gear, he may elect to decelerate to the desired touchdown velocity 
above the surface of the runway.  With the required deceleration 
completed, the remaining height gap can be closed at a constant vertical 
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velocity, thus reducing the risk of a hard landing.  Such a supposition is 
consistent with the finding of Ref. 3, which demonstrated that use of the 
type 2 flare strategy resulted in consistently lower values of vertical 
velocity at touchdown compared to the type 1 strategy. 
6.1.2. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis that formed the basis of the experiment described in this 
Chapter was that the type 2 flare is a strategy adopted to compensate for 
the pilot’s inability to directly observe the motion gap.  Conversely, 
therefore, it was proposed that providing the appropriate visual cues would 
enable pilots to revert to the type 1 flare strategy (in which deceleration is 
sustained until touchdown). 
It was also hypothesised that this process of displaying the visual cues 
directly relevant to the gap closure would improve flare performance in 
(terms of     ) by enabling pilots to execute the deceleration more 
accurately.  Furthermore it was proposed that displaying views of both the 
main gear and the conventional OTW scene could be an effective method 
of teaching pilots to estimate the relationship between the two.  Thus it was 
hypothesised that, following a training phase involving additional visual 
cues, pilots would derive a performance benefit when performing the 
standard task (with only the OTW visual scene). 
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6.2. Experimental Set-up 
6.2.1. Pilots 
Fifteen novice pilots were recruited for the purposes of this study.  The 
decision to use novices was taken on the basis that this experiment was 
primarily concerned with the use of visual guidance strategies, the use of 
which does not necessarily require piloting experience.  In addition, one of 
the objectives of the task was the use of visual cueing to train pilots to 
perform the flare manoeuvre, a task for which novices were considered 
more suitable.  It would also have been impractical to recruit such a large 
number of experienced pilots with the available resources, and a relatively 
large sample was considered beneficial for the nature of the experiment as 
it would enable analysis of the statistical significance of the results. 
All of the pilots were recruited from the School of Engineering at UoL (9 
male and 6 female).  Each of the participants had previously completed a 
“flight awareness” exercise in the HELIFLIGHT simulator as part of their 
degree programmes.  This consisted of familiarisation with the standard 
controls of a fixed-wing aircraft and a 20 minute simulated flight.  This 
meant that the participants were notionally at an identical level of training 
and proficiency at the start of the experiment.  To further ensure parity 
within the group, applicants for the study with more than 1 hour of real-
world flying experience were not accepted.  Before the flight test 
programme was started, the pilots were briefed on the nature of the task 
and given some relevant background information.  In order to avoid any 
inadvertent influence on the results, they were not informed of the specific 
objectives of the study.  Before each session in the simulator the pilots 
were individually reminded of the functions of the relevant controls and (as 
appropriate) the nature of the displays to be used. 
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6.2.2. Direct Display of Motion Gap 
Two methods of directly displaying the visual cues relevant to the motion 
gap between the main gear and the runway were used in this experiment.  
The first consisted of a simulated video feed from a virtual camera directed 
towards the main landing gear.  For the purposes of brevity, the name 
given to this virtual camera was “FlareCam”. 
FlareCam was displayed through the HDD, replacing the PFD (as used in 
Chapters 4 and 5) once the aircraft was within 5 seconds of touchdown (i.e. 
     sec).  Upon this criterion being satisfied, the FlareCam switch was 
latched such that if the value of    were to increase above 5 sec (e.g. after 
flare initiation), the view type would not change back to PFD.  The 
threshold value at which the FlareCam view became active was tuned 
based on the subjective assessment of the pilots recruited for the HUD 
evaluation experiment detailed in Chapter 5.  These pilots were used for 
the development of the concept due to their greater levels of experience 
and proficiency compared to the novice pilots recruited for the actual 
testing.  The position of the camera was also defined in this way, with the 
pilots having been given a range of viewing angles (Figure 91) and asked 
to rank them in order of preference. 
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Figure 91.  FlareCam positioning options. 
The three pilots unanimously agreed upon the forward-facing camera 
(Figure 91a) position as the most appropriate.  This was followed by the 
side-on camera shown in Figure 91c, which was deemed to be “useful, if 
somewhat counter-intuitive”.  The rear-facing view (Figure 91b) was 
described as “visually offensive” by P1 due to the fact that the camera was 
facing in the opposite direction to the pilot in the cockpit.  In addition, P2 
encountered a form of pilot-induced oscillation when using this rear-facing 
view.  The oscillation was initiated by the pilot unintentionally applying a 
forward input on the control column when the intention had been to raise 
the nose of the aircraft (which would require an aft input).  This caused a 
sudden loss of altitude which, in close proximity to the ground, was clearly 
undesirable.  For these reasons, the front-facing configuration was selected 
for use in this experiment.  The pilots also commented that a view of the 
main gear from this angle would be useful when performing crosswind 
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landings, as it would enable accurate lateral positioning on the runway.  
This is currently achieved by the pilots estimating the position of the 
wheels based on the view out of the windscreen; something which can be 
difficult on large aircraft types due to the large longitudinal displacement 
of the cockpit from the wheels.  Parallels can be drawn between the lateral 
positioning task and the hypothesis tested in this experiment, both of which 
are related to the fact that the pilot is unable to directly observe the 
required gap closure.  It should be noted that the concept of locating a 
camera in such a position on a real aircraft is not technically infeasible.  
For example, the Airbus A380 features five externally mounted video 
cameras, which are designed to give increased visibility whilst taxiing; one 
of these provides a view of the main landing gear [28].  Such a system 
could be adapted for the purposes described in this experiment. 
The second medium through which to directly observe the gap closure was 
a graphical representation of the main gear and the runway, displayed 
through a HUD (Figure 92).  The rationale for the use of a HUD was that it 
would enable the pilots to observe both the relevant motion gap and the 
standard OTW view.  In this way, it was proposed that the novice pilots 
would be able to gain an understanding of the relationship between the 
view out of the windscreen and the height of the wheels above the runway.  
This HUD was designated the “Direct Gap Display” (DGD), due to the 
nature of the information being displayed to the pilot. 
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Figure 92.  Direct Gap Display (DGD) HUD. 
Figure 92 shows the symbology used for the DGD HUD.  This consisted of 
a hashed line representing the runway surface and rectangles representing 
the left and right main gear.  The objective for the pilot was, therefore, to 
control the position of the wheel symbols relative to the runway symbol 
through use of the longitudinal stick inputs.  Main gear touchdown was 
indicated by the bottom of the wheel symbols coming into contact with the 
runway symbol.  Note that the HUD symbology only became visible once 
the aircraft had descended below a threshold height value.  The aircraft 
height represented by the range of travel of the wheel symbols was tuned 
on the basis of subjective assessment of the pilots used in Chapter 5.  An 
initial height range was set at 0ft – 50ft, as this corresponded to the flare 
initiation height used in Chapter 4.  However, this resulted in the symbols 
moving too quickly down the screen upon becoming visible, inducing the 
pilots to perform an overly aggressive flare manoeuvre. It was found that 
an appropriate height range for the wheel symbols was 100ft, as this 
enabled the pilots to make use of the symbols as an anticipation cue for 
flare initiation. 
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6.2.3. Task Description 
The simplified approach and landing task similar to that used in Chapters 4 
and 5 also formed the basis of this experiment.  As the experiment was to 
be undertaken by novice pilots, some measures were taken to further 
reduce the complexity of the task.  Specifically, the approach angle was set 
to a standard value of 3°, and the aircraft was trimmed at the desired 
landing velocity (145kts) at the start of each run.  The pilots were required 
to maintain the approach angle using the ILS glideslope indicator and then 
to perform the flare manoeuvre at their discretion.  As was the case in the 
previous Chapters, the flare was the manoeuvre of interest, and so the 
approach was reduced to a relatively short 1 nautical mile.  The pilots were 
each given a number of familiarisation runs (maximum 4) in order to 
ensure that they understood the function of the controls and the objective of 
the task. 
The simulated flight tests were divided into four tasks of five runs per task: 
 Task 1: This task was used as an initial evaluation, in order to 
establish the baseline performance of each pilot for comparison 
against the subsequent tasks.  All pilots flew the manoeuvre 
“manually”, i.e. using the standard OTW visual channels and the 
PFD on the HDD.  Following this task, the pilots were ranked in 
order of performance (in terms of     ) and then divided into three 
groups of approximately equal ability (“G1” – “G3”) based on this 
ranking.  The task 1 performance results and the group allocation 
are discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
 Task 2:  This constituted the training phase of the experiment.  In 
order for the novice pilots to understand what constitutes desired 
performance for the flare, an automated message appeared via a 
HUD following each landing.  This displayed the text 
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“UNACCEPTABLE”, “ACCEPTABLE”, or “DESIRED” in red, 
amber or green respectively depending on the value of vertical 
velocity at touchdown relative to the performance criteria defined 
by Ref. 71.  The drive logic for this display, which was designated 
the “touchdown feedback” (TDFB) HUD, is shown in Table 18. 
Table 18.  Drive logic for touchdown 
feedback HUD. 
    (ft/sec) Message Text Colour 
     > 5 UNACCEPTABLE Red 
3 >       5 ACCEPTABLE Amber 
     ≤ 3 DESIRED Green 
The purpose of this task was to ensure that the pilots were aware of 
how their baseline performance compared with the performance 
criteria.  In addition to the touchdown feedback, G2 and G3 were 
provided with visual cues relating to the gap closure through the 
use of FlareCam (G2) and the DGD HUD (G3).  G1 was used as 
the control group, and as such were provided only with the same 
visual cues as for task 1 (OTW only). 
 Task 3:  This was used as an assessment of the performance of the 
pilots’ ability to perform the flare with the visual cues provided (the 
touchdown feedback HUD was now removed).  G2 and G3 were 
again provided with FlareCam and DGD HUD respectively.  G1 
remained the control group with the standard OTW visual channels. 
 Task 4:  The final assessment was conducted in this task.  In terms 
of experimental setup, this task was identical to task 1, using only 
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the standard OTW visual channels for all pilots.  The purpose of 
this was to allow a comparison to be performed between the results 
of task 1 and task 4.  If the hypothesis was to be supported, an 
improvement in performance between the tasks should have been 
observed for G2 and G3 compared with that of G1. 
The use of the visual displays for each task / group combination is 
summarised in Table 19. 
Table 19.  Summary of display 
configurations for flight tests. 
 Task 
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6.3. Results 
For each test, a set of flight data was recorded for later analysis, and this 
Section presents the results of such an analysis performed in order to test 
the hypothesis defined in Section 6.1.2. 
6.3.1. Flare Strategy 
In order to perform a comparison of the flare strategy types used by the 
pilots during the flight tests, it was necessary to define a method for 
identifying a given flare as either type 1 or type 2.  This was achieved by 
performing a least squares regression analysis on the time-history plot of 
  , starting at the point of touchdown and iterating backwards along the 
trace.  This enabled the behaviour of the    parameter during the flare to be 
compared against a line of best fit.  For the case of the type 1 flare,  ̇    
from initiation until touchdown, corresponding to a linear line of best fit of 
slope  .  For the type 2 flare, the value of  ̇  would be expected to increase 
towards unity in the seconds immediately preceding touchdown 
(corresponding to the phase of constant vertical velocity).  Examples of 
each of these flare types are shown in Figure 93. 
 
Figure 93.  Sample results showing a) type 1 
and b) type 2 flares. 
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Figure 93 shows sample data from task 1.  The trend shown Figure 93a is a 
typical example of a type 1 flare, with a constant rate of change of    being 
maintained for approximately 4 seconds before touchdown.  The least 
squares regression analysis for this data yielded the following relationship: 
                 Equation 30 
The value of   ̇  selected for the flare in this case is reflected in the first 
term of Equation 12 (0.883).  With reference to Table 4 in Section 2.2.4, a 
value of  ̇        corresponds to a deceleration which increases 
throughout the duration of the gap closure, as would be expected for a type 
1 flare.  Note that this value of   ̇  was marginally higher than those 
typically exhibited by the pilots in Ref. 3 a result which can be attributed to 
the fact that the novice pilots used for this study generally performed 
landings with higher values of     .  Figure 93b shows a typical example 
of a type 2 flare, in which the deceleration is completed before touchdown.  
This deceleration phase is shown by the region between approximately -6.5 
and -3 seconds time-to-go in Figure 93b, in which the value of    remains 
approximately constant.  This corresponds to a strategy of  ̇   , meaning 
the aircraft would have followed an approximately exponential trajectory 
during this period.  However, for approximately the final 2.5 seconds 
before touchdown, the least squares regression analysis yielded the 
following result: 
   .            Equation 31 
Equation 31 shows that the value of  ̇  in this case reverted to 
approximately 1 for the final moments before touchdown.  Such a strategy 
implies a period of constant vertical velocity following completion of the 
deceleration, which is consistent with the definition of a type 2 flare.  This 
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process of strategy identification was repeated for each of the flights, and a 
summary of the findings for task 1 is shown in Figure 94. 
 
Figure 94.  Flare strategy analysis for task 1. 
From the results shown in Figure 94, it is clear that each the novice pilots 
exhibited both types of flare strategy to varying degrees.  For example, 
pilot 14 consistently performed type 1 flares, whereas pilots 3, 4 and 11 
exclusively performed type 2 flares.  Furthermore, a number of pilots 
exhibited a mixture of the two strategies.  This finding is consistent with 
the results of Ref.3, in which a sample of 3 pilots each exhibited both types 
of flare in a simulated flight test.  In terms of the number of instances of 
strategy selection, the type 2 flare was marginally more common with 59% 
of total.   
This method of flare strategy analysis was repeated for each of the four 
tasks.  The percentage of type 1 flares performed by each group is shown 
in Figure 95. 
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Figure 95.  Flare strategy analysis by group. 
In order to establish the effect of the varying display types, the pilots have 
been grouped for the analysis shown in Figure 95 (G1=Control, 
G2=FlareCam, G3=DGD HUD).  It was necessary to establish the 
significance of any change in the number of instances of type 1 flares 
between tasks, as a certain level of variation was to be expected.  
Therefore, the error bars shown in Figure 95 correspond to the range of 
inter-group instances of type 1 flares for task 1, as this was taken to be the 
level of variation in strategy expected for the baseline task.  Thus, any 
value falling outside the error bars of the G1 results was considered to be 
due to the effects of varying display type.  The results show that, for the 
baseline case in task 1, the number of type 1 flares performed was 
approximately 40% for all three groups.  However, upon introduction of 
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FlareCam and DGD HUD in task 2, both G2 and G3 displayed an increase 
in the number of type 1 flares performed (from ~40% of total to ~60%).  
By contrast, the percentage of type 1 flares performed by G1 for this task 
remained at approximately 40%.  This result suggests that providing the 
pilots with visual cues directly related to the gap closure increases the 
probability of performing a type 1 flare.  However, it should be noted that a 
significant proportion of the flares performed were of type 2 (~40%), 
suggesting that the pilots still experienced some difficulty in accurately 
controlling the vertical deceleration of the aircraft.  This is investigated 
further in Section 6.3.2. 
The increase in type 1 flares was sustained for G3 in task 3, in which the 
DGD HUD was also used.  In this task G2 retained an increased percentage 
of type 1 flares in comparison with the baseline case (56% of total), albeit 
to a lesser extent than that in task 1 (60%).  The results show that the two 
methods of providing the visual cues provide approximately equal results 
in terms of strategy selection.  In task 4, the novel visual aids were disabled 
and the pilots in all 3 groups performed the baseline task.  This is reflected 
in the results, as the number of type 1 flares for G2 and G3 reduced to 
near-baseline levels (G2=52%, G3=45%).  This result demonstrates that 
although providing relevant visual cues increases the usage of the type 1 
strategy, it does not necessarily enable pilots to learn this strategy for use in 
the baseline case. 
Throughout the tasks, the percentage of type 1 flares performed by the 
control group (G1) was approximately equal, with a slight downwards 
trend from 40% in task 1 to 32% in task 4.  This result suggests that simply 
practicing the task does not increase the probability of performing a type 1 
flare. 
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6.3.2. Flare Performance 
The second aspect of the hypothesis for this experiment was that 
performance benefits could be derived from enabling the pilots to directly 
observe the gap closure.  In order to test this, the flare performance of each 
of the pilots was analysed, and this Section reports on these findings.   
As for the experiments detailed in previous Chapters, the measure of flare 
performance used for this analysis was the vertical velocity at touchdown 
(    ).  The values of      achieved by the 15 pilots for task 1 are shown 
in Figure 96. 
 
Figure 96.  Vertical velocity at touchdown 
data for task 1. 
Note that the red and green lines in Figure 96 represent the adequate and 
desired performance criteria for this task as defined by Ref. 71.  
Comparison with these values shows that the majority of the landings 
performed in task 1 fell outside of the adequate performance range.  On the 
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basis that experienced pilots have reported the flare manoeuvre to be one of 
the most difficult aspects of fixed-wing flight [8], it is not unexpected that 
novice pilots were unable to consistently achieve adequate performance. 
Based on the performance results from task 1, the pilots were divided into 
groups of approximately even proficiency.  The group allocation is shown 
in Table 20. 
Table 20.  Group allocation based on results 




















In order to assess the effect of the additional visual cues provided to groups 
2 and 3, the number of hard landings (i.e.     > 5ft/sec) was computed for 
each group for the remaining tasks (Figure 97). 
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Figure 97.  Hard landing progression over 4 
tasks. 
Figure 97 shows that, over the four tasks, the number of hard landings 
(outside of the adequate performance criterion) for the control group (G1) 
remained approximately constant at ~70%.  As such, the results suggest 
that the amount of practice available to the pilots was not sufficient to 
effect an improvement in performance.  By contrast, the results show that 
G2 experienced a reduction in the occurrence of hard landings from 72% in 
task 1 to 48% in task 3.  This suggests that providing the pilots with 
FlareCam led to an improvement in flare performance, a finding which 
supports the hypothesis of the experiment.  In addition, this improvement 
was sustained once FlareCam was disabled in task 4.  On this basis, it can 
be tentatively concluded that providing novice pilots with the FlareCam 
view facilitates a faster improvement in flare performance than practice 
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alone.  The DGD HUD (G3) produced a less pronounced improvement in 
flare performance over the course of the 4 tasks, from 84% hard landings 
in task 1 to 60% in task 4. 
It should be noted that a large proportion of the landings performed in task 
1 incurred      values well outside of the adequate performance criterion, 
leaving scope for improvement without actually moving into the adequate 
performance region.  It was thus possible that an improvement in flare 
performance may have occurred that was not reflected in Figure 97.  In 
order to further investigate this possibility, the values of      for each 
group were collated for each task.  This also enabled a test to be performed 
to assess the statistical significance of the results using a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test.  This is a non-parametric statistical analysis method which tests 
the “null hypothesis” between two sets of data; i.e. that there is no 
statistically significant difference between them [74].  The result of the test 
is the probability, “ ”, of the data observed in the second set being a 
variation of the observed distribution of the first set.  As such, a low   
value (typically         [74]) rejects the null hypothesis, and suggests 
that the result is statistically significant.  This method was selected as it 
does not assume the data to be normally distributed, as such an assumption 
would not have been valid due to the nature of the task.  Specifically, the 
results featured a “floor” effect due to the fact that      must always be 
greater than zero, but without a corresponding “ceiling” (as there was no 
upper limit on     ).   
The first comparison of collated      values was performed in order to 
compare the results of task 1 and task 3.  This is shown in Figure 98, 
together with the   values generated by the Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
test the hypothesis that the data observed in task 3 was a statistical 
variation of the task 1 results. 
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Figure 98.       comparison for task 1 and 
task 3. 
For the case of the control group (G1), Figure 98 shows that there is only a 
small variation in the median value of      between task 1 and task 3.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test yielded a   value of 0.115, showing that the 
variation between the task 1 and task 3 results for G1 was statistically 
insignificant (assuming a confidence interval of 0.05).  This suggests that 
the level of practice available to the pilots in G1 had no significant effect 
on their performance.  However, there was clearly a larger difference in the 
task 1 and task 3 values for G2 and G3.  Specifically, the median      
value for G2 was reduced from 6.7 ft/sec in task 1 to 4.2ft/sec in task 3, 
corresponding to a shift from outside of adequate to adequate performance.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test for these data yielded a   value of 0.00942, 
suggesting that this result was unlikely to be the result of a statistical 
anomaly.  This result suggests that the introduction of FlareCam was 
effective in improving flare performance compared to practice alone (G1).  
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G3 demonstrated a small reduction in the median value of      from 8.66 
ft/sec task 1 to 7.5ft/sec in task 3.  However, the   value returned for these 
data was 0.0693, implying that the statistical significance of this result was 
marginal as it was close to the confidence interval of 0.05. 
In order to determine whether the performance benefits associated with 
FlareCam were sustained once the display was disabled, the same analysis 
was conducted for the task 4      values (Figure 99). 
 
Figure 99.       comparison for task 1 and 
task 4. 
For the case of G1, Figure 99 illustrates that there was again very little 
change in the      values in terms of spread and median between task 1 
and task 4.    For G1, a   value of 0.946 was returned, suggesting that there 
was a very high probability of any difference between the task 1 and task 4 
data being due to a statistical anomaly (0.946>>0.05).  This supports the 
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previously stated assertion that practice alone had no significant impact on 
flare performance for the novice pilots tested.  In the case of G2, there was 
a reduction in both the spread and median value of      between task 1 
and task 4.  A Wilcoxon signed-rank test yielded a value of   = 0.0396, 
indicating that this result was statistically significant.  For G3, Figure 99 
shows that there was a reduction in the median value of      from 
8.6ft/sec in task 1 to 5.8ft/sec in task 4.  The fact that this value lies outside 
of the 5ft/sec criterion for adequate performance provides an explanation 
for the small performance improvement shown in Figure 97.  However, the 
result was shown to be statistically significant (  = 0.0149), suggesting that 
the novice pilots did in fact experience an increase in performance through 
training with the DGD HUD. 
6.4. Conclusions & Recommendations 
An experiment was undertaken to test the hypothesis that the type 2 flare is 
a strategy adopted due to the pilots’ inability to directly observe the gap 
closure.  It was therefore proposed that pilots would revert to the type 1 
flare (which is more representative of directly observed gap closures from 
previous studies) when presented with appropriate visual cues.  An 
additional hypothesis was that providing these visual cues would improve 
flare performance, and assist novice pilots in learning to perform the 
manoeuvre effectively.  Two methods of presenting these direct visual cues 
were used, and were compared against the effect of simply practicing the 
task.  The results can be summarised as follows: 
 When provided with a simulated video feed which enabled the 
pilots to directly observe the landing gear and the runway 
(“FlareCam”), the number of instances of type 1 flares increased 
from ~40% to ~60%.  This result supports the hypothesis that the 
type 2 strategy is one adopted to compensate for the inability of the 
pilots to directly observe the gap closure.  A similar increase in the 
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occurrence of type 1 flares was achieved through the use of HUD 
symbology representing the main gear and the runway. 
 The introduction of the FlareCam view was shown to be effective 
in improving flare performance, reducing the occurrence of hard 
landings from 68% of total in task 1 to 48% in task 3.  This finding 
supports the second aspect of the initial hypothesis. 
 The improvement in flare performance due to FlareCam was 
sustained when the display was disabled in the final assessment 
task.  A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed this to be a statistically 
significant result.  This suggests that providing visual cues directly 
relating to the gap closure task is an effective method of teaching 
novice pilots to perform the flare manoeuvre. 
 The previously stated finding that the flare manoeuvre is a difficult 
piloting task was further supported by the findings of this 
experiment.  Specifically, novice pilots who had received a basic 
explanation of how to perform the manoeuvre were unable to 
achieve adequate touchdown performance for approximately 75% 
of the landings performed in task 1. 
 For the novice pilots tested in this experiment, simply practicing 
the flare manoeuvre had no significant effect on performance.  It 
could be the case that a greater number of practice runs would be 
required to achieve an improvement; however the pilots in the 
control group of this experiment demonstrated no improvement in 
performance after at least 20 attempts. 
 For the baseline task, the pilots tested exhibited both the type 1 and 
type 2 flare strategies, with the type 2 being marginally more 
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common (44 out of 75).  This is consistent with the findings of Ref. 
3, which also found pilots to exhibit both strategies. 
 Of the two display types tested, FlareCam was shown to provide a 
greater performance benefit compared to the DGD HUD.  This 
could be due to the fact that the FlareCam view offers a richer 
visual scene than the simplified HUD symbology, which enabled a 
more accurate determination of the tau parameters. 
In addition to the conclusions of this experiment, a number of 
recommendations were made for further investigation.  These are 
summarised below: 
 Although the introduction of additional visual cues led to an 
increase in the number of type 1 flares, a significant proportion (35-
40%) of type 2 flares were observed.  It could be the case that 
although sufficient visual cues were available, the task of 
controlling the aircraft dynamics was prohibitively difficult for the 
novice pilots.  A similar result was reported in Ref. 52, in which it 
was found that degrading the vehicle handling qualities reduced the 
pilots’ ability to implement a tau-based control strategy.  This could 
be further tested by varying the handling qualities of the aircraft 
used for the flight tests. 
 Novice pilots were selected for this study based on the reasons 
outlined in Section 6.2.1.  However, during the display 
development phase, three professional pilots indicated that, 
following familiarisation, both FlareCam and the DGD HUD were 
useful when performing the flare manoeuvre.  It is therefore 
proposed that these two displays could be useful not just as training 
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aids, but as an alternative to current in-service pilot aids for this 
manoeuvre such as BAE Systems’ VGS HUD [22]. 
 During the display development phase, the pilots commented that 
the FlareCam view would be useful when performing crosswind 
landings, due to the fact that it enabled the pilots to observe the 
lateral position of the main gear.  This is something which is 
currently estimated by the pilots based on the view out of the 
windscreen, but which is particularly difficult for larger aircraft 
types due to the longitudinal displacement of the cockpit from the 
main gear.  With the addition of relevant symbology, the DGD 
HUD could also be adapted for this purpose.  In order to evaluate 
the suitability of the displays for this task, the experiment could be 
modified by the introduction of lateral aircraft model dynamics and 
a range of crosswind conditions. 
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C h a p t e r  7  
TAU-BASED PILOT MODELLING 
The research presented in the previous Chapters has focussed on the 
identification of tau-based control strategies, and the formation of guidance 
techniques to augment the capabilities of human pilots.  Logically, 
therefore, the next step was to remove the human pilot from the aircraft and 
to make use of tau-based guidance to generate appropriate control inputs.  
Such an approach potentially offers a true representation of the behaviour 
of a real pilot, as it has previously been demonstrated that pilots make use 
of tau parameters to guide their aircraft (Chapter 2). 
This Chapter, therefore, details the development of two methods of 
modelling pilot control inputs to achieve tau-generated trajectories.  The 
first of these generated the reference trajectory and then applied control 
inputs to minimise the error between this and the current measured 
trajectory of the aircraft.   Such a method was used previously to 
implement a tau-based automatic landing system for a rotary-wing aircraft 
by Ref. 23; however this study represents the first application of such a 
system to a fixed-wing aircraft.  Additionally, this new pilot model was 
extended to undertake a range of manoeuvres in order to demonstrate the 
generic nature of tau-based guidance.  The second method used an inverse 
simulation method to generate an “ideal” control input based on the 
required trajectory; an approach which has not previously been 
investigated in a tau-based context.  Both methods were implemented and 
tested on a simulation model of a light fixed-wing aircraft, and this Chapter 
discusses the relative merits of each approach. 
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7.1. Background 
7.1.1. Previous Findings 
It had previously been shown that a wide variety of manoeuvres, both in 
the natural world and human flight, conform to trajectories generated 
through the use of tau-based parameters.  Section 2.2.4 demonstrated that 
manipulation of a single parameter (the coupling constant,  ) results in the 
generation of a number of different types of manoeuvre.  An example of 
this is the coupling of the desired motion onto the constant acceleration 
intrinsic tau guide, which is shown in Figure 100 (full description in 
Section 2.2.4.). 
 
Figure 100.  Motion tau, gap distance, 
velocity and acceleration when following the 
constant acceleration tau guide. 
The motion gap’s properties, shown in Figure 100, are normalised to give 
manoeuvre start and end points of -1 and 0 respectively.  Similarly, the 
  208 
manoeuvre time is normalised to vary between 0 and 1.  Therefore, it is 
possible to scale the tau-based trajectory shown in Figure 100 for any 
manoeuvre of known duration and amplitude.  Such a method was used to 
generate the trajectory command in the automatic landing system 
developed by Ref. 23.  This reference trajectory was then used to drive a 
conventional Translation Rate Command (TRC) control system by 
minimising the error between it and the measured position of the aircraft.  
The proposed advantages of such a system were twofold; firstly that the 
manoeuvre could be flown in a way closely representative of that of a 
human pilot, and secondly that the system contained no controller gains 
which required tuning.  Ref. 23 concluded that the system was able to 
provide appropriate guidance for a rotary wing deck landing manoeuvre 
and that, in principle, this method could be extended to other manoeuvres. 
7.1.2. Hypothesis 
Based on the findings of Ref. 23, it was proposed that the tau-based 
approach to pilot modelling could be extended to a variety of manoeuvres 
for a fixed-wing aircraft.  A fixed-wing aircraft was selected for the 
following reasons: 
 The work presented in the previous Chapters has focussed on the 
applications of tau theory to fixed-wing flight.  It was therefore 
appropriate to use these findings to directly inform the design 
process of the pilot models developed in this Chapter. 
 A light, fixed-wing training aircraft has a lower baseline level of 
complexity compared to that of a rotary-wing vehicle.  As such, the 
selection of a fixed-wing aircraft would reduce the time spent on 
implementing a standard SCAS (stability control augmentation 
system), and therefore enable the work to focus on the novel (tau-
based) aspects of the system. 
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In order to extend the scope of the work undertaken by Ref. 23, the generic 
nature of the pilot model was to be demonstrated by commanding the 
aircraft to perform a standard circuit of an airfield.  Successful completion 
of such a flight task would demonstrate the capability of this method of 
pilot modelling to undertake whole missions, as opposed to the single 
manoeuvres previously demonstrated. 
In addition to the implementation of a generic tau-based pilot model, this 
study also sought to address a key limitation of the method developed by 
Ref. 23.  Specifically, it was hypothesised that a new method of control 
input generation would enable tau-based manoeuvres to be performed by 
the unaugmented aircraft, eliminating the need for a separate control 
system.  The format of this new method is detailed in Section 7.2. 
7.2. Model Development 
The purpose of a pilot model is to emulate the control inputs that would be 
applied by a human pilot for a given task [77].  To this end, Ref. 78 states 
“Since the controlled motion of an airplane is a combination of airplane 
and pilot characteristics, it is necessary to know something about both 
airplane and pilot characteristics before a satisfactory job of airplane 
design can be done”.  This highlights the importance of pilot model 
development, as it is integral to the aircraft design process rather than an 
isolated areas of research. 
7.2.1. Error Minimisation Method 
The first of the two methods of implementation of the tau-based pilot 
model was based upon the principle of minimising the error between a 
predefined reference trajectory and the current position of the aircraft.  In 
this way, the aircraft would be induced to follow a tau-based trajectory.  A 
similar design method was successfully implemented in Ref. 23, albeit for 
a single manoeuvre for a rotary-wing aircraft.  However, differences in 
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flight dynamics and mission types between rotary and fixed-wing aircraft 
were considered sufficiently disparate for there to be novelty in a fixed-
wing application of this concept.    A system-level view of this method is 
shown in Figure 101. 
 
Figure 101.  System overview of error 
minimisation method implementation. 
The process was divided into the two main functions shown in Figure 101: 
1. Manoeuvre Planning Phase:  During this initial phase, the model 
received information about the current position / orientation of the 
aircraft.  Additionally, information about the objective (“goal”) of 
the manoeuvre was defined by the user.  Specifically, the following 
properties of the manoeuvre were predefined: 
 The axis in which the manoeuvre was to be performed 
(longitudinal / lateral / vertical). 
 The desired amplitude of the manoeuvre (e.g. 30° roll 
angle). 
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 The desired manoeuvre duration from start to finish. 
 The desired behaviour upon completion (e.g. maintain roll 
angle or roll back to centre). 
By comparing the current position data with the goal, the controller 
defined the motion gap to be closed.  This took the form of a 
commanded displacement from trim in the selected axis as a 
function of time.  An example of such a command in the roll axis is 
shown in Figure 102. 
 
Figure 102.  Conversion of normalised tau-
based trajectory into roll manoeuvre 
command. 
Figure 102 shows the process used to convert the normalised tau-
based trajectory (a) into a user-defined manoeuvre (b); in this case 
a roll of 30° (from initial roll angle).  This was achieved by scaling 
the x-axis by the desired manoeuvre duration and the y-axis by the 
desired amplitude (in the desired units).  Note that, for the purposes 
of this initial proof-of-concept exercise, a single value of coupling 
constant k was selected for the generation of the tau-based 
trajectory.  A value of k=0.5 was selected as this strategy has 
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previously been shown to provide appropriate guidance for a 
number of manoeuvres [17].  It should be noted, however, that the 
model architecture was implemented such that the value of k could 
be changed to any value in the range shown in Figure 100.  For 
example, this could be used to implement evasive-type 
manoeuvres, which typically feature a large initial acceleration that 
decreases in amplitude throughout the remaining manoeuvre.  
Figure 100d shows that this could be achieved by setting the value 
of  k to 0.2.  The test aircraft was equipped with an Attitude 
Command Attitude Hold (ACAH) SCAS in the roll axis with a 1:1 
relationship between lateral stick and roll angle; that is to say a 1% 
lateral stick input resulted in a 1° change in roll angle (Section 
3.3.1).  For this reason, the command shown in Figure 102b could 
be fed directly into the lateral stick channel on the aircraft model. 
2. Manoeuvre execution phase: With this reference trajectory in place, 
the process moved on to the manoeuvre execution phase.  The first 
aspect of this was comparison of the reference trajectory with the 
current position and orientation of the aircraft.  The difference 
between these two formed an error signal that was monitored by 
the SCAS, which sought to minimise the error in roll angle between 
the input and output.  In order to achieve this, the SCAS generated 
control surface deflection commands, which caused a change in roll 
angle which was fed back to the trajectory error signal (forming the 
feedback loop shown in Figure 101). 
7.2.2. Additional Functionality 
Following initial testing in Simulink, the pilot model was integrated into 
the Grob Tutor aircraft model in Flightlab.  In order to demonstrate the 
generic nature of the guidance provided, a number of additional features 
were added.  Firstly, definitions of a standard set of common manoeuvres 
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were saved within the model, and referenced through the use of a control 
variable, navmode.  It was therefore possible to control the aircraft in a 
real-time simulation by varying the value of navmode.  These presets are 
shown in Table 21. 
Table 21.  Preset manoeuvre list for tau-
based pilot model. 







inf n/a Allows manual control of the 
aircraft through conventional 
controls 
1 Straight and 
level 
inf n/a SCAS maintains straight and 
level flight 
2 Roll right 4 sec 30° Roll to 30° and hold 
3 Roll left 4 sec 30° Roll to 30° and hold 
4 Climb 40 sec 200ft Climb 200ft and level out 
5 Descend 40 sec 200ft Descend 200ft and level out 
6 Flare 4 sec n/a Perform a flare manoeuvre 
(assumes aircraft it currently 
descending) 
In addition, it was possible the drive the value of navmode using logic 
statements and a predefined waypoint list.  These waypoints were defined 
as locations in the simulation environment in terms of latitude, longitude 
and altitude.  In combination with this, the pilot model was able to 
overwrite the default values of manoeuvre amplitude and duration shown 
in  Table 21, depending on the location of the aircraft relative to the target 
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waypoint.  In this way, the pilot model was capable of guiding the aircraft 
from one waypoint to another by manipulation of navmode, which in turn 
could be used to complete a circuit of an airfield.  The intended variation in 
navmode for a turn-to-new-heading manoeuvre is shown in Figure 103. 
 
Figure 103.  Variation of navmode to execute 
a turn between waypoints. 
The numbered steps shown in Figure 103 are defined as follows: 
1. The aircraft flew straight and level towards a predefined waypoint 
(navmode = 1).  Based on the findings of Chapter 4, a threshold 
value of time to contact with the waypoint,    , was used to 
determine the manoeuvre initiation point (      seconds). 
2. Upon reaching the     threshold, the logic commanded navmode = 
2 or 3 (depending on the bearing to the next waypoint), causing the 
aircraft to roll to a constant bank angle.   
3. This bank angle was maintained until the correct heading for the 
next waypoint was achieved, at which point the aircraft would level 
out by rolling in the opposite direction.   
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4. During the straight and level phase the heading error was 
monitored, with any value greater than 5° triggering a corrective 
turn by setting navmode to 2 or 3.  
5.  Once the next waypoint was reached, the procedure was repeated. 
Note that this procedure was intended to approximate the relevant piloting 
technique defined by Ref. 5.  In order to allow two gaps to be closed 
simultaneously, the subsystem used to generate the constant acceleration 
tau guide shown in Figure 100 was duplicated.  Thus, it was possible for 
the pilot model to command the aircraft to perform turns whilst climbing or 
descending.  Such a combination was a requirement for the aircraft to 
perform a standard circuit of an airfield. 
The tau-based pilot model had control authority in both the lateral and 
vertical axes, as this enabled the control of both the height and direction of 
the aircraft.  In order to maintain the desired airspeed, a simple speed hold 
controller was implemented into the aircraft model.  The block diagram 
components relating to the speed hold are shown in Figure 104. 
 
Figure 104.  CSGE block diagram 
implementation of a simple speed hold. 
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The target airspeed signal shown in Figure 104 was driven by a lookup 
table which related airspeed to the value of navmode.  With the exception 
of the final approach and flare manoeuvre, the target airspeed was set to 
90kts, corresponding to a slow cruising speed of the Grob Tutor [69].  The 
proportional gain shown as 0 in Figure 104 was set to 3 (% throttle / knot) 
when the speed hold was enabled; a value that was selected by iterative 
testing for typical manoeuvres. 
For the final approach, the target was set to 70kts to allow the extension of 
the flaps to 30°.  This process was initiated automatically if the height of 
the target waypoint was less than or equal to the height of the terrain at that 
location.  At this point, the pilot model commanded the aircraft to approach 
the touchdown point at a vertical flight path angle of -3°.  Upon reaching a 
threshold value of    (4 seconds, based on the findings of Chapter 4), the 
pilot model flared the aircraft.  The technique selected for the flare was a 
variation of the constant  ̇  strategy used to drive the HUD described in 
Chapter 5.  The key difference in this strategy was the use of a “type 1” 
flare, i.e. one in which a constant value of  ̇      was set at initiation 
and then maintained until touchdown.  This corresponds to the pilot model 
commanding constant vertical deceleration throughout the flare 
manoeuvre.  Such a strategy was described by Ref. 3 as being more 
appropriate for light aircraft, as opposed to the “type 2” flare which was 
used for the HUD development for a large transport aircraft.  The block 
diagram (CSGE) implementation of the flare command generation element 
of this pilot model is shown in Figure 105. 
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Figure 105.  CSGE implementation of flare 
control aspects of tau-based pilot model. 
The value of  ̇      was maintained by generation of a  ̇  error signal, 
which in turn was fed through a proportional gain to convert it into the 
longitudinal stick command shown in Figure 105.  To facilitate the aircraft 
settling onto the runway, the throttle was automatically set to idle at the 
point of flare initiation; a strategy which is a basic approximation of that 
undertaken by human pilots performing such manoeuvres [5].  This was 
achieved by setting the throttle input to zero once the flare initiation 
command was enabled (“Throttle Command” in Figure 105). 
In order to focus on the most novel aspects of pilot model design, takeoff 
functionality was omitted.  This was due to the fact that the pilot model 
would have required control authority in an additional axis (yaw) in order 
to control the lateral direction of the aircraft on the ground.  The level of 
additional complexity associated with such functionality was deemed 
prohibitive within the time constraints of the project.   Therefore, in place 
of a takeoff run, the aircraft was initially trimmed in level flight at a height 
of 5ft, from which the pilot model would command the climb as though the 
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aircraft had just taken off.  However, it should be noted that full takeoff 
functionality could be added in a future iteration of the pilot model design. 
Control of the aircraft in the vertical axis was achieved through use of a 
height hold controller, which commanded the aircraft to achieve a target 
value of vertical position.  The block diagram (CSGE) implementation of 
the height hold aspect of this pilot model is shown in Figure 106. 
 
Figure 106.  CSGE block diagram 
implementation of height hold system. 
The height hold controller shown in Figure 106 generated a longitudinal 
stick command by finding the error in height between the target and 
current values.  This error was then multiplied by a simple proportional 
gain,    , in order to generate a stick command of appropriate amplitude.  
The value of     was, following an iterative tuning exercise, set to a value 
of 1.  Consequently, a deviation in height of -1ft resulted in an aft 
longitudinal stick input of 1%.  This was found to be adequate for the 
purposes of holding a constant height whilst the aircraft was turning, when 
the aircraft would otherwise tend to descend.   
The value of target height could also be driven by the pilot model to cause 
the aircraft to follow a tau-based trajectory in the vertical axis.  In this 
instance, the required height change was computed by comparing the 
current height of the aircraft with that of the target waypoint; this was then 
  219 
used to scale the normalised trajectory generated by the tau guide shown in 
Figure 102a.  The corresponding manoeuvre duration was computed as a 
function of desired average climb rate (5ft/sec for this aircraft [69]). 
7.2.3. Perfect Control Prediction Method 
An alternative approach to the closed-loop, reference trajectory based 
method detailed in Section 7.2.1 was developed based upon the concept of 
applying the perfect control input for a specified manoeuvre.  Previous 
studies at UoL demonstrated that, given a vehicle with adequate dynamics, 
human test subjects perform gap closure using a single, continuous control 
input [52].  It was therefore proposed that a method of computing the 
appropriate control input could be implemented in the form of a pilot 
model.  This differs from the previously proposed error minimisation 
method, which commands a series of corrective control inputs based on the 
trajectory error signal.  By removing the requirement for a SCAS to follow 
a predefined reference trajectory, the complexity of the system was 
significantly reduced, including the removal of the controller gains 
contained within the SCAS.  The system overview of the perfect control 
prediction method of tau-based pilot modelling is shown in Figure 107. 
Note that because the design of this pilot model was entirely novel, it was 
decided to implement it in a single axis for this initial evaluation exercise.  
The roll axis was selected for this purpose due to the relative simplicity of 
its dynamics; the roll axis response of a fixed-wing aircraft can be 
approximated to a 1
st
 order system [15].  The implications of this on the 
design of the pilot model are discussed in this Section. 
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Figure 107.  System overview of perfect 
control prediction method of tau-based pilot 
modelling. 
The manoeuvre planning phase of the system shown in Figure 107 was 
largely similar to that described in Section 7.2.1.  The difference occurred 
when mapping the desired motion gap to the normalised trajectories 
generated by the constant acceleration tau guide.  Rather than using the 
angular displacement signal as was the case in Figure 101, this method 
used the angular rate command generated by the tau guide (Figure 100c).  
The reason for this was that the unaugmented (SCAS disabled) aircraft had 
a rate response type in the roll axis, and it was thus necessary for the 
generated command to be in terms of roll rate. 
The manoeuvre execution phase for this method of pilot modelling differed 
from that defined in Section 7.2.1. The primary difference was the removal 
of the feedback loop between the aircraft response and the control input, on 
the basis that this was not required as the generated control input would be 
“right first time”.  As such, this pilot model can be described as an open-
loop system, with no feedback between the response and the control input.  
In reality, a human pilot would be expected to perform a small corrective 
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control action following completion of the initial manoeuvre to stabilise the 
aircraft [52].  However, assuming an exact knowledge of the aircraft 
dynamics and ideal atmospheric conditions (nil wind), it should be possible 
to perform the manoeuvre using only the initial control input.  The 
accuracy of this assertion is discussed in Section 7.4.2.  For the purposes of 
this investigation, the control input was generated through the use of the 
inverse aircraft dynamics block shown in Figure 107, which converted 
desired roll rate to required lateral stick input.  In this case, the inverse 
aircraft dynamics were derived from the roll mode approximation.  Ref. 15 
defines a reduced-order model of the lateral dynamics of a fixed wing 















] Equation 32 
 Assuming aircraft wind axes and zero rudder input: 
           
   ̇          Equation 33 
Rearranging for   gives: 
  
 ̇     
  
 Equation 34 
Equation 34 gives an expression for required aileron deflection,  , as a 
function of desired roll acceleration / rate ( ̇ /  ), and the two aerodynamic 
derivatives    and   .     is the roll damping derivative, and    is the aileron 
effectiveness; and it was possible to obtain approximate values of each for 
a range of flight conditions through linear analysis of the aircraft model.  
Specifically, the non-linear model was trimmed at a range of airspeed 
conditions and then linearised to give a number of reduced-order linear 
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aircraft models.  The variation of the two lateral aerodynamic derivatives 
with airspeed is shown in Figure 108. 
 
Figure 108.  Variation of lateral aerodynamic 
derivatives with indicated airspeed. 
Figure 108a shows that the roll damping term    increased in amplitude 
with indicated airspeed.  Note that the sign convention for    is such that 
negative values indicate roll moments opposing to the roll rate. For this 
reason, the increasingly negative values in Figure 108a demonstrate that 
the roll response of the aircraft became more highly damped with airspeed.  
This result is to be expected, as the aircraft features a dihedral wing 
configuration that generates a component of lift acting towards the c.g., 
introducing an increasingly stabilising roll moment with airspeed.  The 
aileron effectiveness,   , was also shown to increase with airspeed (Figure 
108b), which can be attributed to the greater aerodynamic forces generated 
by the control surfaces at higher airspeeds.  Due to the range of variation of 
these two parameters, it was deemed necessary to compensate for airspeed 
in the design of the pilot model.  Thus, the values of    and    used in 
Equation 34 to generate the tau-based control input were varied as a 
function of airspeed in the block diagram implementation.  This block 
diagram implementation is shown in Figure 109. 
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Figure 109.  Block diagram (CSGE) 
implementation of perfect control prediction 
pilot model. 
Figure 109 shows that the pilot model generated a lateral stick input 
command as a function of values of   and  ̇ required to achieve the tau-
based trajectory shown in Figure 100.  Note that due to time constraints, 
this method of tau-based pilot modelling was intended only as a 
demonstration of the concept, and as such did not feature the additional 
functionality of the error minimisation method pilot model.  This, 
combined with the removal of the requirement for a SCAS, accounts for 
the relative simplicity of this pilot model compared with the alternative 
method described in Section 7.2.1. 
7.3. Test Manoeuvres 
Details of the test aircraft and experimental set up for the evaluation 
exercise are given in Section 3.3.  This Section describes the piloting task 
used for the evaluation of the tau-based pilot model.  The visual 
environment used for the real-time simulation consisted of a photographic 
scenery database of the United Kingdom, including detailed models of a 
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number of large airfields [70].  One such airfield, RAF Valley [58] was 
selected as the test area for this investigation (Figure 110). 
 
Figure 110.  Graphical representation of 
RAF Valley airfield [70]. 
This airfield was selected for the following reasons: 
 This airfield features a relatively long and wide runway (7500ft), 
minimising the task difficulty associated with the landing phase of 
flight. 
 The surrounding terrain is largely flat, with no significant areas of 
high ground to obstruct the test course.  This enabled the aircraft to 
fly a simple circuit without the need for terrain avoidance 
manoeuvres. 
 The surrounding terrain featured a number of landmarks such as 
rivers, beaches, main roads and bridges which facilitated visual 
verification of the aircraft’s position during real-time simulation. 
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In accordance with the objectives defined in Section 7.1.2, the pilot model 
was configured to fly a standard circuit of the test airfield.  An overview of 
this circuit is shown in Figure 111. 
 
Figure 111.  Circuit pattern for pilot model 
evaluation exercise. 
The circuit pattern shown in Figure 111 represents a typical “rectangular” 
orbit of an airfield [5], and is a typical mission for the type of aircraft used 
for this evaluation exercise.  The circuit consisted of the following 
elements: 
 A short phase of straight and level flight on runway heading.  This 
was used in place of the takeoff run that would be present for a 
real-life circuit. 
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 A climb on runway heading towards the first waypoint (A).  The 
rate of climb was determined by the aircraft type, in this case an 
average of approximately 300 ft/min. 
 A 90° turn onto the crosswind leg of the circuit (AB).  Note that 
although this naming convention for the legs of the circuit reflects 
the nominal wind direction (based on an into-wind takeoff), the 
wind speed was set to zero for this evaluation exercise.  Depending 
on the layout of the circuit, it is common for the aircraft to be 
climbing during this turn [5]. 
 A short phase of straight and level flight following completion of 
the climb to desired circuit altitude (B).  Again, this parameter 
depends on the location and geography of the airfield, and was set 
to a nominal value of 700ft AGL for this exercise. 
 A level (i.e. with no height change) 90° turn onto the downwind leg 
of the circuit (BC), consisting of straight and level flight parallel to 
the runway (C). 
 A further 90° turn onto base leg (CD), upon completion of which 
the aircraft would typically begin to descend. 
 The descending turn onto final approach (DE), followed by a 
steady descent towards the runway at an angle of approximately 3° 
(E).  Flaps are typically deployed in this phase to allow a lower 
approach speed. 
 Finally, the pilot would be expected to flare the aircraft in order to 
reduce its vertical velocity to an appropriate value for touchdown. 
For the purposes of this evaluation exercise, the circuit was 
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considered to have ended upon main gear touchdown (i.e. the 
ground roll was omitted). 
In summary, this flight task required the pilot model to guide the aircraft 
through a straight climb, a climbing turn, a level turn, a descending turn, a 
straight descent and a flare manoeuvre.  This was deemed to be a suitably 
representative sample of manoeuvres to demonstrate the generic nature of 
the tau-based guidance model. 
7.4. Results 
This Section presents results of the evaluation exercise undertaken for each 
of the tau-based pilot models. 
7.4.1. Error Minimisation Model 
In order to satisfy the requirement defined in Section 7.1.2., the error 
minimisation pilot model performed a standard circuit of the airfield 
described in Section 7.3.2.  This was achieved by defining a series of 
waypoints to represent the four turning points of the circuit, and a final 
waypoint to indicate the desired touchdown point.  A plan view of the 
lateral and longitudinal position of the aircraft during this test manoeuvre is 
shown in Figure 112. 
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Figure 112.  Plan view of tau-guided circuit. 
Figure 112 shows that the aircraft completed a roughly rectangular circuit, 
departing from (0,0) and proceeding in a clockwise direction.  At each of 
the waypoints the pilot model initiated a turn, and levelled out once the 
heading error to the next waypoint fell below a threshold value (5°).  
Shortly before performing the turn CD, Figure 112 shows that the aircraft 
performed a small amplitude turn in the opposite direction.  This was due 
to the cumulative effect of a small initial heading error upon 
commencement of the downwind leg, resulting in a lateral displacement 
from the next waypoint.  The presence of this corrective turn demonstrates 
the robust nature of this pilot model; it was able to detect an unacceptably 
large deviation from its intended course and to take corrective action. 
The roll angle time-history of the aircraft during the (constant altitude) turn 
CD is shown in Figure 113. 
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Figure 113.  Aircraft response to (error 
minimisation method) turn command. 
Figure 113 shows that, upon approaching the waypoint, the aircraft 
initiated a turn by rolling to a constant bank angle.  Note that the large 
amplitude pulse in roll angle command which occurred at 15 sec was an 
artefact of the change in navmode from one value to another.  As the pulse 
was of insignificant duration (<0.1sec), it did not have a significant effect 
on the trajectory of the aircraft.  The shape of the roll angle trace 
corresponds closely to that defined by the constant acceleration tau guide 
shown in Figure 100b.  The duration and amplitude of the roll angle 
response were closely correlated to the command signal, demonstrating 
that the tau-based trajectory was appropriate for this manoeuvre.  The 
response was shown to lag the command by approximately 0.5 seconds, a 
feature that can be attributed to the limited roll acceleration capability of 
the SCAS-augmented aircraft model.  Once the heading to the next 
waypoint passed below the threshold value, the pilot model generated the 
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tau-based roll out command.  Specifically, the gap size was set to the 
current roll angle, and the manoeuvre duration scaled accordingly based on 
the nominal roll rate of the aircraft.  Thus, it was possible for the pilot 
model to command the aircraft to roll out from any given initial roll angle; 
and such a capability was a further demonstration of the adaptability of this 
approach to pilot modelling.  
In order to evaluate the performance of this tau-based pilot model in the 
vertical axis, an example of a small amplitude (200ft) height change 
manoeuvre is shown in Figure 114. 
 
Figure 114.  Example of a small amplitude 
height change manoeuvre commanded by the 
error minimisation pilot model. 
Note that the manoeuvre shown in Figure 114 represents a simplified case 
compared to that used as a part of the circuit task in terms of both 
amplitude and duration.  The results show that the pilot model commanded 
the aircraft to climb gradually away from the initial height of 500ft, 
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achieving a steady climb rate after approximately 15 seconds.  Figure 114 
shows that the maximum rate of change of height occurred at the midpoint 
of the manoeuvre (time = 64 seconds).  This demonstrates adherence to the 
constant acceleration tau guide, k=0.5 strategy, as the peak value of 
corresponding normalised gap closure rate (Figure 100c) occurs exactly 
half way through the manoeuvre (normalised time = 0.5).  As was the case 
for the roll manoeuvre shown in Figure 113, the aircraft response lagged 
the command by a relatively small, constant value; in this case 
approximately 1.5 seconds.  This value was greater than that experienced 
for the roll axis response; a fact that can be attributed to the slower aircraft 
dynamics in the vertical axis [15].  It should be noted, however, that the 
error in height between command and response at the end of the climb was 
negligible, represented by the superposition of the two lines in Figure 114.  
This demonstrates an advantage of a closed-loop system design, as the 
control input applied was generated as a function of the error between 
command and response at a given time.  As such, the reference trajectory 
generated by the pilot model was tracked by the SCAS, resulting in an 
accurate height change manoeuvre. 
Having validated the vertical-axis behaviour of the pilot model for a simple 
case, the height change was integrated into the circuit task described in 
Section 7.3.2.  The height command and aircraft response for the climb 
phase of the circuit are shown in Figure 115. 
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Figure 115.  Height change manoeuvre 
commanded by the error minimisation pilot 
model during the climb out phase of the 
circuit task. 
The overall trend observed for the small amplitude height change 
manoeuvre was also present for the 700ft climb manoeuvre shown in 
Figure 115.  However, Figure 115 shows that the aircraft response deviated 
from the command of the pilot model on two occasions; firstly at 72 
seconds and then at 107 seconds.  Investigation into these deviations 
revealed that they coincided with the first two turns performed by the 
aircraft during the circuit task shown in Figure 112.  As the aircraft rolled 
to perform each turn, it was necessary for the pilot model to apply an aft 
longitudinal stick input in order to compensate for the associated loss of 
lift.  The height hold controller described in Section 7.2.1 did compensate 
for this, but did not respond quickly enough to prevent a slight loss of 
height (approximately 25ft); it could be the case that a more sophisticated 
height hold controller design (such as a PID controller) would have 
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reduced this height loss.  However, the fact that the current controller 
compensated sufficiently to allow the aircraft to regain the commanded 
trajectory following completion of the turn suggests that it was sufficient 
for the purposes of this demonstration.  Thus, it was demonstrated that in 
addition to the small height change manoeuvre shown in Figure 114, this 
tau-based pilot model was able to provide appropriate guidance for a height 
change manoeuvre representative of the climb phase of the circuit task. 
Having passed through the four waypoints constituting the corners of the 
rectangular circuit, the pilot model instructed the aircraft to descend 
towards a fifth waypoint.  This waypoint was positioned on the touchdown 
marker of the runway (at ground level), and as such was identified by the 
pilot model as a landing target.  At this point the aircraft decelerated to 
70kts and to deployed 30° of flaps whilst maintaining a 3° approach angle.  
Once    reached the threshold value of 4 seconds, the flare initiation signal 
(Figure 105) became active and caused the aircraft to begin a vertical 
deceleration manoeuvre.  The resultant trajectory and tau parameters are 
shown in Figure 116. 
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Figure 116.  Aircraft trajectory and tau 
parameters during the flare manoeuvre as 
commanded by the pilot model. 
The trajectory time-history shown in Figure 116a and Figure 116b 
demonstrates that the aircraft maintained a constant rate of descent prior to 
the flare initiation point at      seconds.  From this point onwards, the 
pilot model commanded a nose up command in order to reduce the value 
of  ̇  to the target value of 0.5.  Figure 116d shows that this was achieved 
approximately 1 second after flare initiation, albeit with an overshoot of 
0.1.  This led to the aircraft experiencing a marginally more aggressive 
vertical deceleration than would have been the case for  ̇  = 0.5.  The value 
of the proportional gain used to convert the  ̇  error signal into a 
longitudinal stick command was varied in an attempt to more accurately 
achieve the commanded value of  ̇  = 0.5.  However, it was found that the 
value of  ̇  achieved was extremely sensitive to the vertical deceleration of 
the aircraft,  ̈.  As such, it was not practical to more accurately achieve  ̇  
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= 0.5 during the flare using a simple proportional gain, although it may be 
the case that a more sophisticated controller type would reduce the  ̇  
overshoot.  However, it was deemed that the performance was sufficient 
for the purposes of this demonstration of concept, especially given the 
small amplitude of the overshoot and the resultant value of vertical velocity 
at touchdown,     .  Figure 116d also shows that the value of  ̇  increased 
towards unity in the final 1.25 seconds before touchdown.  This result 
suggests that the aircraft was not capable of sustaining the level of vertical 
deceleration necessary to follow the command of the pilot model in the 
final moments of the manoeuvre.  An explanation for this was that the 
throttle was set to idle throughout the flare, resulting in a reduction of 
forward airspeed and a tendency for the aircraft to settle onto the runway.  
Such a result is also consistent with the type 2 flare strategy discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, although the distinction between the deceleration and 
touchdown phases was less pronounced; i.e. the value of  ̇  did not return 
to a value of approximately 1 before touchdown was achieved.  This can be 
attributed to the difference between the pilot intentionally reducing the 
amplitude of the aft longitudinal stick input to force the aircraft to touch 
down and the aircraft settling due to reduction of forward airspeed. 
Note that, although Chapter 2 did not establish any existing performance 
criteria for the light aircraft flare task in terms of     , the value shown in 
Figure 116b was well within the desired performance criterion (3ft/sec) 
used for large transport aircraft equivalent manoeuvre in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6.  Furthermore, the value of      achieved by the pilot model compared 
favourably to those achieved by a human pilot flying this aircraft; P3 from 
the flare initiation investigation (reported in Chapter 4) performed a 
number of landings in this aircraft during  the development phase of the 
aircraft model.  Specifically, the human pilot achieved a mean      of 
2.32ft/sec from 4 landings, compared with the value of 1.05ft/sec 
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demonstrated by the pilot model in Figure 116d.  Thus, it was 
demonstrated that this pilot model was able to successfully command the 
aircraft to flare through use of a constant  ̇  strategy. 
7.4.2. Perfect Control Prediction Method 
As an initial evaluation exercise, the pilot model was configured to 
command a unit change in roll angle with a manoeuvre duration of 1 
second.  The resultant command and response are shown in Figure 117. 
 
Figure 117.  Pilot model command and 
aircraft response to a unit roll angle change. 
Figure 117a demonstrates that the pilot model generated a single, smooth 
lateral stick input that continued for the duration of the manoeuvre.  In 
terms of the aircraft response, Figure 117b shows a strong similarity 
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between the commanded and achieved roll rate  .  This subsequently led to 
the close correlation between the commanded and achieved roll angle  
shown in Figure 117c, which gave a small final value error of 4%.  It 
should also be noted that the 0.5 second lag between command and 
response that was observed for the error minimisation pilot model (Figure 
113a) was not present in Figure 117c.  This supports the previously stated 
assertion that the response lag was due to the limited roll acceleration 
capability of the SCAS-augmented aircraft model.  Thus, it was 
demonstrated that this pilot model was able to provide appropriate 
guidance for roll angle changes of small amplitude and duration. 
The next stage in the evaluation process was to increase the manoeuvre 
duration and amplitude to establish whether the close correlation between 
command and response shown previously would still be present.  For this 
reason, the roll angle command was increased to 30° amplitude and 5 
seconds duration (Figure 118). 
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Figure 118.  Pilot model command and 
aircraft response to a 30°, 5 second roll angle 
change. 
Figure 118a shows that the lateral stick command was of a higher 
amplitude and duration than that for the unit roll angle change shown in 
Figure 117a.  This demonstrated that the pilot model had adapted the 
command in order to achieve the higher roll rate necessitated by the 30° 
command.  The roll rate time-history in Figure 118b shows that the aircraft 
response did not fully match the commanded value of  , with a difference 
in peak value of approximately 13%.  This accounted for the difference in 
final values of   observed in Figure 118c, which at 8.3% represented an 
increase over the 4% value observed for the unit roll angle change 
command.  In this way, it was demonstrated that the aircraft response was 
less true to the command generated by the pilot model for higher amplitude 
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and longer duration inputs.  There are a number of potential explanations 
for this: 
 The pilot model generated commands based on the assumption that 
the roll response of the aircraft is 1
st
 order, and in the form defined 
in Equation 33.  However, the aircraft used for the evaluation 
exercise was a nonlinear, six degrees-of-freedom model, which 
implies a higher order roll response.  As such, the true “ideal” 
lateral stick command may differ subtly from that generated by the 
pilot model. 
 The values of lateral aerodynamic derivatives    and    used were 
derived by linearising the aircraft model trimmed in straight and 
level flight.  However, it could be the case that the values of    and 
   vary with roll angle and roll rate, leading to a difference between 
the true ideal command and that generated by the pilot model. 
 The pilot model applied control in the roll axis only.  Although the 
aircraft was trimmed in level flight at the start of each manoeuvre, 
cross-coupled responses exist which could potentially perturb the 
aircraft in the pitch and yaw axes.  For example, large roll angles 
are likely to excite the spiral mode; and large aileron deflections the 
dutch roll mode.  Each of these would cause perturbations in the 
pitch and yaw axes respectively. 
In order to investigate the possibility that the lateral aerodynamic 
derivatives    and    are dependent on roll angle, the aircraft model was 
trimmed and linearised at a range of steady turn radii.  This enabled the 
values of    and    to be derived for a range of roll angles, as shown in 
Figure 119. 
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Figure 119.  Variation of lateral aerodynamic 
derivatives with indicated roll angle. 
The reduction in amplitude of     with increasing roll angle shown in 
Figure 119a demonstrates that the roll axis became less damped at large 
bank angles, with a reduction in    of approximately 33% between 0° and 
30°.  Additionally, the trend shows that the rate of reduction in    became 
more pronounced at higher roll angles, which offers an explanation for the 
larger final value error in roll angle for the 30° manoeuvre (Figure 117) 
than for the 1° manoeuvre (Figure 118).  In order to address this, it would 
be necessary to include roll angle as an extra dimension in the    lookup 
table shown in Figure 109.  However this was not deemed feasible within 
the timescales of the project, given the large number of flight condition 
combinations required to populate such a lookup table and the associated 
complexity of implementation.  As such, it was identified as a 
recommended improvement for a future design iteration of this pilot 
model.  Note that the aileron effectiveness    (Figure 119b) was found to 
vary by <1% across the range of roll angles tested, and can therefore be 
assumed to be independent of roll angle for the purposes of this 
investigation 
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The pitch and yaw responses were recorded in order to analyse the off-axis 
response of the aircraft during the 30°, 5 second roll manoeuvre.  This is 
shown in Figure 120. 
 
Figure 120.  Pitch and yaw axis response 
during 30°, 5 second roll manoeuvre. 
The pitch rate time-history (Figure 120a) demonstrates that the aircraft did 
indeed exhibit an off-axis response, with a maximum pitch rate   of 1.2 
deg/sec.  Furthermore, this pitch-due-to-roll response continued throughout 
the duration of the manoeuvre, resulting in a steadily increasing nose-down 
pitch angle (Figure 120c).  Such a response is consistent with the excitation 
of the spiral stability mode, supporting the previously stated assertion.  
Similarly, Figure 120b and Figure 120d show that the roll command 
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caused a perturbation in the yaw axis, invalidating the wind axes 
assumption made in the derivation of Equation 33. 
Based on these findings, the test manoeuvre was repeated with the off-axis 
states disabled, so that the aircraft was free to move in the roll axis only.  
The results of this manoeuvre are shown in Figure 121. 
 
Figure 121.  Pilot model command and 
aircraft response to a 30°, 5 second roll angle 
change for both full and reduced aircraft 
models. 
Figure 121b shows that the removal of the off-axis degrees-of-freedom 
significantly reduced the difference between the commanded and achieved 
roll rate; the error in peak values of   was reduced from 11.1% to 5.4%.  
This gave a subsequent reduction in final   value error of 3.3% (Figure 
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121c), compared to the 8.3% achieved by the full degree of freedom 
model.  These findings support the previously stated assertion that the 
difference between the commanded and achieved trajectory was largely 
due to the off-axis response of the aircraft model.  It is therefore 
recommended that future iterations of the pilot model include a method of 
compensating for these effects; for example by estimating the amplitude of 
the pitch due to roll cross-couple and applying an appropriate 
compensatory longitudinal stick command.  It should also be noted that, in 
its current form, the pilot model executes the roll manoeuvre simply by 
applying a lateral stick input, whereas the technique used by pilots is 
somewhat more sophisticated.  Specifically, pilots apply rudder inputs in 
order to align the yaw angle of the aircraft to its overall velocity vector, 
resulting in what is termed a “coordinated turn” [5].  Provision could be 
made for this in the pilot model either by computing an appropriate pedal 
input or by implementing a simple controller to command zero sideslip 
angle at all times.  Alternatively, a small (closed-loop) correction could be 
applied at the end of the manoeuvre using the method demonstrated by the 
error minimisation pilot model.  Such a method would be consistent with 
the findings of Ref. 52, which showed this to be the method employed by 
human pilots performing gap closure manoeuvres in vehicles with 
degraded handling qualities. 
Even without further model development, however, the results presented in 
this Chapter suggest that it is indeed possible to generate a “perfect” 
control input through use of a tau-based trajectory.  The roll axis was 
selected for this initial investigation as these dynamics were the most 
suitable for low-order approximation.  However, reduced-order 
approximations also exist for other axes [15], which could be used to 
extend this concept to other flight tasks.  With further development, it is 
entirely feasible that the additional functionality described in Section 7.2.2. 
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could be integrated into the perfect control prediction pilot model.  This 
would enable an extended piloting task, such as the circuit described in 
Section 7.3, to be undertaken by this pilot model.  
7.5. Conclusions & Recommendations 
This Chapter described the development and evaluation of two tau-based 
pilot models, which were implemented on a simulation model of a light 
aircraft.  The first of these fed a tau-generated reference trajectory into a 
conventional SCAS, in order to minimise the error between it and the 
resultant trajectory of the aircraft.  The second used an approximation of 
the inverse dynamics of the aircraft to predict the “perfect” control input 
required to achieve the tau-based trajectory.  The results of the evaluation 
exercise are summarised as follows: 
 The “error minimisation” pilot model was, when equipped with a 
simple set of logic commands, shown to be capable of flying a 
standard circuit of an airfield.  This included climbing from a near-
ground initial altitude to 700ft AGL, whilst simultaneously turning 
at the appropriate points to fly in a roughly rectangular path around 
the airfield.  Having turned onto the “base leg” of the circuit, the 
pilot model commanded the aircraft to descend before turning for 
the final approach to the runway.  This result supports the assertion 
made by Ref. 17 that this tau-based method of pilot modelling is 
appropriate for extension to manoeuvres other than rotary-wing 
lateral repositioning and landing.  Additionally, this supports the 
hypothesis defined in Section 7.1.2, which proposed that this 
method could be applied to a fixed-wing aircraft; the work detailed 
in this Chapter represents the first instance of such an 
implementation. 
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 Based on the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, the error minimisation 
pilot model initiated a flare using the constant  ̇  strategy upon 
reaching a threshold value of    (4 seconds).  Analysis of the 
trajectory and vertical velocity at touchdown,      showed this 
manoeuvre to be of satisfactory performance.  This further supports 
the findings of Chapters 4, 5, and 6, (in addition to the previous 
body of work described in Chapter 2), as to the appropriateness of 
the tau-based flare strategy. 
 Some limitations of the error minimisation pilot model were 
identified during the evaluation exercise.  Firstly, it was found that 
the aircraft tended to lose a small amount of height during turns.  
Secondly, the results showed that the aircraft did not fully conform 
to the constant  ̇  strategy in the final moments before touchdown.  
However, both of these limitations were identified as being related 
to the simple design of the SCAS, rather than with the pilot model 
itself. 
 The “perfect control prediction” pilot model was implemented in 
the roll axis of the aircraft model.  This axis was selected for the 
purposes of the evaluation exercise as its dynamics could be 
modelled as a 1
st
 order system, allowing for a relatively simple 
design.  The commands generated by this pilot model were shown 
to produce an aircraft response very closely related to the intended 
(tau-based) trajectory for short duration and small amplitude roll 
angle changes.  For example a 1 second, 1° roll angle change 
manoeuvre resulted in a final value error between command and 
response of 4%.  For longer duration / higher amplitude roll 
manoeuvres, the perfect control prediction pilot model still 
generated appropriate lateral stick commands, albeit with a 
marginally greater final value error (8.3% for a 5 second, 30° roll 
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angle).  It was found that the difference between command and 
response was partly due to the off-axis aircraft response 
invalidating the 1
st
 order roll mode approximation used to generate 
the command.  Reducing the degrees of freedom in the aircraft 
model to the roll axis only was shown to improve the correlation 
between command and response (3.3%).  It was also found that the 
lateral aerodynamic derivative    varied with roll angle, whereas it 
had been approximated as a constant value in the design of the pilot 
model.  This was identified as an additional source of inaccuracy 
between the true “ideal” control input and that generated by the 
pilot model.  Overall, however, the results supported the hypothesis 
that the method of inverting the aircraft dynamics to generate a tau-
based control input provides appropriate guidance for a roll 
manoeuvre.   
Recommendations for further investigation of the concepts discussed in 
this Chapter are summarised as follows: 
 In terms of final value error between command and aircraft 
response, the error minimisation pilot model was shown to provide 
superior performance.  This can be attributed to the closed-loop 
nature of its design; the control input was generated as a function of 
this error.  By contrast, the perfect control prediction pilot model 
featured an open-loop design, which led to the accumulation of 
errors in aircraft response over time.  This could potentially be 
addressed by the addition of a simple SCAS to apply corrective 
inputs following completion of the tau-based manoeuvre.  It is 
therefore recommended that any future design iteration should 
investigate the possibility of implementing such a system. 
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 The accuracy of the control input generated by the perfect control 
prediction model could be further improved by adding roll angle-
varying values of the aerodynamic derivative   .  This could be 
achieved by the addition of an extra dimension to the lookup table 
which schedules    with airspeed in the current design. 
 The perfect control prediction pilot model was implemented in the 
roll axis in order to provide an initial validation of the concept.  
Since the results demonstrated that this method was able to provide 
appropriate guidance, it is recommended that the model be 
extended to provide control in additional axes.  This would enable 
the model to be integrated with the additional functionality 
described in Section 7.2.2, enabling whole flight tasks to be 
undertaken (as was the case for the error minimisation pilot model). 
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C h a p t e r  8  
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
Chapters 4-7 each described an investigation into a particular aspect of the 
tau-based approach to pilot strategy analysis and modelling.  The 
conclusions from each of these investigations were considered individually 
in their respective Chapters; the purpose of this Chapter is to bring these 
together to draw overall conclusions with respect to the project objectives 
defined in Section 1.3. 
8.1. Conclusions of the Research 
8.1.1. Flare Initiation Investigation 
The first objective stated in Section 1.3 was “To investigate the strategy 
used by pilots of fixed-wing aircraft to determine when to initiate the 
landing flare manoeuvre”.  To this end, a piloted simulation experiment 
was undertaken using a simplified flare task.  Recent studies at the 
University of Liverpool (UoL) demonstrated the use of tau theory as an 
appropriate method of modelling pilot behaviour during visually guided 
flight.  For this reason, the primary hypothesis of this investigation was that 
pilots make use of a constant, critical value of “time-to-contact with 
runway”,   , to determine the point of flare initiation.  To this end, the 
value of    at flare initiation was recorded and compared to a number of 
previously proposed parameters.  Of the parameters analysed,    was 
shown to be the most consistent at flare initiation across a range of 
approach angles for the four pilots tested; a finding which supports the 
primary hypothesis.   
A secondary hypothesis of this investigation was that commanding flare 
initiation using the constant    strategy would lead to more successful 
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flares than one based on a constant value of height above runway, h, or 
runway side angle,    .  Analysis of vertical velocity at touchdown 
(    ) showed that the   -cued flares were consistently the most 
successful for all pilots tested, supporting this hypothesis.  It should be 
noted that this represents the first study that linked an investigation into the 
flare initiation point with the success of the subsequent manoeuvre.  The 
findings of this experiment also demonstrated the previously established 
high level of task difficulty associated with the landing flare, as the pilots 
were not consistently able to achieve desired performance. 
8.1.2. Pilot Aid Development 
The second project objective defined in Section 1.3 was to “To build on 
the findings of Ref. 3 to develop a tau-based pilot aid for the flare 
manoeuvre”.  In order to address this, a novel tau-based pilot aid was 
designed, implemented and tested as part of the work described in this 
Thesis.  The primary hypothesis for this investigation was that the type 2 
tau-based strategy identified by Ref. 3 could be used to provide appropriate 
guidance for the flare manoeuvre.  The results of a piloted evaluation 
exercise demonstrated that this pilot aid provided performance comparable 
to that of an in-service example, supporting the primary hypothesis.  
Additionally, a key limitation of the tau-based HUD previously tested by 
Ref. 3 was addressed in this study by emulating the symbology of an in-
service HUD.  This was shown to be successful, as all of the pilots 
awarded similar workload and controllability ratings to the novel and in-
service displays.  Indeed, two of the three pilots tested awarded level 1 
ratings to the tau-based HUD, corresponding to display controllability and 
workload that was “satisfactory without improvement”.  Recommendations 
for future design iterations were made in order to enable this concept to be 
developed further, as well as considerations for real-life implementation. 
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8.1.3. Flare Strategy Investigation 
The third objective of this project was defined in Section 1.3 as “To 
undertake an investigation into the variations in flare strategy reported but 
not further investigated by Ref. 3”.  Following the development of a novel 
pilot aid for the flare manoeuvre, an investigation was conducted to 
investigate a previously observed difference in flare strategy for different 
pilots.  Specifically, it had been observed that pilots used either a strategy 
in which the aircraft performed a continuous vertical deceleration until 
touchdown (type 1), or a strategy in which the vertical deceleration was 
completed before touchdown (type 2).  The primary hypothesis of this 
investigation was that type 2 flare strategy is a method pilots use to 
compensate for the fact that they cannot directly observe the gap being 
closed (between the main gear and the runway surface).  On this basis, it 
was hypothesised that providing pilots with visual information to enable 
them to directly observe the gap closure would enable them to make use of 
the type 1 strategy.  It was further hypothesised that the provision of this 
visual information would improve performance in terms of vertical 
velocity at touchdown, and that this improvement in performance would be 
sustained once the supplementary visual information was removed.    
Two methods were tested; firstly “FlareCam”, a simulated video feed 
showing a view looking forward from aft of the main gear; secondly the 
“Direct Gap Display (DGD) HUD”, a set of HUD symbology representing 
the main gear and the runway.  When provided with a FlareCam, the 
number of instances of type 1 flares increased compared to the baseline 
task, a result which supported the primary hypothesis.  A similar increase 
in the occurrence of type 1 flares was achieved through the use of the DGD 
HUD.  Additionally, the introduction of FlareCam was shown to be 
effective reducing the occurrence of hard landings, and this improvement 
in flare performance was sustained when the display was disabled in the 
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final assessment task.  This was also observed to a lesser extent for the 
DGD HUD.  Overall, therefore, the results supported both the primary and 
secondary hypotheses. 
8.1.4. Pilot Model Development 
The final project objective defined in Section 1.3 was “To develop tau-
based pilot modelling methods for fixed-wing aircraft”.  Chapter 7 
described the development and evaluation of two such pilot models; one 
based on the design philosophy of the controller described in Ref. 23 
(“error minimisation method”), and another based on an entirely novel 
design (“perfect control prediction method”).  The former was shown to 
provide appropriate guidance for a typical range of manoeuvres for a light 
fixed-wing training aircraft, and the latter was shown to provide 
appropriate guidance for the single manoeuvre tested.  The relative merits 
of each design approach were also discussed, and it was concluded that the 
error minimisation model provided more accurate trajectory following due 
to its closed-loop design.  However, the perfect control prediction method 
was shown to feature a much simpler architecture, and also to provide an 
aircraft response with a reduced lag compared to the error minimisation 
model.  Overall, the findings of this investigation supported those of Ref. 
17, which concluded that tau-based control would be appropriate for a 
range of flight tasks.  Additionally, a number of recommendations were 
made for further refinement of both pilot models in future design iterations. 
8.2. Recommendations for Further Work 
During the course of the experimental work conducted as part of this 
Thesis, a number of recommendations arose for extension or expansion of 
the work.  Full lists of recommendations can be found in each of the 
Chapters 4-7, the most significant of which are summarised in this Section. 
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8.2.1. Flare Initiation 
The recommendations for further work arising from the flare initiation 
investigation described in Chapter 4 are summarised as follows: 
 Pilots of varying levels of experience were used for the flight trials, 
and some differences in performance and strategy implementation 
were evident.  However, it would be necessary to test additional 
pilots with a broader range of experience levels to form any firm 
conclusions on the effects of experience on flare initiation strategy.  
It may also be of interest to test non-pilots, to enable a direct 
comparison with the results of those previous studies (identified in 
Section 2.4) that did not use professional pilots. 
 For reasons of simplicity, the piloting task was limited to the 
longitudinal and vertical axes.  However, an extension of this 
experiment could feature control in the lateral axis, which would 
enable the robustness of the tau-based flare initiation strategy to be 
further tested; for example in the presence of crosswinds or other 
atmospheric disturbances. 
 The aircraft simulation model used for this investigation was the 
Generic Large Transport Aircraft (GLTA), which was based upon 
the characteristics of the Boeing 707.  This was used as the 
Technical Review concluded that the majority of fatal airliner 
accidents occur in aircraft of this type.  However, an additional test 
of the robustness of the tau-based flare initiation strategy would be 
to repeat this experiment with various types of smaller and larger 
aircraft types. 
 Similarly, the tests used a single runway of dimensions 
representative of a large civilian airfield.  Two of the previously 
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proposed flare initiation cues,     and  ̇   were shown to be 
defined as functions of the runway geometry.  Ref. 8 suggested that 
pilots attempting to execute a    -based flare initiation strategy 
(learned at their home airfield) at an unfamiliar airfield with 
different runway geometry is a potential cause of accidents.  This 
could be investigated by repeating the experiment described in 
Chapter 4 with a variety of runway geometries.  If    is truly 
runway-independent, then a   -based flare initiation strategy would 
be valid for any runway (or indeed any surface).  Such a finding 
would further support the appropriateness of the tau parameter for 
use in this area of flight. 
8.2.2. Pilot Aid Development 
A number of recommendations resulted from the development and 
evaluation of a novel tau-based pilot described in Chapter 5.  These are 
summarised as follows: 
 Although the TDE HUD was able to provide adequate 
performance, there is scope for improvement of the design.  In 
particular the pilots reported that the simple text-based flare 
anticipation cue “STANDBY” was not as intuitive as the moving 
anticipation symbol on the in-service example HUD.  For this 
reason, a future iteration of the TDE HUD should feature a more 
dynamic anticipation cue, such as that of the in-service example 
HUD. 
 As was the case in Chapter 4, this investigation only considered 
longitudinal and vertical control for the piloting task.  
Appropriate lateral dynamics would need to be added to the TDE 
HUD in order to move the concept closer to real-world 
implementation. 
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 A secondary objective of the HUD development exercise was to 
compare the relative performances of the TDE HUD and the tau-
based HUD previously developed by Ref. 3.  Although a basic 
comparison was undertaken using the results reported in Ref. 3, it 
would be necessary to modify the task definition to match that 
used in Ref. 3 to allow a direct comparison. 
 A number of assumptions were made for the implementation of 
the TDE HUD onto the GLTA model.  For example, the data 
sources for the HUD algorithm were based on “truth data”, i.e. 
without modelling the behaviour of the sensor (i.e. signal noise / 
bias) that would be required for implementation on the real 
aircraft.  For this reason, it would be beneficial to investigate the 
feasibility of implementing the TDE HUD onto a real aircraft.  
An appropriate intermediate objective would be to add 
representative sensor dynamics to the existing simulation model. 
8.2.3. Flare Strategy Investigation 
The recommendations arising from the flare strategy investigation (Chapter 
6) are summarised below: 
 Although the introduction of additional visual cues led to an 
increase in the number of type 1 flares, a number of type 2 flares 
were still observed.  An explanation for this could be that although 
sufficient visual cues were available, the task of controlling the 
aircraft dynamics was prohibitively difficult for the novice pilots 
tested.  A similar result was reported in Ref. 52, in which it was 
found that degrading the vehicle handling qualities reduced the 
pilots’ ability to implement a tau-based control strategy.  It is 
therefore proposed that this could be further tested by varying the 
handling qualities of the aircraft used for the flight tests. 
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 Novice pilots were selected for this study based on the reasons 
outlined in Section 6.2.1.  However, during the display 
development phase, three professional pilots indicated that both 
FlareCam and the DGD HUD were useful when performing the 
flare manoeuvre.  It is therefore proposed that these two displays 
could be useful not just as teaching aids, but as an additional pilot 
aid for the flare manoeuvre.  For this reason, it is recommended 
that a display evaluation exercise similar to that described in 
Chapter 4 be undertaken for FlareCam and the DGD HUD. 
 During the display development phase, the pilots asserted that the 
FlareCam view would be useful when performing crosswind 
landings, due to the fact that it enabled the pilots to observe the 
lateral position of the main gear.  With the addition of relevant 
symbology, the DGD HUD could also be adapted for this purpose.  
In order to evaluate the suitability of the displays for this task, the 
experiment could be modified by the introduction of lateral aircraft 
model dynamics and a range of crosswind conditions. 
8.2.4. Pilot Model Development 
Chapter 7 described the development of two tau-based pilot models.  The 
recommendations arising from this investigation are summarised as 
follows: 
 The error minimisation pilot model was shown to provide 
appropriate guidance for a number of manoeuvres.  The 
architecture of the model was configured in such a way as to effect 
control the lateral and vertical axes separately, which does not 
necessarily give appropriate control inputs for manoeuvres 
involving both axes.  In order to address this, the coupled aircraft 
dynamics should be considered in any future iteration of this pilot 
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model design.  This could take the form of anticipatory longitudinal 
control inputs to control height more accurately during turns. 
 Due to time constraints, the second pilot model was only 
implemented in the roll axis, and without the additional 
functionality of the error minimisation model.  As the evaluation 
exercise demonstrated the validity of this concept, it is 
recommended that it is suitable for extension to other axes and 
manoeuvres. 
8.3. Concluding Remarks 
The title of this Thesis made reference to the current and future roles of 
optical tau theory in fixed-wing flight.  Through the investigation of 
piloting strategy, this study has shown the current role of tau theory to be 
as an appropriate, succinct method of describing pilot behaviour for the 
flare manoeuvre.  This finding was further supported by the results of the 
pilot aid evaluation exercise, which demonstrated that providing pilots with 
tau-based guidance facilitated execution of the flare in the absence of 
normal visual cues.  By increasing the level of understanding of piloting 
strategy for the flare manoeuvre, tau theory offers a basis for the eventual 
improvement of safety in this phase of flight. 
In terms of the future roles of tau theory in fixed-wing operations, it has 
been shown to be an appropriate substitute for a human pilot when 
provided with the relevant system architecture.  Such a role is likely to 
become increasingly significant given the growing numbers of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) being used for both military and civilian 
applications;  the United States Air Force (USAF) increased the size of its 
UAV fleet by 330% in the years 2008-2010 [79].  In order to maintain 
manageable levels of operator workload, these UAVs must necessarily 
become more autonomous, something for which tau-based guidance could 
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provide a suitable framework.  For example, the error minimisation pilot 
model described in Chapter 7 features no fundamental engineering 
infeasibilities, and follow could be implemented on a (appropriately 
instrumented) real aircraft following further refinement.  This could then 
be used to perform typical UAV-type missions.  Another recent trend in 
UAV design is the emulation of animal flight mechanics, for example very 
small vehicles with flapping wings [79].  Since tau theory can provide 
guidance which is both computationally simple and representative of 
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Airbus A320 EU 180 5 598 NB 
Airbus A310 EU 279 5 577 WB 
Airbus A300 EU 361 4 462 WB 
Airbus A330 EU 440 3 332 WB 
Antonov AN 24/26/28 UA 44 34 729 RA 
Antonov AN 12 UA 90 22 160 RA 
Antonov AN 32 UA 50 10 138 RA 
Antonov AN 140 UA 52 2 76 RA 
ATR ATR EU 74 9 177 RA 
Avro RJ100 GB 20 2 99 CA 
BAC 1-11  GB 89 1 71 RA 
BAC-
Aerospatiale 
Concorde EU 128 1 109 SST 
BAE 3102 GB 19 3 51 CA 
BAE 146 GB 100 3 48 NB 
BAE 748 GB 58 3 37 RA 
BAE ATP GB 64 1 35 RA 
Beechcraft 1900 US 19 21 123 CA 
Boeing 737 US 215 32 2108 NB 
Boeing 727 US 189 7 385 NB 
Boeing 707 US 202 4 43 NB 
Boeing 757 US 289 1 2 NB 
Boeing 747 US 524 7 323 WB 
Boeing 767 US 375 2 346 WB 
Canadair CL600 CA 19 9 117 CA 
de Havilland 
Canada 
DHC-6 CA 20 26 223 CA 
de Havilland DHC-8 CA 78 1 49 RA 
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Canada 
Dornier Do 228 DE 33 3 38 RA 
Dornier Do 328 DE 34 1 4 RA 
Douglas DC-3 US 32 8 57 RA 
Embraer 110/120 BR 37 15 142 RA 
Fairchild FH-227E US 56 2 31 RA 
Fairchild 
Swearingen 
Metroliner US 19 11 57 CA 
Fokker F27 
Friendship 
ND 56 11 145 RA 
Fokker 50 ND 58 3 65 RA 
Fokker F28 
Fellowship 
ND 85 1 46 RA 
Grumman G73T US 17 1 20 CA 
Gulfstream G1159 US 19 3 24 CA 
Harbin Yunshuji Y-12 CN 17 1 28 CA 
Ilyushin 18V RU 120 1 27 NB 
Ilyushin 62M RU 186 1 16 NB 
Ilyushin Il-76/86 RU 350 14 109 WB 
Let L410/420 CZ 19 26 207 CA 





US 172 10 818 NB 
Macdonald 
Douglas 
MD 10/11 US 380 9 493 WB 
Saab 340 SE 36 2 23 RA 
Shorts 330/360 GB 39 6 79 RA 
Sud Aviation Caravelle FR 140 1 3 NB 
Tupolev Tu-154 RU 180 13 983 NB 
Tupolev Tu-134 RU 84 2 50 RA 
Xian Yunshuji Y-7/8 CN 52 4 90 RA 
Yakovlev Yak-40/42 RU 32 7 201 RA 
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Key to notation 
 
Nationalities: 
BR – Brazil 
CA – Canada 
CN – China 
CZ – Czech Republic 
DE – Germany 
EU – European Union 
FR – France 
GB – United Kingdom 
ND – Netherlands 
RU – Russia 
SE – Sweden 
UA – Ukraine 
US – United States of America 
 
Aircraft Types: 
CA – Commuter Airliner 
NB – Narrow-body Jet Airliner 
RA – Regional Airliner 
SST – Supersonic Transport 
WB – Wide-body Airliner 
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Pilot Briefing Documents 
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MARCH 2010 TRIAL 
 
Objective:  To investigate the piloting strategies associated with initiation 
of the flare manoeuvre. 
Task 1:   
 The pilot will fly a series of approach and landing manoeuvres, from the 
start conditions shown in Table 1.  
 The aircraft to be used for the test is the Generic Large Transport 
Aircraft, which has been modified to enable approach angles of up to 5
0
.   
 The aircraft will be trimmed at a range of 2nm from the airfield in all 
cases (Figure 1). 
 A simple ILS has been implemented to allow the pilot to maintain the 
correct approach angle by use of a glideslope deviation indicator (note 
that the pilot will not be required to capture the glideslope initially as 
the aircraft will be trimmed at the appropriate angle at the start of each 
run).   
 During the approach, the aircraft should decelerate to the desired 
touchdown velocity - spoilers can be extended by pulling up on the 
collective lever.  An airspeed indicator is provided on the Head Down 
Display (HDD). 
 Finally, the pilot will perform a flare manoeuvre.  The test will end 
when the aircraft has successfully touched down on the runway. 
 The runway elevation is 242ft ASL. 
Task 2: 
 As per Test 1, except the pilot will initiate the flare manoeuvre when 
instructed by the Head Up Display (HUD). 
 The instruction will take the form of the word “FLARE” displayed in 
the centre window (Figure 2). 
 Note that the timing of the initiation cue shall be varied on different 
runs. 
Limitations: 
 The aircraft will be limited to freedom in the longitudinal axis only.  
Hence, lateral stick or pedal inputs will have no effect on the motion of 
the aircraft. 
 In order to enable the aircraft to be trimmed in steep approach 
conditions, the drag characteristics of the fuselage and undercarriage 
have been modified.  This may result in higher than expected power 
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2 145 140 
3 145 140 
4 145 140 
5 157.5 140 
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AUGUST 2010 TRIAL 
 
1. Objective:  To perform an evaluation of a number of displays designed 
to aid the pilot during the flare manoeuvre. 
 
2. Simulation Environment:  The tests will be conducted in the 
HELIFLIGHT Flight Simulator at the University of Liverpool.  This is a 6 
degree of freedom motion, single seat simulator with 4 visual channels (3 
OTW (Out The Window) + 1 Instrument). 
 
3. Aircraft:  The aircraft to be used for the trial is the Generic Large 
Transport Aircraft (GLTA), which is based on the dimensions of the 
Boeing 707.  For the purposes of this trial, the lateral axes (roll, yaw and 
sway) have been locked out, allowing the aircraft motion in the 
longitudinal axes only (pitch, heave and surge).  The aircraft model 
features a single throttle lever to collectively control the thrust of all 4 
engines and pilot-controllable spoilers. 
 
4. Task:  The task in each test flight is to perform the final stages of the 
approach and landing manoeuvre.  The start conditions are defined in 
Table .  From this position, the pilot will maintain the approach angle of 
3.5 degrees and initiate the flare manoeuvre either at his discretion or as 
instructed (depending on the enabled display).  Desired IAS at touchdown 
is the same as the initial value (140kts).  The test finishes once the main 
gear has come into contact with the runway.  The tests will be performed in 
both a good visual environment (GVE) and a degraded visual environment 
(DVE) equivalent to Cat IIIb RVR. 
 
5. Displays:  The display concepts to be tested are as follows: 
5.1. Primary Flight Display (PFD) –Figure 1.  The PFD is a Head Down 
Display (HDD) which provides standard flight information.  Of particular 
significance is the ILS Glideslope Indicator, which is set to display the 
required 3.5 degree glideslope.  Note that the PFD will be enabled for all 
tests. 
5.2. Visual Guidance System (VGS) – Figure 2.  The BAE VGS is an 
industry-standard Head Up Display (HUD) which provides both guidance 
and detailed flight information for the approach and landing phases of 
flight.  Guidance is provided by a flightpath angle command symbol 
(circle) and a flightpath angle indicator symbol (“bird” symbol).  A flare 
anticipation cue is provided by a cross moving up towards the flightpath 
guidance cue, into which it locks following interception.  The cue (now a 
circle containing a cross) should be followed until touchdown. 
5.3. Tau Dot Error (TDE) – Figure 3.  This HUD provides flightpath 
guidance and indication cues in the same format as VGS.  Flare 
anticipation cues are provided by the text alerts “STANDBY” (2 seconds 
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before flare initiation) and “FLARE” (at the point of flare initiation).  The 
guidance cue should be followed until touchdown. 
 
6. Performance Metrics:  The display controllability and pilot workload 
for each display design is to be evaluated using the rating scales in 
Appendix A.  Flight data is to be recorded for post-trial analysis. 
 
Table 1 - Initial Conditions 
7. Screenshots 
 
Figure 1 - PFD 
Parameter Initial Value 
IAS 140 kts 
Runway Height ASL 242 ft 
Pressure Altitude 613 ft 
Vertical Flightpath Angle -3.5 deg 
Gear Down 
Flap Angle 50 deg 
Range to Runway 1 nm 
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Figure 2 – VGS 
Figure 4 - TDE  
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APPENDIX C 
TDE HUD CSGE Implementation 
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APPENDIX D 
Pilot Rating Scales 
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